The southern Irish unionists, the Irish question, and British politics, 1906–14

1967 ◽  
Vol 15 (59) ◽  
pp. 228-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
P.J. Buckland

The period 1906–14 is often regarded as one of continual disagreement and turmoil in British politics. This may be true; but it is important to understand why. In fact, British politics between 1906 and 1914 were marked by a strong desire to avoid extremes. Developments on the fringe of politics, socialism, syndicalism and suffragism, made a deep impression upon the moderate elements of both major parties and their desire to contain such signs of disturbance was epitomised in the constitutional conference held in 1910. Yet the Irish question frustrated attempts at moderation, embittered politics and hindered the development of a more representative, democratic and social stage in the United Kingdom.

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 575-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
IAIN McLEAN ◽  
JENNIFER NOU

Recent veto player work argues that majoritarian regimes such as the United Kingdom have better fiscal discipline and smaller welfare states than proportional regimes with more veto players. An analytic narrative of the failure of land value taxation in the United Kingdom between 1909 and 1914 shows, however, that it failed not because of previously advanced reasons, but because the number of veto players in British politics was sharply increased. This increase in veto player numbers prevented a tax increase. All seven of the conventional reasons for characterizing the United Kingdom as a low-n veto player regime failed to hold between 1906 and 1914. Observable implications discussed include the need to review the entire history of British politics in this period in the light of the temporary increase in veto players; and the ambiguous implications of number of veto players for fiscal discipline.


2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Belchem

As imperial pride flourished in the racial discourse of late Victorian British politics, ethnic revival and Celtic nationalism also gained purchase and resonance. These complex and seemingly competing issues of identity extended beyond the “four nations” of the United Kingdom to the Isle of Man, a crown dependency constitutionally outside the United Kingdom but at the very center of the British Isles. In this “land of home rule,” adrift in the Irish Sea, the juxtaposition of Britishness and Celticism was particularly acute, compounded by the proud persistence of Norse traditions. Manx independence within the Atlantic archipelago was symbolized by the annual Tynwald Day ceremony, a Viking “Thing” or general meeting, at which the year's new legislation was promulgated in both English and Manx Gaelic. In the late Victorian period, as Anglo-Manx business syndicates invested heavily in the “visiting industry,” transforming the island into “one large playground for the operatives of Lancashire and Yorkshire,” gentlemanly antiquarians constructed (and/or invented) the necessary traditions to safeguard Manx cultural distinctiveness and its devolved political status. Through the assertion of Celticism, a project that tended to downgrade Norse contributions to the island's past, the little Manx nation girded itself against cultural anglicization, yet remained unquestionably loyal to the British empire.Slightly other than English, the Manx have displayed what Sir Frank Kermode has described as “mild alienation” and “qualified foreignness,” characteristics that need to be considered in the wider debate about British identity.


2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Wickham-Jones

On 9 April 1992, the British Labour party lost its fourth successive general election. The outcome, coming after prolonged economic difficulties, led many commentators to call into question altogether the viability of the reformist project in the United Kingdom. For Labour's leaders, the result was bitterly disappointing. To lose any general election is, of course, evidence of failure. But, given the extent of the radical transformation the party appeared to have undergone in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to lose in the propitious circumstances of 1992 was especially frustrating. Just over five years later, however, much of the period under a new leader, Tony Blair, and having undergone further dramatic adaptation, including a comprehensive rebranding as “New Labour,” the party not only took office at the general election of 1 May 1997 but won a landslide victory of 179 seats. A little over four years later it won a second landslide victory with a majority just 12 seats fewer at 167: it was an unparalleled achievement in the party's history.


Author(s):  
Eamonn O’Kane

This chapter seeks to examine the impact and legacy of the failed Sunningdale initiative on British policy in Northern Ireland. At a superficial level British policy towards the problem oscillated markedly in the 25 years between the Sunningdale and Belfast/Good Friday Agreements. The approach of seeking to build a power-sharing devolved government with a strong Irish dimension proved unattainable in 1974. Over the subsequent years the British appeared to toy with: Irish unity; full integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom; devolution without an Irish dimension (or indeed much power to share); and a variant of joint authority with the Irish government without power-sharing in Northern Ireland, before returning successfully to the Sunningdale model in the late 1990s. This chapter will question the reasons for this oscillating approach. Was it a result of a disillusion with Sunnningdale amongst British policy-makers; a reflection of their pragmatism; a desire to insulate wider British politics from the Irish question; or an indication of a lack of ideological commitment and interest in Northern Ireland in wider British political circles? Drawing on the available archival sources, and interview data from British policymakers, the chapter will argue that it was not slow learning that delayed the ‘return’ to Sunningdale for the British, but the realities of events on the ground in Northern Ireland and the political attitudes of those involved in the conflict. The British were key players in this conflict but their ability to control events and outcomes was severely limited. Sunningdale represented what the British believed would be the most acceptable solution to the problem in 1973, but the conditions were not conducive for almost a quarter of a century.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
YI-FEI LIU

The University of Edinburgh is a renowned university in the world now. However, it was only a town college back in 1583, and the function of Edinburgh University varies from period to period. It was functioned as a religious, educational institutions in the first place and gradually involved in British politics as well. Moreover, the University of Edinburgh witnessed and promoted the Scottish Enlightenment. Eventually, Edinburgh University becomes an essential university for high-level education in the United Kingdom with advanced and diverse curriculums.


Author(s):  
James Loughlin

In summarising the findings of this study a number of points can be made. First, as a region of the United Kingdom Ulster/Northern Ireland stands out for the singularity of its history and characteristics. While for other regions of the British State the issue of nationality only arose in very singular circumstances such as those created by a world war, in Ulster the divided national identities of its people and the constitutional claims of Irish Governments meant that issues of nationality were a perennial concern, rendering the usual bread and butter issues common to British politics to a secondary position. Similarly, fears of communist subversion such as stimulated extreme right agitation in Britain for much of this period, was a very marginal issue in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, despite commitment to common symbols of Britishness the singularity of its concerns had created a political environment which left very little space for new entrants to occupy, despite, latterly, a growing race problem. The extreme Right’s effective target community was the Protestant and loyalist people, but only if it had become a major force in British politics would it have had some leverage in Northern Ireland.


Author(s):  
Paul Whiteley ◽  
Matthew Goodwin ◽  
Harold D. Clarke

This chapter describes the rise and fall of the United Kingdom Independence Party. Even though the party never simultaneously had more than two MPs in the House of Commons, it exerted an enormous influence on the direction of British politics, and its rise was an important factor in David Cameron’s decision to call the Brexit referendum. This chapter explains where UKIP drew its support and examines the importance of economic factors, as well as concerns about European integration and immigration. It also considers the challenges facing the party in the wake of the 2017 election and its future prospects.


2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882097724
Author(s):  
Jens Wäckerle

In recent years, parties in the United Kingdom have increasingly pushed for higher descriptive representation of women. To achieve this goal, Labour has introduced All-Women Shortlists, while the Conservatives have used the A-List and similar tools to promote women in their party. This article shows how All-Women Shortlists were effective at levelling the playing field between women and men, while the measures of the Conservatives did not fully achieve that effect. In fact, women are consistently nominated in less promising constituencies for the Conservatives. Nominating female candidates leads to more women being nominated in neighbouring constituencies in subsequent elections, while there is no evidence of cross-party contagion effects. Overall, these findings present strong evidence that the introduction of All-Women Shortlists started a dynamic process that consistently increased the number of female candidates and MPs for Labour, while the measures introduced by the Conservatives failed to achieve a similar effect.


Author(s):  
Matthias Matthijs ◽  
Christina Toenshoff

The June 2016 referendum vote in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union was both the result of a perfect storm and a long time in the making. On the one hand, many events had to occur in the lead-up to the vote for it to end with this particular outcome. These included Cameron’s decision in January 2013 to call a referendum if his party were to win the next general election, the unexpected victory of the Conservatives in the May 2015 election, and the coincidence of the vote with a continent-wide refugee and migration crisis while the aftershocks of the euro crisis had still not been fully digested. On the other hand, from the very beginning of its membership in the European Community in 1973, the United Kingdom has featured as an awkward and reluctant partner while a uniquely Euroskeptic tabloid press has been systematically critical of anything coming out of “Brussels.” The reasons why 52 percent of the United Kingdom electorate voted “leave” were therefore complex and multifaceted. The pro-leave coalition constituted of strange bedfellows, including people who yearned for Britain’s imperial greatness and favored low regulation and free trade as well as voters who wanted to put a halt to the country’s openness to immigration and hoped leaving the European Union would allow the UK government to protect British industry and jobs. Prime Minister David Cameron’s resignation the day after the vote and succession by Theresa May, who made implementing Brexit the main goal of her new government, have set in motion various dynamics. They will have far-reaching consequences for British politics, and the constitutional balance between England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Brexit has reignited fears in Ireland of a return to “the troubles” in Ulster that had been put to rest by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. It also brought back the thorny issue of Scottish independence. Furthermore, the referendum result has laid bare divisions that cut across political party lines, and exposed deep societal cleavages between young and old, North and South, urban and rural areas, educated elites and less educated citizens, and the winners and losers of globalization. Brexit is also part of larger phenomena in European and world politics. It is only one symptom of a deeper malaise in European integration, in addition to intractable problems regarding Eurozone reform in the North, migration in the South, security in the East, and the backsliding of liberal democracy in the center. Finally, Brexit is also a peculiarly British (or English) expression of rising populism and anti-elite politics that have swept the globe since 2016.


2009 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nishan Fernando ◽  
Gordon Prescott ◽  
Jennifer Cleland ◽  
Kathryn Greaves ◽  
Hamish McKenzie

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