Encyclopedia of Black Radio in the United States, 1921‐1955201326Ryan Ellett. Encyclopedia of Black Radio in the United States, 1921‐1955. Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland 2012. vii+208 pp., ISBN: 978 0 7864 6315 2 (print); 978 0 7864 8819 3 (e‐book) £83.95 $95 Available in the United Kingdom, Europe, the Middle East and Africa from Eurospan

The three foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and United States met in Washington from September 10 to 14, 1951. The agenda of the conference included items on: 1) the general situation and measures to contain communist expansion; 2) the Atlantic command and the United Kingdom suggestion for a middle east command; 3) inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic Pact;1 4) the French plan for a European army with German units; 5) change in the three governments’ relations with Germany; 6) revision of the Italian peace treaty; 7) French and United Kingdom objections to United States activities in regard to Spain; 8) the Korean war and the consequences of the Japanese treaty on the situation in the far east; 9) war in Indo-China and the French request foreconomic and military aid; 10) question of the Austrian treaty; 11) attitude to be adopted towards communist China; 12) Iranian oil situation and the situation in the middle east; 13) economic and political measures to protect the interests of the western nations behind the “iron curtain”. This item had been suggested by the United States as a result of the Oatis case.

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Baghdad Pact

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818300031489 ◽

1958 ◽

Vol 12 (4) ◽

pp. 548-549 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

United Kingdom ◽

Middle East ◽

The United States ◽

Military Assistance ◽

Full Member ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

Secretary Of State ◽

The Press ◽

Joint Resolution

The Council of the Baghdad Pact, meeting on the ministerial level, convened in London on July 28, 1958. It was reported that during its two-day meeting, Secretary of State Dulles committed the United States to partnership in the pact with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States' acceptance of obligations expressed in Article 1 of the pact was accompanied by an oral promise to increase military assistance to the three Asian members. According to the press, these two steps were considered “just as good” as signing a treaty. There were two considerations, according to one source, in the procedure adopted by the United States of agreeing to obligations to members of the pact instead of becoming a full member: 1) special military and economic agreements to be made could be made immediately under the joint resolution on the Middle East passed by both Houses of Congress in March 1957; if the United States had joined the pact as a full member, a new treaty would have been involved requiring the Senate's ratification; 2) the United States was not committed to make such special agreements with Iraq, since the latter did not sign the declaration issued by the Council following its meetings on July 28.

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Selective Membership

Divided Allies ◽

10.7591/cornell/9781501741845.003.0005 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 87-109

Author(s):

Thomas K. Robb ◽

David James Gill

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

United Kingdom ◽

New Zealand ◽

Middle East ◽

The United States ◽

Asia Pacific ◽

Pacific Region ◽

Asia Pacific Region ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

Existing Form

This chapter assesses in detail the exclusion of Britain from the ANZUS Treaty, which embarrassed British policymakers and undermined many of the United Kingdom's interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Clement Attlee had initially accepted exclusion, but Winston Churchill's election to office in October of 1951 resulted in a concerted effort to gain membership. Although Australia and New Zealand remained sympathetic to an expanded treaty, both feared that pushing British membership too forcefully risked the United States dissolving the ANZUS Treaty. Despite enjoying a degree of recovery, economic limitations and ongoing commitments to Europe and the Middle East meant that the United Kingdom was unable to offer the antipodean states a credible alternative to existing arrangements. Australia and New Zealand consequently attempted to secure membership for Britain but prioritized ongoing cooperation with the United States. The major obstacle to British membership in ANZUS remained the United States. As far as U.S. policymakers interpreted matters, British inclusion provided few benefits and considerable economic and strategic drawbacks. Yet, U.S. officials preferred to use arguments about race and imperialism to justify British omission from the treaty. Ultimately, the United States remained committed to maintaining ANZUS in its existing form and rebuffed efforts by the antipodean powers to secure British inclusion.

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Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War

Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism ◽

10.23943/princeton/9780691196510.003.0006 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 164-186

Author(s):

Melvyn P. Leffler

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

United Kingdom ◽

Cold War ◽

Soviet Union ◽

Middle East ◽

The United States ◽

Joint Chiefs Of Staff ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

The Cold War

This chapter takes a look at U.S. war planning during the Cold War. Looking through Joint Chiefs of Staff records, the chapter shows that U.S. war planning, although crude, began in the early months of 1946. If war erupted, for whatever reasons, the war plans called for the United States to strike the Soviet Union (USSR). Expecting Soviet armies to overrun most of Europe very quickly, planners assumed that the United States would launch its attack primarily from bases in the United Kingdom and the British-controlled Cairo-Suez base in the Middle East. To protect the latter, it would be essential to slow down Soviet armies marching southward to conquer the Middle East. The United States needed the Turkish army to thwart Soviet military advances and required Turkish airfields to insure the success of the strategic offensive against targets inside the USSR.

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