scholarly journals The Rights Discourse and the Obligation of States to Admit Immigrants

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-182
Author(s):  
Chaim Gans

I argue in this Article that states have two types of moral duties with regard to their intake of immigrants. First, they have a duty to accept quotas of immigrants who have no individual rights to entrance prior to the determination of specific immigration criteria applicable in their case. Second, they have a duty to admit immigrants who are entitled to enter as individuals, namely, refugees and immigrants, who wish to enter the state for family reunification. However, under certain conditions, states could be justified in limiting the entrance of refugees and family reunification immigrants, who might eventually be eligible for naturalization by means of various qualifications and even quotas.Initially, I defend the complex thesis stated above by rejecting two positions supported by contemporary liberal immigration theorists. One position advocates a cosmopolitan human right to immigration, namely, every single individual's right to immigrate into any country of his/her choosing. The other position claims that states have a universal right to lock their gates to immigration. Finally, I argue for the middle-ground position stated above.

2006 ◽  
pp. 29-56
Author(s):  
Michal Sládecek

In first chapters of this article MacIntyre?s view of ethics is analyzed, together with his critics of liberalism as philosophical and political theory, as well as dominant ideological conception. In last chapters MacIntyre?s view of the relation between politics and ethics is considered, along with the critical review of his theoretical positions. Macintyre?s conception is regarded on the one hand as very broad, because the entire morality is identified with ethical life, while on the other hand it is regarded as too narrow since it excludes certain essential aspects of deliberation which refers to the sphere of individual rights, the relations between communities, as well as distribution of goods within the state.


1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vandergeest

Studies of what we call modern societies frequently take one of two major perspectives. The first emphasizes an ever-increasing constraining or regulatory power (Weber's iron cage [1976], or Foucault's discipline and regulation [1979, 1980]). The second tradition seems to contradict the first by emphasizing trends, such as a “democratic revolution” (de Tocqueville 1969:702–5; Laclau and Mouffe 1985:152) or the extension of citizenship rights (Marshall 1973; Bendix 1977). In this essay I argue that the twin processes of increasing regulation on one hand, and institutionalization of individual rights on the other, are closely linked. I make this argument by interpreting the transformation of relations between the state and peasants in Siam (Thailand) during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and through an assessment of two books which have been particularly influential in comparative studies during the 1980s: James Scott's Weapons of the Weak (1985) and Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities (1983).


1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Cohen-Almagor

It has been argued that the difference between liberal states and theocratic, communist or fascist states is not that the liberal states promote different ideals of the good, but that they promote none. Unlike illiberal states, which regard it as a primary function of the state to prescribe the moral character of society, liberal states shun such attempts and allow freedom to citizens to develop their own conceptions.The aim of this paper is to analyze the notions of “conception of the good” and “neutrality” and to suggest a perspective which provides a middle ground between strict perfectionism, on the one hand, and complete neutrality, on the other. This perspective would allow plurality and diversity without resorting to absolute neutrality. It would involve some form of perfectionism without resorting to coercion. I will assert that liberal states do resort to some forms of perfectionism in conducting their policies. I will further argue that the policy they should adhere to is one of impartiality rather than one of neutrality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Elwidarifa Marwenny ◽  
Engrina Fauzi ◽  
Jelisye Putri Cenery

One of the form of applying the value of democratic in Indonesia is accommodate by the regulation of community organization which is concretely regulated in the provisions of article 28 E Paragraph 3 of the 1945 constitution also in the provisions of law number 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. The existence of community organizations does have a great constribution in the implementation of the state, but on the other hand the existence of people raises the pro and contra. The enecment of government regulation number 59 on community organization established by foreign citizens makes the community more worried if the exixtance of community organizations affect the sovereignty of NKRI because they have different ideology with Indonesia. Based on this, it should be discussed about the organizations in Indonesia. The position of foreign social organizatios in Indonesia is reviwed from the government regulation number 59 of 2016 on community organizations established by foreign citizens and the influence of basic organizations for the sovereignty of NKRI. To answer that question, qualitative method is used  as a means to answer the problem by conducting of normative juridical approach which is done by reviewing the law and the literature. Based on this study, it is concluded that the existence of foreign social organizatios in Indonesia in line with  democracy and human right but also politically can treaten NKRI.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Linda Evirianti

Everyone has the right of religious freedom or belief which becomes one of important parts of Human Rights (HAM/Hak Asasi Manusia). Thus, no one can be subjected to coercion that can interfere his freedom to adopt or embrace a religion or belief of his choice. The main characteristic of modern constitutional state is the guarantee of human rights in its constitution. In the Constitution NKRI 1945 has set human rights and the rights of citizens in the form of guarantees freedom for each citizen to embrace religion and worship according to their religion or belief. A state guarantees the freedom of each citizen to adopt a religion or belief, but the state (the government) must regulate the freedom in implementing and practicing a religion or belief so that the government can respect, protect, enforce and promote Human Right (HAM) and conserving security, order, health or public morals. Speaking of human rights in Islam is not an historical product arising from human ideology, a concept that has a theological dimension and will be accountable to God. Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief is part of the most important human rights, even have status as a right that should not be reduced and violated under any circumstances. On the other hand, religious freedom protects the phenomenon that can be controversial and dangerous for human existence, because religion and systems of ideological belief can be misused to trigger intolerance, discrimination, prejudice, hatred, and violence.[Setiap orang berhak atas kebebasan beragama atau kepercayaan yang menjadi salah satu bagian penting Hak Asasi Manusia. Dengan demikian, tidak ada yang bisa terkena paksaan yang bisa mengganggu kebebasannya untuk mengadopsi atau menganut agama atau kepercayaan pilihannya. Karakteristik utama negara konstitusional modern adalah jaminan hak asasi manusia dalam konstitusinya. Dalam Konstitusi NKRI 1945 telah menetapkan hak asasi manusia dan hak warga negara dalam bentuk jaminan kebebasan bagi setiap warga negara untuk merangkul agama dan ibadah sesuai agama atau kepercayaan mereka. Sebuah negara menjamin kebebasan setiap warga negara untuk mengadopsi agama atau kepercayaan, namun negara (pemerintah) harus mengatur kebebasan dalam melaksanakan dan mempraktikkan agama atau kepercayaan sehingga pemerintah dapat menghormati, melindungi, menerapkan dan mempromosikan Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM). Dan melestarikan keamanan, ketertiban, kesehatan atau moral publik. Berbicara tentang hak asasi manusia dalam Islam bukanlah produk historis yang muncul dari ideologi manusia, sebuah konsep yang memiliki dimensi teologis dan akan bertanggung jawab kepada Tuhan. Kebebasan berpikir, hati nurani, agama dan kepercayaan adalah bagian dari hak asasi manusia yang paling penting, bahkan memiliki status sebagai hak yang tidak boleh dikurangi dan dilanggar dalam kondisi apapun. Di sisi lain, kebebasan beragama melindungi fenomena yang bisa kontroversial dan berbahaya bagi eksistensi manusia, karena agama dan sistem kepercayaan ideologis dapat disalahgunakan untuk memicu intoleransi, diskriminasi, prasangka, kebencian, dan kekerasan.]


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 350-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Spahr

Does the concept of sovereignty under law necessarily involve a self-contradiction? That it does, has admittedly been held by the great majority of careful thinkers from the time of Hobbes to the present day. Nor has this been inconsequential. The belief that submission to an enforceable law would be a surrender of sovereignty has been a most potent obstacle to the substitution of the law court for the battlefield in the determination of international disputes. On the other hand, it is generally conceded that for the individual the only liberty worth seeking is liberty under law. It is the thesis of this article that sovereignty under law for the state is no more absurd than liberty under law for the individual.The term “sovereignty” has been variously and elaborately defined, but for present purposes its essential elements may be listed as authority, equality, and liberty. The first-named attribute—authority—has its great importance in the field of constitutional law, which postulates that in every state there is some agency or combination of agencies possessed of the authority to control everything within the state. However, it is well known that the rise and spread of constitutionalism and federalism have rendered the concept of sovereign authority increasingly mystical. Even in Great Britain, the old simplicity of the sovereignty of “King in Parliament” has been complicated by the Parliament Act of 1911, and especially by the Statute of Westminster of 1931. To-be sure, it is easy enough to visualize sovereign authority in a dictatorial régime, but this arouses no envy on the part of those who enjoy other forms of government.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Stefan Konstańczak

In his paper, the author makes an attempt at reconstructing one of the first propositions in Poland to start a philosophical discourse on ecological problems. The author of this proposition is priest Tadeusz Ślipko. According to this author the problems of the moral aspects of natural environmental protection are also bioethical problems. Therefore, we can see that he does not consider ethics of the environment as an individual philosophical discipline. The article concentrates on presenting the sources and the range of moral duties of humankind towards the natural environment. Tadeusz Ślipko does not approve of the anthropocentric or biocentric standpoints in the issues of natural environmental protection. He offers his own idea of anthropopriorism, which takes the middle ground between these two extreme concepts. In conclusion, the author underlines that there is still a strong need for ethical reflection over the state of the natural environment along the lines of Ślipko’s stance.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 302-306
Author(s):  
Eyal Benvenisti

In “Are There ‘Inherently Sovereign Functions’ in International Law?”, Frédéric Mégret provides a deeply insightful reflection on “the essence of the state” from the point of view of international law, outlining a theory about the inherently sovereign functions in international law. He carefully identifies existing norms of international law that articulate certain public functions to be performed solely by the state rather than delegating them to private actors. Mégret offers functional and intrinsic rationales, suggesting that individuals have a right to benefit from certain public functions exercised by state authority, such as legislation and adjudication, what perhaps could be termed “the human right to the state.” In this essay, I suggest that it is indeed possible to derive such demands from the requirements of stable and sustainable governance that are embedded in the concept of sovereign responsibility, as well as from the rights associated with democracy and self-determination. I further argue that Mégret's inquiry can and must be extended also to explore the other side of the coin: the role of international law in facilitating (and possibly limiting) the delegation of public authority to unaccountable international organizations and other global governance bodies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller

Abstract This article argues that there is no human right to cross borders without impediment. Receiving states, however, must recognize the procedural rights of those unable to protect their human rights in the place where they currently reside. Asylum claims must be properly investigated, and in the event that the state declines to admit them as refugees, it must ensure that the third country to which they are transferred can protect their rights. Both procedural and substantive rights apply while refugees are physically present in the state’s territory and their immigration status is being investigated. The state’s obligation to protect these rights arises from the power it exercises over them. In contrast, the state does not exercise equivalent power over those it declines to admit in the first place, even though its immigration criteria – if discriminatory in the negative sense – can be faulted on other grounds. Beneath these arguments lie two basic assumptions: one is the need to separate human rights claims from other claims of justice, especially those deriving from citizenship; the other is the need to determine who bears the obligations that correspond to these rights. Attention to the different relations in which prospective immigrants may stand toward the state they hope to enter can help us understand how border regimes may comply with, or violate, human rights.


Author(s):  
D.R. Rasmussen ◽  
N.-H. Cho ◽  
C.B. Carter

Domains in GaAs can exist which are related to one another by the inversion symmetry, i.e., the sites of gallium and arsenic in one domain are interchanged in the other domain. The boundary between these two different domains is known as an antiphase boundary [1], In the terminology used to describe grain boundaries, the grains on either side of this boundary can be regarded as being Σ=1-related. For the {110} interface plane, in particular, there are equal numbers of GaGa and As-As anti-site bonds across the interface. The equilibrium distance between two atoms of the same kind crossing the boundary is expected to be different from the length of normal GaAs bonds in the bulk. Therefore, the relative position of each grain on either side of an APB may be translated such that the boundary can have a lower energy situation. This translation does not affect the perfect Σ=1 coincidence site relationship. Such a lattice translation is expected for all high-angle grain boundaries as a way of relaxation of the boundary structure.


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