Europe and the Nato Shield

1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold Wolfers
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Field ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The North ◽  
Reasonable Degree ◽  
Economic Collaboration ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Military

Pressures to extend the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into fields other than the military, or actually to shift the emphasis to political, economic, and cultural objectives, have been so strong in recent years that one wonders whether there has not been a growing tendency, particularly in Europe, to lose sight of the purpose for which NATO was established and which makes it vital to the United States. Essentially, NATO is a multilateral military alliance for the protection of western and southern Europe against Soviet conquest, a means of denying these areas and their resources to the Soviets. If the members of the alliance, on one side or the other of the Atlantic, were ever to reach the conclusion that the threat of military attack from the east had vanished or that it could not be countered effectively by common military effort, NATO would have lost its original raison d'être, though it might be continued for the sake of what today are secondary non-military functions, such as political conciliation and economic collaboration. It should be added that the primacy of the military purpose of NATO, as it exists today, does not preclude the desirability or even the necessity of extending its scope beyond purely military matters. As Ruth C. Lawson has pointed out, there is little hope for reliable military collaboration among countries ohat do not succeed in attaining a reasonable degree of harmony between their political aims and policies. Cyprus, Suez, and Algeria are symptomatic of the problems NATO faces in the political field.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-611
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
German Federal Republic ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Military

During the summer of 1953, two questions of political importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were raised. According to press reports, some NATO members felt that the Council should discuss the questions of Germany and of the policy which the west should adopt if the Soviet Union proposed full withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany as a prelude to reunification. The eventual agreement, if any were reached, was not made known, but press reports indicated that there were several obstacles to such a discussion: 1) the German Federal Republic was not a member of NATO; 2) the United States did not want to consider publicly alternatives to the European Defense Community; 3) France opposed direct entrance of the German Federal Republic into NATO; and 4)other NATO members felt that the work of the organization should be first in the military, and eventually in the economic social and cultural fields but not in the political-diplomatic field.

Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
Nuclear Control ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe

The Evolution of a New Nato for a New Europe

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Woodliffe
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Political Change ◽  
First Century ◽  
The Political ◽  
Original Text ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Set Up

History suggests that a military alliance will rarely survive major political change that results in the disappearance of the original danger that the alliance was first set up to combat. Since 1989 the reshaping of the political and strategic map of Europe has proceeded on a scale and at a pace such as to give rise to an expectation that the North Atlantic Alliance would become a victim of historical inevitability and thus be either formally dissolved or left to atrophy. Instead, the North Atlantic Alliance has embarked on a root and branch transformation of its structures, procedures and strategies for the twenty-first century. What is equally remarkable is that these changes have been accommodated within the framework of the original text of the North Atlantic Treaty drawn up in 1949,1thus obviating the need for large-scale formal amendment.

Department of Defense Report: The Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement

1998 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-128
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
Department Of Defense ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
The North ◽  
Nato Enlargement ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Central Pillar ◽  
The Military

At the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invited Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. On February 11, 1998 the President transmitted the accession protocols to the United States Senate seeking its advice and consent on this central pillar of the Administration's strategy for ensuring European stability into the 21st century.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-441
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Year ◽  
Present System ◽  
Assistance Program ◽  
Air Power ◽  
The North ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
The Military

The second annual report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR, Ridgway), to the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the operations of Supreme Head-quarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) during the period since May 1952, was released on May 30, 1953. In reviewing the changes which had been made in the period under consideration – the first year in which General Ridgway held the position of SACEUR – the report noted that “much has been done to increase our defense forces and to make them more effective” but “measured against the Soviet capacity, our progress is insufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success if attacked”. SACEUR observed that by the end of 1952, the numerical goals for NATO forces set at the Lisbon meeting of the Council had in large part been met, “although there was a substantial shortfall in planned combat effectiveness”. The outstanding deficiency of a year ago in tactical air forces had been improved both from deliveries under the United States military assistance program and from increased combat capability; nevertheless, the Supreme Commander still regarded air power as “the weakest link in our defense”. While the growth of land forces had been “encouraging” if not “satisfactory”, the same was not true of the arrangements for the supply and support of those forces. General Ridgway emphasized the complexity of the present system in which each nation was responsible for the support of its own troops; however, he felt that the situation could largely be remedied with the approval and implementation of plans submitted by SHAPE to the Standing Group in October 1952. Progress had been good, the report noted, in the infrastructure program.

North Atlantic Council

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-520
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
The North ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Official Statement ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

Defense CommiteeA week of conferences on strategic plans for meeting the threat of communist aggression preceded the meeting of the Defense Committee on the North Atlantic Treaty organization on April 1at the Hague. The North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board met for one day on March 24 at the Hague under the chairmanship of Hubert K. Howard, head of the United States delegation. The primary object of this meeting was to consider certain proposals for an integrated and coordinated production of military equipment and supplies by members of the pact. An official statement made at the end of the meeting announced that “encouraging” progress had been made in laying the groundwork for effective operation of production and supply activity. Thestanding group of the Military Committee, composed of military representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, on March 25 resolved final, minor differences in an all inclusive program evolved from plans of the five regional military groups in the pact.

scholarly journals The Incident at Cavalese and Strategic Compensation

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-515
Author(s):  
W. Michael Reisman ◽  
Robert D. Sloane
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Benjamin Franklin ◽  
State Party ◽  
The North ◽  
The Status ◽  
Local Courts ◽  
And Training

Penny wise, pound foolish.—Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s AlmanackIn 1953 the United States ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Status of Forces Agreement of 1951 (SOFA), which set forth “conditions and terms which will control the status of forces sent by one state, party to the Agreement, into the territory of another state, party to the Agreement.” The drafters foresaw that the presence and training of foreign military forces within and between their territories would probably, if not inevitably, cause injury to civilians, giving rise to claims that, if not settled quickly and satisfactorily, could spark incidents disruptive to their cooperation in mutual defense. To this end, the SOFA established ajurisdictional regime designed to minimize the political friction these incidents threatened to generate, by providing prompt and manifestly fair settlement procedures. The SOFA’s jurisdictional framework protects nationals of a foreign military force from the criminal processes of the alienjurisdiction in which they reside and train, yet permits injured citizens of the host state to pursue civil damages for the tortious acts of foreign forces without fear that their claims might receive prejudicial treatment in the foreign state’s local courts.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-147
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Ministers ◽  
The Military ◽  
Of Greece

The eighth meeting of the North Atlantic Council met in Rome from November 24 through November 28, 1951, under the chairmanship of Lester B. Pearson (Canada) and with representatives of Gṙeece and Turkey participating as observers. Press reports indicated that the agenda included: 1) discussion of an interim report on the non-military objectives of the Atlantic alliance prepared by a five-power committee consisting of representatives of Canada, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium; 2) the report of the Military Committee calling for increased rearmament pledges for 1954 and increased commitment of military contingents in 1952; 3) a report by Dean G. Acheson (United States) on discussions held between Konrad Adenauer (Germany) and the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France; 4) a recommendation that the Council of Deputies receive more power; and 5) an interim report by the Temporary Council Committee appointed at Ottawa to survey the economic resources of the members of the alliance.

The Evolution of the NATO-Russia Relations

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-31
Author(s):  
V. I. Batyuk
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Terrorism ◽  
European Security ◽  
Sovereign State ◽  
The North ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Us ◽  
Complete Exclusion ◽  
The Military

Over the past 30 years, NATO-Russia relations have come a long way. The present paper provides a retrospective analysis of the NATO-Russia relations that may shed new light on their current state and prospects for development. The author shows that after the collapse of the bipolar world, and the Russian Federation’s emergence on the international scene as a sovereign state, Moscow did not exclude the possibility of establishing partnership and even allied relations with the North Atlantic Alliance. In fact, during the 1990s2000s, Russia and the Alliance cooperated successfully in such areas as the fight against piracy and international terrorism, rescue at sea, etc. However, hopes for a full-fledged partnership between Moscow and Brussels did not materialize as a result of the Alliance’s advance to the East, to the Russian border. NATO’s eastward enlargement — combined with the firm position of the official Washington and Brussels on the unacceptability of Russia’s membership in the Alliance — meant a complete exclusion of Russia from the decision-making process on the European security. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, in the post-bipolar world the military-political dependence of the Western European subregion on Washington did not decrease, as many hoped, but, on the contrary, has increased, thus excluding for Moscow the very possibility to play on the contradictions between the United States and its European allies. Accession to the Alliance of the Eastern and Southern European ‘recruits’ (many of which shared strong anti-Russian sentiments) further limited the Russia’s possibilities for such maneuvering. The Alliance thus became an instrument of the US global domination — a domination which Moscow rejects categorically. The author concludes that in these circumstances, it will not be easy to overcome the military-political contradictions between Russia and NATO.

Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Wenger
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Political Role ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The North ◽  
Political Purpose ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
New Vision

This article discusses how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) overcame the challenged posed by France in the mid to late 1960s. French President Charles de Gaulle's decision to withdraw France's remaining forces from NATO's integrated military commands, and his visit to Moscow shortly thereafter, exposed the alliance to unprecedented tension. Yet as NATO moved toward a crisis, opportunities arose to define a new vision for the alliance in a time of détente. Trilateral talks among the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany forged a consensus on strategy, force levels, burden sharing, and nuclear consultation a consensus that was endorsed by the other member-states. The Harmel exercise in 1967 restored NATO's political purpose, expanding its political role as an instrument of peace. By 1968 NATO had evolved into a less hierarchical military alliance of fourteen and a more political and participatory alliance offifteen (including France). This successful transformation of NATO moved the process of détente from the bilateral superpower accommodation of 1963 to the multilateral European rapprochement of the 1970s.

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