Organization of American States

1967 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 210-220

The Organization of American States (OAS) Council met in Washington, D.C., in secret session on April 29, 1965, at the request of the United States to consider the crisis which had arisen in the Dominican Republic. This crisis had been brought about by the overthrow on April 25–26 of a three-man civilian junta which had ruled the Dominican Republic since 1963. Civil ar had almost immediately broken out between supporters of former President Juan Bosch, led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó and military units headed by Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin, who was one of the leaders of the coup which had overthrown Bosch in 1963.

1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome Slater

The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion is now almost universally considered to be “one of those rare politico-military events—a perfect failure.” One of the conclusions usually derived from that affair is the general inadvisability of direct United States intervention in the internal affairs of other nations to bring about desired changes in their domestic political structures. Almost simultaneously, however, the United States was doing just that in the Dominican Republic with a considerable degree of success, indicating that the lessons of the Cuban experience should not be overdrawn.


1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 360-361 ◽  

It was reported that during a meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) on February 8, 1960, a debate took place on the alleged violations of human rights perpetuated by the government of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina of the Dominican Republic. Dr. Falcon-Briceno, Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, who had brought the charge on instructions of his government, contended that a concern for human rights was a basic function of the inter-American system and called upon the Council to investigate the situation. He was challenged by the Dominican ambassador, Mr. Diaz Ordoñez, who insisted that the prevailing situation was a matter of exclusively domestic concern to his government and stressed the fact that non-intervention in internal affairs was a basic principle of the inter-American system. The delegates were urged to action by the delegate of Honduras, who expressed the view that the principle of non-intervention should not close the door to action deemed to be necessary for the preservation of human rights and liberties. After a threehour debate, the Council reportedly decided, by a vote of 20 to none, with 1 abstention (the Dominican Republic), to initiate an inquiry into the matter. To this end, five nations—Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Peru, and the United States—were appointed as a working group to consider whether and how the organization could conduct an investigation in the case.


1975 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Meek

Literature on U.S. influence in the Organization of American States reveals a marked diversity of views. Some authors consider that U.S. influence is absolute or very nearly so; others hold that it is relative; still others think it is minimal.In the nearly-absolute school, former Guatemalan President Arévalo (1961: 126) says that the United States “always wins” in the OAS. The Ecuadorian writer Benjamín Cardón (1965: 29) says that the OAS “receives orders and complies with them, with the appearance of discussion, and the appearance of votes that satisfy pro-forma the hypocritical quakerism of the masters.” This view might be summed up by a comment attributed to a Latin American delegate to one Inter-American Conference: “If the United States wanted to badly enough, it could have a resolution passed declaring two and two are five ” (New York Times, March 8, 1954).


1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 255-257 ◽  

The press announced that the Inter-American Economic and Social Council met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) from August 5 to 17, 1961. A draft act embodying the principles of the “Alliance for Progress” plan for the economic development of Latin America envisaged by the United States was put before the meeting by the delegates of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the United States, according to press reports. Mr. Douglas Dillon, United States Secretary of the Treasury, promised that his government would provide active assistance in the form of development loans running up to 50 years, but Mr. Dillon made it clear that the development scheme depended on the local programs for social and economic advancement. It was noted that aside from the United States offers, some European and odier countries had indicated that they would take part in development programs in the area.


1968 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 306-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Jeanne Reid Martz

Amid the aura of urgency in which many today view hemispheric affairs, criticisms of the Organization of American States are legion. In both Latin America and the United States, there are growing numbers who believe that the only viable alternative to complete systemic collapse is a radical organizational transformation. For critics of the inter-American organization, there has been a sharp predilection to place the burden of their argument on either a cataloguing of bureaucratic ills or a polemic attack upon the problems and inconsistencies of United States involvement. And certainly various North American actions and policies have helped contribute to the present precarious position of the OAS.


Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-20
Author(s):  
John Tessitore

Last November nearly two thousand conferees from the United States and twenty-six Caribbean nations gathered in that most Caribbean of all cities, Miami. The occasion was the annual conference on trade, investment, and development in the Caribbean Basin—die seventh such conference to date. This year, however, there was a difference. President Reagan had announced his Caribbean Basin Initiative in February of 1982 at a meeting of the Organization of American States; and on August 5, 1983, following often delicate negotiations with Congress and a score of governments, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act became law.


Author(s):  
Konstantin S. Strigunov ◽  
◽  
Andrei V. Manoilo ◽  

The aim of the article is to reveal the mechanism of the coup d'etat in Bolivia in November 2019. Based on the research of Russian and foreign experts, as well as official documents of international organizations, a research center, speeches by world leaders, and the media, the authors analyze the internal causes and external factors that contributed to the overthrow of Evo Morales and the coming to power of the right opposition, oriented to the United States and supranational structures. The methods for the research were selected based on the requirements of a multilateral and systematic analysis of the domestic political situation in Bolivia, its cultural, historical, territorial, and economic characteristics, as well as foreign policy factors that influenced the situation in the country. A comparative analysis of the coup d'etat in Bolivia with the situation in some other Latin American states was done. The first section analyzes the domestic political situation in Bolivia, economic factors, and a number of actions by Evo Morales which led to the weakening of his position on the eve of the presidential election. The second section discusses the mechanism of influence of the Organization of American States on the election process in Bolivia. The influence of neo-fascist organizations, which receive external support and financing and became the main shock force of the coup d'etat, is investigated. The channels of influence of international players and organizations on the internal political processes of Bolivia are studied. The authors infer that the ousted president did not solve the task of creating and implementing a development project for all social and ethnic groups of Bolivia while maintaining their own support and state sovereignty. In addition, the authors give a critical assessment to the decision of the Bolivian leadership led by Evo Morales to entrust election monitoring exclusively to the Organization of American States where the US position dominates. The authors suggest that, for political support, in the monitoring of the election, Evo Morales should have involved representatives of states and organizations not controlled by Washington, for example, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For the first time, the authors reveal and thoroughly study the trigger mechanism for activating a coup d'etat using technologies for dismantling political regimes adapted to Bolivian conditions. They conclude that, in fact, counteraction to left-wing political regimes by the United States in Latin America is de facto a continuation of the formally completed Operation Condor, but using modern technologies to eliminate the unwanted regime in a particular country in new geopolitical conditions.


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