North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 253-254 ◽  

According to the press, the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its twelfth annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 13 to 15, 1961. It was reported that diplomatic soundings of the Soviet Union's intentions on Berlin would be undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom, Berwith the approval of thirteen other NATO partners and the acquiescence of France, The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, was reported to have expressed the view that the Soviet offensive on Berlin was aimed ultimately at the neutralization of Germany and the detachment of Germany and the Scandinavian counganization tries from the NATO alliance, and to have urged that the West strengthen its military forces.

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-657

Council It was reported in the press on July 20, 1956 that the west German government was preparing to bring its anxieties about United Kingdom and United States suggestions for a reduction in armed forces before the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council, but contrary to expectation, at the July 25 meeting of the Council no reference was made to the reduction of forces. The press did note on July 25 that the United States Secretary of State Dulles gave reassurances to the German ambassador that the United States contemplated no change from the existing number of troops at that time and was still in favor of a German contribution of twelve divisions to NATO. Press reports also noted that the west German government transmitted notes to the members of the Western European Union calling for a review of allied strategy and military planning in view of moves by the United States and United Kingdom to cut their armed forces.


1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-484 ◽  

The Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Paris early in May 1959 to consider the proposals of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom for presentation to the Soviet Union at the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers. According to the press, the proposals won a favorable reception from the Council. No formal action of approval was required, but agreement was reached on the principle of a permanent liaison between the western ministers and the Council during the Geneva conference, scheduled to begin on May 11.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-401

On December 7, 1950 it was reported that the Council of Deputies of the North Atlantic Pact Organization had resolved the difficulties standing in the way of the creation of integrated military forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by accepting a compromise proposal put forward by the United States representative (Charles M. Spofford). The essence of the plan was reported to be that the twelve treaty countries would proceed with the formation of integrated forces under a supreme command, including German combat teams recruited by German civilian authorities under the supervision of the Allied High Commissioners; in the meantime the French would call a conference to explore the possibilities of forming a European army into which German units would be merged. Despite indications from western Germany that the Federal Republic was dissatisfied with the limitation of 6,000 men per combat unit as compared with units of from 10,000 to 15,000 for the twelve members of NATO, the press reported that the compromise was agreed to by the Council of Deputies and by the Military Committee at a meeting on December 12 and 13, 1950.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-186

CouncilThe Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in regular ministerial session in Paris on December 17 and 18, 1954, under the chairmanship of Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece. One of the principal items considered by the Council was the annual review of the military position of NATO, which had been prepared by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR, Gruenther) and by the Military Committee at its meetings in Washington in November and in Paris immediately preceding the Council meeting. According to press reports, the review showed that defensive rearmament of NATO was virtually completed so far as conventional armaments were concerned. It was reported that SACEUR and the Military Committee recommended that only the air arm of NATO defenses be substantially augmented in 1955, and that even the increases recommended in this regard represented a realization in 1955 of the goals set for 1954 which had not been met. Ground forces in 1954 were said to have been reduced by the equivalent of two divisions by the reduction in periods of conscription in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, the failure of Norway to increase its conscription period and the transfer of French units to north Africa; a reported two percent increase in NATO naval forces was recommended for 1955. Total defense expenditures of European NATO members in 1954 were reported to have fallen 2.4 percent below the 1953 level; the eleven European members were reported to have spent $10,865 million in 1954 as compared with $11,133 million in 1953.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (4) ◽  
pp. 715-721

In July, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and other allies attributed a variety of malicious cyber activities, including the Microsoft Exchange hack, to China. This joint attribution builds on commitments made in June summits with NATO, the G7, the EU, and the United Kingdom, and is consistent with the Biden administration's multilateral approach to confronting cybersecurity threats and China more generally. Still, critics question whether the administration's efforts will succeed in altering the behavior of states that pose cybersecurity threats to the United States.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 362-369

The Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;Being parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949;Considering their reciprocal pledges under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty separately and jointly with the other parties, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack;


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document