Criminal Procedure and Evidence

1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 592-621
Author(s):  
Eliahu Harnon

Once upon a time there was a lawyer who was most familiar with the rules of criminal procedure and of evidence in force in mandatory Palestine in May 1948. One day in June 1948, the lawyer disappeared. Some say he fell into a deep sleep for many years. Only after the passage of forty years he awoke.Turning to and fro, he will immediately recognize the Ottoman building that houses the courts in Jerusalem's Russian Compound. He will also feel at home with the basic hierarchy of the judiciary: two courts of first instance—magistrates' and district—and no intermediate court of appeal between the district level and the Supreme Court.

Author(s):  
Анастасия Анатольевна Рукавишникова

На основании изучения норм закона, разъяснений Пленума Верховного суда РФ, правоприменительной практики и сущности современного порядка проверки в суде кассационной инстанции промежуточных судебных решений формулируется вывод о существовании системы процессуальных особенностей обжалования и проверки судебных решений, вынесенных в порядке исполнения приговора, проводится их систематизация и анализ. На основе систематизации выделены следующие особенности применения норм гл. 47.1 УПК РФ при обжаловании и проверке судебных решений: способы проверки решений, основания проверки и виды решений, выносимых по итогам такой проверки. Делается вывод, что обоснованность не должна выступать самостоятельным основанием проверки таких решений, но может быть проверена как последствие нарушения требований ч. 4 ст. 7 УПК РФ. Решения, выносимые судом кассационной инстанции при проверке таких решений, должны зависеть от вида допущенной ошибки и от того, было ли данное решение предметом проверки суда апелляционной инстанции. Существенные ошибки в применении уголовного закона должны выявляться и устраняться самим судом кассационной инстанции путем внесения изменений в состоявшиеся решения. Существенные ошибки в применении процессуального закона, повлиявшие на ничтожность процессуальной формы при рассмотрении вопросов, связанных с исполнением приговора, могут быть только выявлены судом кассационной инстанции, но исправляться должны судом первой или апелляционной инстанции (где они допущены), что обеспечивает соблюдение требования ч. 3 ст. 8 УПК РФ. Суд кассационной инстанции должен принять решение о возвращении материалов в соответствующий суд. При выявлении нарушения требования ч. 4 ст. 7 УПК РФ решение отменяется, а материалы направляются в суд той инстанции, который допустил выявленное нарушение. Аргументируется, что в целях обеспечения правовой определенности применения судами процессуального законодательства, процессуальные особенности применения гл. 47.1 УПК РФ, выявленные применительно к проверке изучаемой категории решений, нуждаются в разъяснении на уровне Постановления Пленума ВС РФ. Based on legal norms research, resolutions of Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, law enforcement practice and essence of modern order of verification in cassation court of intermediate judgments, it is formulated a conclusion on existence of the system of procedural particularities of appeal and verification of judgments, given in furtherance of the execution of sentence, it is made its systematization and analysis. Based on systematization it was pointed out following particular features of the application of norms of article 47.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation in case of appeal and verification of judgments: methods of verification of judgments, grounds for verification and types of judgments, made on the results of this verification. It is made a conclusion that justification should not be a separate grounding for verification of such judgments, but it can be verified as consequence of violation of requirements of part 4 of the article 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation. Decisions of the cassation courts in case of verification of these decisions should be dependent on the type of committed error and on the judgment which was the subject of this verification by the cassation court. Substantial errors in application of criminal law should be determined and eliminated by cassation court itself by modification of existed judgments. Substantial errors in application of procedural law, which influenced on nihility of procedural form of reviewing questions related to execution of sentence, can be revealed by the cassation court, but they should be eliminated by the general court jurisdiction or by the court of appeal (where these errors were made), it provides compliance with requirements of part 3 of the article 8 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation. Cassation court should make a decision to return case materials to corresponding court. When revealing violation of requirements of part 4 of article 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code the judgment of the court is canceled, case materials are remitted to that court, where this violation was detected. In this article the author gives reasons that in case of providing legal certainty to apply procedural legislation by the courts, discovered procedural particularities of application the chapter 47.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation relating to verification of considering category are required to be explained by the Resolutions of Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina Manohina

In the article, the author turns to the study of the peculiarities of choosing such a preventive measure as house arrest for minors. Due to the fact that the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation does not precisely define cases when a court must elect a house arrest in relation to minors, in practice there are often difficulties in which cases to choose such a preventive measure as detention, and in which house arrest. In the work, the author attempts to determine the essence of such a preventive measure as house arrest and the peculiarities of his election in relation to minors, and also considers the prohibitions and (or) restrictions to which minors cannot be subjected. The positions contained in the resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court “On the practice of the application by the courts of legislation on preventive measures in the form of detention, house arrest and bail” are analyzed. The author expresses the opinion that it is inadvisable to choose such a preventive measure as house arrest for minors. Based on the study, the author makes recommendations on the possibility, at the discretion of the court, to make adjustments to the prohibitions and (or) restrictions to which a minor suspect or accused will be subjected to whom such a preventive measure as house arrest is chosen.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lieneke Slingenberg

In September 2012, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld a judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal that the eviction from basic shelter of a mother and her minor children, who did not have legal residence in the Netherlands, was unlawful. This ruling was instigated by a radically new interpretation of the European Social Charter’s personal scope and caused a major shift in Dutch policy. This article provides a case study into the legal reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It argues that, instead of relying on legal doctrinal reasoning for justifying the outcome, both courts referred to factors that the general public relies on to assess people’s deservingness of welfare. This finding raises fundamental questions about the relationship between human rights law and deservingness; and calls, therefore, for further research into the relevance of deservingness criteria in judicial discourse.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-378
Author(s):  
JC Sonnekus ◽  
EC Schlemmer

Personal rights may be transferred by means of cession, and, in such an instance, the cedent (creditor) does not need the debtor’s permission, but once the debtor has been informed, the debt is redeemed only if he performs against the cessionary. If however, someone owes a debt, he (the debtor) can free himself of the obligation only if he redeems the debt, if he is released, or through the running of prescription. But sometimes it might be necessary that a restructuring of someone’s debts takes place or the debtor may want to be replaced with someone else who is willing to take over his obligation. This can be done only with the cooperation and agreement of the creditor. In such a case the debtor delegates his obligation to another person, who then becomes the new debtor of a new debt – the creditor relinquishes his right against the old debtor and accepts the new debtor and the new debt. The old debt no longer exists. It is also possible to rearrange the debt and create a new obligation which extinguishes the old debt – a novation takes place. This contribution starts with a discussion of these general principles and particularly the role that they (should) play when one is dealing with a secured debt which the debtor wants to delegate or when novation comes into play. This leads into a discussion of Wilke NO v Griekwaland Wes Korporatief Ltd (1327/2019) 2020 ZASCA 182 (23 Dec 2020) and the judgments in the earlier courts in which the supreme court of appeal and the other courts did not consider the implications of delegation and novation on an underlying debt when that debt was secured. Delegation and novation extinguish the underlying debt and any security right fortifying that debt is thereby also extinguished because of the principle of accessority. If the creditor requires the new debt to be secured, a new security right needs to be established by meeting all the requirements for the establishment of such security whether it is a right of suretyship or a real security right. A creditor must carefully consider agreeing to a delegation or novation of a secured debt since the implication is that he loses his secured and preferential position, and, even with the creation of a new security right, he loses the ranking he initially held in the line of secured creditors when a right of mortgage, for example, is at stake – qui prior est tempore potior est iure (D 20 4 11pr).


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