Baghdad Pact

1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 548-549 ◽  

The Council of the Baghdad Pact, meeting on the ministerial level, convened in London on July 28, 1958. It was reported that during its two-day meeting, Secretary of State Dulles committed the United States to partnership in the pact with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States' acceptance of obligations expressed in Article 1 of the pact was accompanied by an oral promise to increase military assistance to the three Asian members. According to the press, these two steps were considered “just as good” as signing a treaty. There were two considerations, according to one source, in the procedure adopted by the United States of agreeing to obligations to members of the pact instead of becoming a full member: 1) special military and economic agreements to be made could be made immediately under the joint resolution on the Middle East passed by both Houses of Congress in March 1957; if the United States had joined the pact as a full member, a new treaty would have been involved requiring the Senate's ratification; 2) the United States was not committed to make such special agreements with Iraq, since the latter did not sign the declaration issued by the Council following its meetings on July 28.

1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-847

The fourteenth session of the Council of Ministers of die Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Ankara, Turkey, on April 20–21, 1966, under the chairmanship of Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, the Foreign Minister of Turkey. Others attending the session were Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan; Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom; and Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States. The session had been preceded by a meeting of the CENTO Military Committee held in Tehran, Iran, on April 5–6.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-863

Tenth meeting: The tenth meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was held in London on May 3–5, 1965, under the chairmanship of Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. Other member governments were represented by Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs of Australia; D. J. Eyre, Minister of Defense of New Zealand; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan; Librado D. Cayco, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines; Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Aflairs of Thailand; and George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State of the United States. Achille Clarac, French Ambassador in Bangkok and Council representative for France, also attended the London session as an observer. (On April 20 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced that France would not send a delegation to the meeting although Ambassador Clarac would be present as an observer only.)


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 832-834

The three foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and United States met in Washington from September 10 to 14, 1951. The agenda of the conference included items on: 1) the general situation and measures to contain communist expansion; 2) the Atlantic command and the United Kingdom suggestion for a middle east command; 3) inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic Pact;1 4) the French plan for a European army with German units; 5) change in the three governments’ relations with Germany; 6) revision of the Italian peace treaty; 7) French and United Kingdom objections to United States activities in regard to Spain; 8) the Korean war and the consequences of the Japanese treaty on the situation in the far east; 9) war in Indo-China and the French request foreconomic and military aid; 10) question of the Austrian treaty; 11) attitude to be adopted towards communist China; 12) Iranian oil situation and the situation in the middle east; 13) economic and political measures to protect the interests of the western nations behind the “iron curtain”. This item had been suggested by the United States as a result of the Oatis case.


Popular Music ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNA FEIGENBAUM

Examining ways in which gender is marked in the press coverage of self-produced, folk-rock artist and record label owner Ani DiFranco, this paper explores how language employed in rock criticism frequently functions to devalue and marginalise women artists' musicianship, influence on fans, and contribution to the rock canon. Investigating how the readerships of different publications may influence the ways in which journalists mark gender in rock criticism, this study utilises a corpus of 100 articles on Ani DiFranco published between 1993 and 2003 from print and online magazines and newspapers in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Focusing on the use of inter- and intra-gender artist comparisons, adjectival gender markers and ‘metaphorical gender’ markers in artist background information, lyrical and musical analyses and descriptions of fans, this analysis maps the discursive conventions that music critics and theorists continue to rely on in reviews and profiles of women artists.


2019 ◽  
pp. 87-109
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This chapter assesses in detail the exclusion of Britain from the ANZUS Treaty, which embarrassed British policymakers and undermined many of the United Kingdom's interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Clement Attlee had initially accepted exclusion, but Winston Churchill's election to office in October of 1951 resulted in a concerted effort to gain membership. Although Australia and New Zealand remained sympathetic to an expanded treaty, both feared that pushing British membership too forcefully risked the United States dissolving the ANZUS Treaty. Despite enjoying a degree of recovery, economic limitations and ongoing commitments to Europe and the Middle East meant that the United Kingdom was unable to offer the antipodean states a credible alternative to existing arrangements. Australia and New Zealand consequently attempted to secure membership for Britain but prioritized ongoing cooperation with the United States. The major obstacle to British membership in ANZUS remained the United States. As far as U.S. policymakers interpreted matters, British inclusion provided few benefits and considerable economic and strategic drawbacks. Yet, U.S. officials preferred to use arguments about race and imperialism to justify British omission from the treaty. Ultimately, the United States remained committed to maintaining ANZUS in its existing form and rebuffed efforts by the antipodean powers to secure British inclusion.


Significance Billed by US and UK officials as the largest-ever mass expulsion of Russian diplomatic personnel, this is an unexpected show of common will. The United States alone is expelling 60 Russian diplomats, as Moscow finds itself having to condemn a broad swathe of countries, not just the United Kingdom. Impacts Western governments will beef up defences against possible asymmetric cyberattacks. The appointment of a hawkish US national security advisor and secretary of state may harden Trump's stand on Russia. President Vladimir Putin will return to the 'Russia besieged' narrative of 2014.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-648 ◽  

Council The Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second session in Teheran from April 16 to 19, 1956. The United States observer delegation was headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson; the choice of Mr. Henderson, was reported to emphasize the importance attached by the United States to the pact, and to have been a direct response to diplomatic pressure from the United Kingdom. During the session, the question of United States participation in the pact through economic aid to the members was reported as a major focus of interest, and on April 18 the United States was reported to have become a full member of the Pact's Economic Committee, having agreed to contribute in technical advice and personnel and possibly in new equipment. Mr. Henderson was reported to have told the Council that the United States was prepared to discuss supplementing its programs of bilateral aid to member countries with a program of broader economic cooperation coordinated through the pact, thus meeting, according to the press, one of the major requests of the member countries. The delegates were reported to have reached unanimous agreement on a plan for combined efforts to combat subversion in member countries, as put forward by the Liaison Committee and the Counter-Subversion Committee; the crux of the plan was reported to be an agreement to form an international security organization to pool the information and resources of member countries, including combined police resources. The recommendations of the Economic Committee and of the Secretary-General for a permanent secretariat were also reported to have been unanimously approved.


Author(s):  
Melvyn P. Leffler

This chapter takes a look at U.S. war planning during the Cold War. Looking through Joint Chiefs of Staff records, the chapter shows that U.S. war planning, although crude, began in the early months of 1946. If war erupted, for whatever reasons, the war plans called for the United States to strike the Soviet Union (USSR). Expecting Soviet armies to overrun most of Europe very quickly, planners assumed that the United States would launch its attack primarily from bases in the United Kingdom and the British-controlled Cairo-Suez base in the Middle East. To protect the latter, it would be essential to slow down Soviet armies marching southward to conquer the Middle East. The United States needed the Turkish army to thwart Soviet military advances and required Turkish airfields to insure the success of the strategic offensive against targets inside the USSR.


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-198

The Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) met in Karachi, Pakistan, on April 30 and May 1, 1963, for its eleventh session, under the chairmanship of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The session was attended by the foreign ministers of the other three CENTO countries—Mr. Abbas Aram (Iran), Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin (Turkey), and Lord Home (United Kingdom)—and by Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Secretary of State, who took part as an observer in accordance with normal practice, since the United States was not a full member of the Organization. The Council session had been preceded by the thirteenth meeting of the CENTO military committee held in Ankara on April 27–28, 1963.


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