North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-147

The eighth meeting of the North Atlantic Council met in Rome from November 24 through November 28, 1951, under the chairmanship of Lester B. Pearson (Canada) and with representatives of Gṙeece and Turkey participating as observers. Press reports indicated that the agenda included: 1) discussion of an interim report on the non-military objectives of the Atlantic alliance prepared by a five-power committee consisting of representatives of Canada, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium; 2) the report of the Military Committee calling for increased rearmament pledges for 1954 and increased commitment of military contingents in 1952; 3) a report by Dean G. Acheson (United States) on discussions held between Konrad Adenauer (Germany) and the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France; 4) a recommendation that the Council of Deputies receive more power; and 5) an interim report by the Temporary Council Committee appointed at Ottawa to survey the economic resources of the members of the alliance.

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-816

On September 15, 1951 the seventh session of the North Atlantic Council met at Ottawa. At this meeting, members were represented by their foreign ministers, defense ministers, and economic or finance ministers. Press reports indicated that the “Big Three” (United Kingdom, France, United States) intended to press for: 1) creation of a unified European army to include German units of “division” strength; 2) addition of Greece and Turkey; 3) revision of the Italian peace treaty in order to release Italy from limitations on its armed forces; 4) negotiation of a settlement of the Italian-Yugoslav dispute over Trieste.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-520

Defense CommiteeA week of conferences on strategic plans for meeting the threat of communist aggression preceded the meeting of the Defense Committee on the North Atlantic Treaty organization on April 1at the Hague. The North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board met for one day on March 24 at the Hague under the chairmanship of Hubert K. Howard, head of the United States delegation. The primary object of this meeting was to consider certain proposals for an integrated and coordinated production of military equipment and supplies by members of the pact. An official statement made at the end of the meeting announced that “encouraging” progress had been made in laying the groundwork for effective operation of production and supply activity. Thestanding group of the Military Committee, composed of military representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, on March 25 resolved final, minor differences in an all inclusive program evolved from plans of the five regional military groups in the pact.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-401

On December 7, 1950 it was reported that the Council of Deputies of the North Atlantic Pact Organization had resolved the difficulties standing in the way of the creation of integrated military forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by accepting a compromise proposal put forward by the United States representative (Charles M. Spofford). The essence of the plan was reported to be that the twelve treaty countries would proceed with the formation of integrated forces under a supreme command, including German combat teams recruited by German civilian authorities under the supervision of the Allied High Commissioners; in the meantime the French would call a conference to explore the possibilities of forming a European army into which German units would be merged. Despite indications from western Germany that the Federal Republic was dissatisfied with the limitation of 6,000 men per combat unit as compared with units of from 10,000 to 15,000 for the twelve members of NATO, the press reported that the compromise was agreed to by the Council of Deputies and by the Military Committee at a meeting on December 12 and 13, 1950.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Weber

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.


Author(s):  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl

This essay analyses the North Atlantic Cotton Trade through records of cotton arrivals at Liverpool, using two sets of data from 1830-1832 and 1853-1855. Using Customs Bills of Entry, Williams presents data of cotton receipts from the United States to Liverpool; quantities of bales exported; numbers of vessels; origin ports of vessels; distinguishes between regular and occasional cotton traders; arrivals at Liverpool by nationality; and vessel tonnage. He determines that the majority of vessels participated in the cotton trade seasonally, and suggests that the cotton trade was not self-contained, but part of a complex interrelationship within the North Atlantic trade system, encompassing commodity dealings, shipping employment levels, and the seasonal characteristics of cargo. The conclusion requests further scholarly research into the pattern of ship movements in the Atlantic. Two appendices provide more data, concerning arrival dates of regular traders in Liverpool, and the month of departure of cotton vessels from Southern states.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-88
Author(s):  
Joseph Drexler-Dreis

Abstract This essay develops a response to the historical situation of the North Atlantic world in general and the United States in particular through theological reflection. It offers an overview of some decolonial perspectives with which theologians can engage, and argues for a general perspective for a decolonial theology as a possible response to modern/colonial structures and relations of power, particularly in the United States. Decolonial theory holds together a set of critical perspectives that seek the end of the modern/colonial world-system and not merely a democratization of its benefits. A decolonial theology, it is argued, critiques how the confinement of knowledge to European traditions has closed possibilities for understanding historical encounters with divinity, and thus possibilities of critical reflection. A decolonial theology reflects critically on a historical situation in light of faith in a divine reality, the understanding of which is liberated from the monopoly of modern/colonial ways of knowing, in order to catalyze social transformation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 135 (12) ◽  
pp. 3927-3949 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron McTaggart-Cowan ◽  
Lance F. Bosart ◽  
John R. Gyakum ◽  
Eyad H. Atallah

Abstract The landfall of Hurricane Katrina (2005) near New Orleans, Louisiana, on 29 August 2005 will be remembered as one of the worst natural disasters in the history of the United States. By comparison, the extratropical transition (ET) of the system as it accelerates poleward over the following days is innocuous and the system weakens until its eventual demise off the coast of Greenland. The extent of Katrina’s perturbation of the midlatitude flow would appear to be limited given the lack of reintensification or downstream development during ET. However, the slow progression of a strong upper-tropospheric warm pool across the North Atlantic Ocean in the week following Katrina’s landfall prompts the question of whether even a nonreintensifying ET event can lead to significant modification of the midlatitude flow. Analysis of Hurricane Katrina’s outflow layer after landfall suggests that it does not itself make up the long-lived midlatitude warm pool. However, the interaction between Katrina’s anticyclonic outflow and an approaching baroclinic trough is shown to establish an anomalous southwesterly conduit or “freeway” that injects a preexisting tropospheric warm pool over the southwestern United States into the midlatitudes. This warm pool reduces predictability in medium-range forecasts over the North Atlantic and Europe while simultaneously aiding in the development of Hurricanes Maria and Nate. The origin of the warm pool is shown to be the combination of anticyclonic upper-level features generated by eastern Pacific Hurricane Hilary and the south Asian anticyclone (SAA). The hemispheric nature of the connections involved with the development of the warm pool and its injection into the extratropics has an impact on forecasting, since the predictability issue associated with ET in this case involves far more than the potential reintensification of the transitioning system itself.


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