Why Islamic ‘Traditionalists’ and ‘Rationalists’ both ought to accept Rational Objectivism

2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-477
Author(s):  
ERIK BALDWIN

AbstractIslamic ‘Traditionalists’ and ‘Rationalists’ have much in common. They agree that theQur'anis divine revelation and acknowledge the authority of theSunna, accept the value of logical reasoning and argumentation, recognizing the validity of basic logical principles and laws, and affirm that basic empirical and historical facts ought to be taken into consideration when interpreting theQur'an. They disagree in that Rationalists accept but Traditionalists deny that human reason can discern objective moral truths independent of divine revelation. I present an argument for Rationalism that makes use of premises that are equally acceptable to Traditionalists and Rationalists alike.

Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Torrell

St Thomas’s sources are to be found in the ‘authorities’ he quotes; he uses them according to precise criteria that make it possible to put them in a hierarchy. First, citations from the Bible have an authority that is absolute in principle. The argument from authority is the weakest of all in human reason, but it is the most efficacious if it is based on divine revelation. Second, the authority of the Fathers of the Church is great in the realm of faith, but not in other matters; they are susceptible to an expositio reverentialis. Third, when they speak the truth, the authorities of human reason represented by the philosophers likewise carry weight, since reason is not in itself contrary to faith. Since grace does not destroy nature, it is legitimate to have recourse to the philosophers. Thomas holds them in high regard, and the manner in which he behaves in respect to them remains exemplary for us all, whether we be philosophers or theologians.


Gersonides ◽  
2010 ◽  
pp. 198-223
Author(s):  
Seymour Feldman

This chapter explores why a divine revelation, in particular the Torah, was given if destiny is defined in terms of intellectual perfection and involves knowledge of the sciences and metaphysics. It talks about Gersonides' whole enterprise of showing the philosophical provability of the fundamental truths of metaphysics, which pertains to true happiness and reveals his complete confidence in the powers of reason. The chapter describes one of the earliest Jewish theologians to confront the issue on the contrast or conflict between human reason and divine revelation head-on, Sa'adiah Gaon. Sa'adiah Gaon was quite confident in his own rational powers and throughout his book engaged in philosophical argument to show that Judaism was a religion wholly compatible with human reason, albeit revealed through prophecy. It points out how divine revelation, according to Sa'adiah Gaon, provides supplementary information that aids in applying the general teachings of the Torah to the specific circumstances of everyday life.


Author(s):  
William L. Rowe

In the popular sense, a deist is someone who believes that God created the world but thereafter has exercised no providential control over what goes on in it. In the proper sense, a deist is someone who affirms a divine creator but denies any divine revelation, holding that human reason alone can give us everything we need to know to live a correct moral and religious life. In this sense of ‘deism’ some deists held that God exercises providential control over the world and provides for a future state of rewards and punishments, while other deists denied this. However, they all agreed that human reason alone was the basis on which religious questions had to be settled, rejecting the orthodox claim to a special divine revelation of truths that go beyond human reason. Deism flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, principally in England, France and America.


2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE B. LAWRENCE

This is the slyest, and therefore smartest, assessment of Islamic fundamentalism currently available. The author, a prolific Lebanese political theorist, has offered in this, his fourth monograph on the subject, a well-argued, highly original thesis. Moussalli asks one basic question: does Islamic fundamentalism have a philosophical basis? “Yes, it does,” he replies, “but it is not the same basis for all Islamic fundamentalists.” He then proceeds to demonstrate how particular Islamic fundamentalist theorists have addressed issues such as ideology and knowledge, society and politics, from their own philosophical perspective. The argument is markedly tilted toward politics, as each of the six chapters examines either a facet of political philosophy or the discourse of a particular theorist on the Islamic state. The first three chapters are framed as general overviews, first of the fundamentalism–modernism dyad, then of the epistemological divide between divine revelation and human reason, and finally of the discursive dichotomy between the Islamic state and democratic pluralism. The next three chapters shift to dominant theorists, the three “heroes” of Islamist ideology. Chapter 4 examines Hasan al-Banna on the Islamic state; Chapter 5, Sayyid Qutb. Chapter 6 takes up the most prominent current Islamist: Hasan al-Turabi. Not since Hamid Enayat's Modern Islamic Political Thought (Texas, 1982) has any scholar made such a comprehensive effort to trace the patterns of similarity—and the evidence of conflict and disagreement—among the major ideologues of Islamic fundamentalism.


Author(s):  
Franz Leander Fillafer ◽  
Jürgen Osterhammel

The European Enlightenment has long been regarded as a host of disembodied, self-perpetuating ideas typically emanating from France and inspiring apprentices at the various European peripheries. This article focuses on the idea of cosmopolitanism in the context of the German Enlightenment. There clearly was a set of overarching purposes of emancipation and improvement, but elaborating and pursuing ‘the Enlightenment’ also involved a ‘sense of place’. The Enlightenment maintained that human reason was able to understand nature unaided by divine revelation, but attuned to its truths; many Enlighteners agreed that God, like Newton's divine clockmaker, had created the universe, but thereafter intervened no more. John Locke's critique of primordialism challenged the existence of innate ideas and original sin. This article moves on to explain notions of religion, empire, and commerce, as well as the laws of nation. Transitions in the German society in the nineteenth century and after that are explained in details in this article.


2021 ◽  
pp. 205-224
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hashim Kamali

This chapter explores the basic compatibility or otherwise of Islam with science, especially with reference to stunning and halal slaughtering, halal vaccines, genetically modified organisms, and the environmental impacts of meat eating. It addresses the basic premise of these concepts. Halal and haram are not determined by reference only to human reason or scientific knowledge, but by a combination of these and the guidance mainly of divine revelation (wahy). Worship matters (‘ibadat) are normally determined by the shariah independently of scientific evidence, and this could also be said of a limited number of dietary restrictions Islam has imposed—even though there may be some scientific justification for them. Still, Islam is on the whole receptive to scientific evidence.


Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson

Lewis as a theist (and Christian theist) was the sworn opponent of philosophical naturalism and materialism as worldviews. In his book Miracles, Lewis launches a philosophical attack on naturalism in a special way: he attacks its assumption that physical or material nature is all there is and runs by unbroken laws. He uses the technical Humean definition that a “miracle” would then be a “violation of the laws of nature” and goes on to show that rational thought (which must be free to decide on truth and not determined by physical processes to believe what it believes) is technically a miracle. Probably Lewis’s most important contribution to the field of philosophy is what we call his “argument from reason,” which maintains that naturalism cannot explain the logical reasoning process and that the very existence of this process strongly points to theism. We discuss the Lewis-Anscombe debate over the relation of naturalism and human reason, which spurred Lewis to revise his earlier argument. Prior to this debate, Lewis charged naturalists with committing a self-contradiction by claiming to hold his or her position by reasoning because naturalism implies that all events (including thoughts) are determined by law rather than freedom to discern logic. The Anscombe encounter led Lewis to say instead that there is a “cardinal difficulty,” which the naturalist cannot overcome.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 172-205
Author(s):  
Yoram Hazony

I address three key questions in Jewish theology that have come up in readers’ criticism of my book The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture: (i) How should we think about God’s revelation to man if, as I have proposed, the sharp distinction between divine revelation and human reason is alien to the Hebrew Bible and classical rabbinic sources? (ii) Is the biblical Law of Moses intended to be a description of natural law, suggesting the path to life and the good for all nations? And (iii) what should be the role of the Jewish theologian, given the overwhelming prevalence of Christian conceptions of God and Scripture in contemporary theological discourse.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document