North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-441
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Year ◽  
Present System ◽  
Assistance Program ◽  
Air Power ◽  
The North ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
The Military

The second annual report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR, Ridgway), to the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the operations of Supreme Head-quarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) during the period since May 1952, was released on May 30, 1953. In reviewing the changes which had been made in the period under consideration – the first year in which General Ridgway held the position of SACEUR – the report noted that “much has been done to increase our defense forces and to make them more effective” but “measured against the Soviet capacity, our progress is insufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success if attacked”. SACEUR observed that by the end of 1952, the numerical goals for NATO forces set at the Lisbon meeting of the Council had in large part been met, “although there was a substantial shortfall in planned combat effectiveness”. The outstanding deficiency of a year ago in tactical air forces had been improved both from deliveries under the United States military assistance program and from increased combat capability; nevertheless, the Supreme Commander still regarded air power as “the weakest link in our defense”. While the growth of land forces had been “encouraging” if not “satisfactory”, the same was not true of the arrangements for the supply and support of those forces. General Ridgway emphasized the complexity of the present system in which each nation was responsible for the support of its own troops; however, he felt that the situation could largely be remedied with the approval and implementation of plans submitted by SHAPE to the Standing Group in October 1952. Progress had been good, the report noted, in the infrastructure program.

Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
Nuclear Control ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-611
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
German Federal Republic ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Military

During the summer of 1953, two questions of political importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were raised. According to press reports, some NATO members felt that the Council should discuss the questions of Germany and of the policy which the west should adopt if the Soviet Union proposed full withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany as a prelude to reunification. The eventual agreement, if any were reached, was not made known, but press reports indicated that there were several obstacles to such a discussion: 1) the German Federal Republic was not a member of NATO; 2) the United States did not want to consider publicly alternatives to the European Defense Community; 3) France opposed direct entrance of the German Federal Republic into NATO; and 4)other NATO members felt that the work of the organization should be first in the military, and eventually in the economic social and cultural fields but not in the political-diplomatic field.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-401
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
The Press ◽  
Combat Unit ◽  
Western Germany ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

On December 7, 1950 it was reported that the Council of Deputies of the North Atlantic Pact Organization had resolved the difficulties standing in the way of the creation of integrated military forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by accepting a compromise proposal put forward by the United States representative (Charles M. Spofford). The essence of the plan was reported to be that the twelve treaty countries would proceed with the formation of integrated forces under a supreme command, including German combat teams recruited by German civilian authorities under the supervision of the Allied High Commissioners; in the meantime the French would call a conference to explore the possibilities of forming a European army into which German units would be merged. Despite indications from western Germany that the Federal Republic was dissatisfied with the limitation of 6,000 men per combat unit as compared with units of from 10,000 to 15,000 for the twelve members of NATO, the press reported that the compromise was agreed to by the Council of Deputies and by the Military Committee at a meeting on December 12 and 13, 1950.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
The North ◽  
The Press ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Medium Range

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.

Europe and the Nato Shield

1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold Wolfers
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Field ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The North ◽  
Reasonable Degree ◽  
Economic Collaboration ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Military

Pressures to extend the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into fields other than the military, or actually to shift the emphasis to political, economic, and cultural objectives, have been so strong in recent years that one wonders whether there has not been a growing tendency, particularly in Europe, to lose sight of the purpose for which NATO was established and which makes it vital to the United States. Essentially, NATO is a multilateral military alliance for the protection of western and southern Europe against Soviet conquest, a means of denying these areas and their resources to the Soviets. If the members of the alliance, on one side or the other of the Atlantic, were ever to reach the conclusion that the threat of military attack from the east had vanished or that it could not be countered effectively by common military effort, NATO would have lost its original raison d'être, though it might be continued for the sake of what today are secondary non-military functions, such as political conciliation and economic collaboration. It should be added that the primacy of the military purpose of NATO, as it exists today, does not preclude the desirability or even the necessity of extending its scope beyond purely military matters. As Ruth C. Lawson has pointed out, there is little hope for reliable military collaboration among countries ohat do not succeed in attaining a reasonable degree of harmony between their political aims and policies. Cyprus, Suez, and Algeria are symptomatic of the problems NATO faces in the political field.

The First Year of Shape

1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Wood
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The Other ◽  
Full Measure ◽  
First Year ◽  
European Cooperation ◽  
The North ◽  
The Us ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Time And Energy

It is just over a year since General Eisenhower exchanged the academic robes he had donned so shortly before for the uniform with which his name and fame were more closely related. This time, despite the ”US” on his lapels, he became, as he has said, only ”one-twelfth” American. The eleven-twelfths he dedicated to the other nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To that body, and its goal of European cooperation for defense against aggression, he has devoted a full measure of his time and energy.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-186
Keyword(s):  
North Africa ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
The North ◽  
Percent Increase ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military ◽  
Of Greece

CouncilThe Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in regular ministerial session in Paris on December 17 and 18, 1954, under the chairmanship of Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece. One of the principal items considered by the Council was the annual review of the military position of NATO, which had been prepared by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR, Gruenther) and by the Military Committee at its meetings in Washington in November and in Paris immediately preceding the Council meeting. According to press reports, the review showed that defensive rearmament of NATO was virtually completed so far as conventional armaments were concerned. It was reported that SACEUR and the Military Committee recommended that only the air arm of NATO defenses be substantially augmented in 1955, and that even the increases recommended in this regard represented a realization in 1955 of the goals set for 1954 which had not been met. Ground forces in 1954 were said to have been reduced by the equivalent of two divisions by the reduction in periods of conscription in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, the failure of Norway to increase its conscription period and the transfer of French units to north Africa; a reported two percent increase in NATO naval forces was recommended for 1955. Total defense expenditures of European NATO members in 1954 were reported to have fallen 2.4 percent below the 1953 level; the eleven European members were reported to have spent $10,865 million in 1954 as compared with $11,133 million in 1953.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-657
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
German Government ◽  
The North ◽  
The Press

Council It was reported in the press on July 20, 1956 that the west German government was preparing to bring its anxieties about United Kingdom and United States suggestions for a reduction in armed forces before the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council, but contrary to expectation, at the July 25 meeting of the Council no reference was made to the reduction of forces. The press did note on July 25 that the United States Secretary of State Dulles gave reassurances to the German ambassador that the United States contemplated no change from the existing number of troops at that time and was still in favor of a German contribution of twelve divisions to NATO. Press reports also noted that the west German government transmitted notes to the members of the Western European Union calling for a review of allied strategy and military planning in view of moves by the United States and United Kingdom to cut their armed forces.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 402-408
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
The Press ◽  
Maximum Effort ◽  
The Military

CouncilThe twelfth session of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was held in Paris, December 14 to 16, 1953, under the chairmanship of French Foreign Minister Bidault. Prior to the opening of the Council session, the permanent representatives of the NATO members and the Military Committee held a series of meetings in Paris preparing the annual review of the military situation of NATO and estimates and recommendations for future action. According to information appearing in the press, the military experts of NATO did not emphasize in this report, as they had done in the past, the need or desirability of numerical increases in NATO armed forces; instead, they were reported to emphasize the need for improving the quality, maintenance, and supplies of existing forces. At a press conference on December 11, Admiral Qvistgaard (Denmark), Chairman of the Military Committee, said that the committee was “satisfied” with the military progress of NATO in 1953 and that force goals set at the April 1953 meeting of the NATO Council had been “substantially achieved”. The Committee shared the view, however, of the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe (SACEUR, Gruenther) that the Supreme Command (SCAP) was deficient in airpower. In analyzing current Soviet strength, Admiral Qvistgaard said that the Committee saw no sign of a slackening of Soviet strength. Studies on the effect of atomic weapons on NATO defense plans were not yet completed, the Admiral continued. He added that it was the view of the Committee that NATO had nearly reached a state of preparedness which represented what most countries considered their maximum effort.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-223
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military ◽  
Met Expectations

The fifteen countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were represented by their defense ministers at a conference held in Paris from October 10 to 12, under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay (Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General of NATO). The meeting, which was attended by the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders, was a preliminary to the full ministerial session, to be held in December; it was the first occasion on which the NATO defense ministers met in Council without the foreign or finance ministers. A communique issued at the close of the meeting stated that the meeting had primarily been for the exchange of information, and that the ministers had heard statements on the strategic situation and on western defensive arrangements from General Sir John Whiteley (United Kingdom), Chairman of the Standing Group, and from his colleagues on the Standing Group, General Joseph Lawton Collins (United States), General Jean Valluy (France), General Alfred M. Gruenther (SACEUR), Admiral Jerauld Wright (SACLANT) and several other officers. Following these statements, a useful exchange of views between the defense ministers took place, the communique concluded. It was reported that many of the speakers had concurred in the view that the military potential of the Soviet Union was steadily increasing, especially in the areas of atomic weapons and submarines, that the recently announced decision to reduce the armed forces in the Soviet Union and some of the people's democracies did not modify the potential of communist forces, and that it was therefore indispensable to intensify the NATO military effort, which so far had not met expectations for it.

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