The partisan paradox and the U.S. tariff, 1877–1934

1996 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Epstein ◽  
Sharyn O'Halloran
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Empirical Equations ◽  
Foreign Economic Policy ◽  
Quantitative Studies ◽  
Subsequent Time ◽  
Historical Accounts ◽  
The U.S

Whereas historical accounts of U.S. tariff policy from 1877 to 1934 emphasize the pivotal role of parties, previous quantitative studies have failed to identify significant partisan effects. A formal model of policymaking in which strong parties aggregate voters' preferences provides empirical equations to test for partisan effects. Subsequent time series analysis shows that, even after controlling for interest group demands, partisan control of government did significantly affect the tariff. Moreover, during the period under study, the two political parties enacted tariff policies that benefited different sets of producer groups at the expense of others. Thus, political institutions did play a significant role in shaping the interests that influence U.S. foreign economic policy.

scholarly journals Bureaucratic Corruption, Democracy and Judicial Independence

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Gang Wang
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Instrumental Variable ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Bureaucratic Corruption ◽  
Institutional Constraint ◽  
Determinants Of Corruption ◽  
The Government ◽  
Different Levels

<p>The theoretical literature in economics and political science has made numerous efforts in understanding the determinants of corruption and stressed the importance of political institutions in shaping the patterns of government corruption. Nevertheless, very few researches focus on the role of judicial system. Employing a formal model with empirical analyses, I incorporate economic factors with political constraints to investigate the different roles of democracy and judicial independence in determining the level of bureaucrats’ corruption across countries. Empirically, the instrumental variable (IV) approach is applied to resolve the endogeneity problems. The evidence indicates that different levels of corruption across countries are significantly influenced by the degrees of judicial independence. To fight corruption successfully, I contend that the judiciary, as a hard institutional constraint to resist bureaucratic corruption, has to be independent from the government. </p>

scholarly journals Editorial introduction: Gender and political financing

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110409
Author(s):  
Rainbow Murray ◽  
Ragnhild Muriaas ◽  
Vibeke Wang
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Women Candidates ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Contesting elections is extremely expensive. The need for money excludes many prospective candidates, resulting in the over-representation of wealth within politics. The cost of contesting elections has been underestimated as a cause of women’s under-representation. Covering seven case studies in six papers, this special issue makes theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding how political financing is gendered. We look at the impact on candidates, arguing that the personal costs of running for office can be prohibitive, and that fundraising is harder for female challengers. We also explore the role of political parties, looking at when and how parties might introduce mitigating measures to support female candidates with the costs of running. We demonstrate how political institutions shape the cost of running for office, illustrate how this is gendered and consider the potential consequences of institutional reform. We also note how societal gender norms can have financial repercussions for women candidates.

Bureaucracy, Political Parties, and Political Development

1973 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 600-607
Author(s):  
Gerald A. Heeger
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Policy Making Process

The growing role of governmental bureaucracy has been one of the most noted and discussed characteristics of developing political systems. The phenomenon of bureaucratic intervention in politics, already discernible in the 1950's in many of these states, has, so it seems, become the rule rather than the exception in the years that have followed. Despite the prevalence of the politicized bureaucracy, however, and the amount of discussion engendered by the phenomenon, die sources of bureaucratic growth and dominance in the developing states remain obscure. Most analysts emphasize the superior organization of the bureaucracy and argue that this organization, reinforced by die transfer of techniques from abroad and uncontested because of weak indigenous political institutions, provides much of the explanation for the aggrandizement of the bureaucracy in die policy-making process.

scholarly journals The Role Of Gender And Women In Political Institutions In Africa: A Case Of Political Parties

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Israel Nyaburi NYADERA ◽  
Michael Otieno KİSAKA
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions

scholarly journals The Role of Political Institutions in Africa In Building Democratic Governments

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-451
Author(s):  
Idris Mahmoud Idris ◽  
Elfatih Abdullahi Abdelsalam ◽  
Abdulhamid Mohamed Ali Zaroum
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Ivory Coast ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
The Third

The “third wave” of democratization, which saw the fall of old authoritarian regimes across Africa, as well as the introduction of multiparty elections and other significant new changes, has faded. Today, we are witnessing a reversal of democratic gains in favour of dictatorship, resulting in political instability and severe outbreaks of violence in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and elsewhere. This article seeks explanation for the failures of the democratization process in Africa, focusing on the challenging role of political institutions in determining the nature of transition trajectories, reviewing its significance, and justifying why this factor is important when analyzing the success or failure of democratization. The paper sought to provide a more robust understanding of Africa's democratization failure and the thorny issue of a transitional path toward good governance. The study found that the progress of the democratic transition process at any given point in history is dependent on the existence of powerful and capable political institutions equipped to face and respond to the challenges of the transition process, and that the more integrated and independent government and civil society institutions are, the more likely democratic practices will thrive. Furthermore, the study showed that under authoritarianism, institutions like elections, political parties, and legislatures are often referred to as "pseudo-democratic" because they are copied, imitated, and mocked to manipulate the concept of democracy and serve the continuation of autocratic rule.

A Discussion of Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King's Fed Power: How Finance Wins

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 519-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Block
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
The U.S

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, political scientists have been paying more careful attention to the role of banking institutions as economic but also political institutions whose financial decisions involve the exercise of power and shape the conditions under which governmental decisions are made. Because the United States is still the world’s preeminent global economic power, the U.S. Federal Reserve looms particularly large in efforts to understand the financial roots of contemporary politics. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King’s Fed Power: How Finance Wins (Oxford University Press, 2016) is a major effort to analyze these questions, and so we have invited a cast of prominent political scientists to comment on the book as an account of “how finance wins.”

When Do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties in Determining Legislator Effort

2009 ◽  
Vol 103 (01) ◽  
pp. 99-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP KEEFER ◽  
STUTI KHEMANI
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Public Spending ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Party Formation ◽  
Unique Type ◽  
Development Fund ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
The Impact

A central challenge in political economy is to identify the conditions under which legislators seek to “bring home the pork” to constituents. We conduct the first systematic analysis of one determinant of constituency service, voter attachment to political parties, holding constant electoral and political institutions. Our analysis takes advantage of data from a unique type of public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund (CDF), which offers more precise measures of legislator effort than are common in the literature. Examining the CDF in India, we find that legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies that are party strongholds. This result, which is robust to controls for alternate explanations, implies that legislators pass on pork when voters are more attached to political parties. It has implications not only for understanding political incentives and the dynamics of party formation, but also for evaluating the impact of CDFs.

A Discussion of Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King's Fed Power: How Finance Wins

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 515-516
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Prügl
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
The U.S

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, political scientists have been paying more careful attention to the role of banking institutions as economic but also political institutions whose financial decisions involve the exercise of power and shape the conditions under which governmental decisions are made. Because the United States is still the world’s preeminent global economic power, the U.S. Federal Reserve looms particularly large in efforts to understand the financial roots of contemporary politics. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King’s Fed Power: How Finance Wins (Oxford University Press, 2016) is a major effort to analyze these questions, and so we have invited a cast of prominent political scientists to comment on the book as an account of “how finance wins.”

scholarly journals The Politics of LGBTQ Rights Expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Reproductive Rights ◽  
Movement Strategies ◽  
Lgbtq Rights ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Caribbean ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Future Direction

The first section of this Element reviews the history of LGBTQ rights in the region since the 1960s. The second section reviews explanations for the expansion of rights and setbacks, especially since the mid 2000s. Explanations are organized according to three themes: (1) the (re-)emergence of a religious cleavage; (2) the role of political institutions such as presidential leadership, political parties, federalism, courts, and transnational forces; and (3) the role of social movement strategies, and especially, unity. The last section compares the progress on LGBTQ rights (significant) with reproductive rights (insignificant). This Element concludes with an overview of the causes and possible future direction of the current backlash against LGBTQ rights.

A Discussion of Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King's Fed Power: How Finance Wins

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 517-518
Author(s):  
Leo Panitch
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
The U.S

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, political scientists have been paying more careful attention to the role of banking institutions as economic but also political institutions whose financial decisions involve the exercise of power and shape the conditions under which governmental decisions are made. Because the United States is still the world’s preeminent global economic power, the U.S. Federal Reserve looms particularly large in efforts to understand the financial roots of contemporary politics. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King’s Fed Power: How Finance Wins (Oxford University Press, 2016) is a major effort to analyze these questions, and so we have invited a cast of prominent political scientists to comment on the book as an account of “how finance wins.”

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document