The Rhetoric of the Market: Adam Smith on Recognition, Speech, and Exchange

2001 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kalyvas ◽  
Ira Katznelson
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Division Of Labour ◽  
Modern Theory ◽  
Modern Analogue ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Social Esteem ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Institutional Foundations ◽  
Normative Role

We probe the connections linking the market, speech, and sympathy in the work of Adam Smith, stressing how individuals strive for social esteem and ethical credit while competing in markets. We demonstrate how Smith approached speech and rhetoric as constituting attributes of markets, the modern analogue of previous institutional foundations for social order. Thus, markets are not simply, or exclusively, arenas for the instrumental quest by competitive and strategic individuals to secure their material preferences. They are a central mechanism for social integration derived not from strategic self-interest but from the inexorable struggle by human agents for moral approbation. Part One retranslates the master concept ofMoral Sentimentsinto a modern theory of recognition. Part Two considers how Smith, in hisRhetoric, established the mutual constitution of recognition and speech. Part Three carries this understanding to hisJurisprudence, the most integrative of his texts, which relocates these impulses inside the market itself.The pivotal second chapter of Adam Smith'sWealth of Nations, “Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division of Labour, ” opens with the oft-cited claim that the foundation of modern political economy is the human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.” This formulation plays both an analytical and normative role. It offers an anthropological microfoundation for Smith's understanding of how modern commercial societies function as social organizations, which, in turn, provide a venue for the expression and operation of these human proclivities.

scholarly journals HOW SHOULD WE RECONCILE SELF-REGARDING AND PRO-SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS? A RENAISSANCE OF “DAS ADAM SMITH PROBLEM”

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-102
Author(s):  
Natalie Gold
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Intrinsic Motivations ◽  
Social Motivations ◽  
Motivation Crowding ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Selfish Agents

Abstract“Das Adam Smith Problem” is the name given by eighteenth-century German scholars to the question of how to reconcile the role of self-interest in the Wealth of Nations with Smith’s advocacy of sympathy in Theory of Moral Sentiments. As the discipline of economics developed, it focused on the interaction of selfish agents, pursuing their private interests. However, behavioral economists have rediscovered the existence and importance of multiple motivations, and a new Das Adam Smith Problem has arisen, of how to accommodate self-regarding and pro-social motivations in a single system. This question is particularly important because of evidence of motivation crowding, where paying people can backfire, with payments achieving the opposite effects of those intended. Psychologists have proposed a mechanism for the crowding out of “intrinsic motivations” for doing a task, when payment is used to incentivize effort. However, they argue that pro-social motivations are different from these intrinsic motivations, implying that crowding out of pro-social motivations requires a different mechanism. In this essay I present an answer to the new Das Adam Smith problem, proposing a mechanism that can underpin the crowding out of both pro-social and intrinsic motivations, whereby motivations are prompted by frames and motivation crowding is underpinned by the crowding out of frames. I explore some of the implications of this mechanism for research and policy.

scholarly journals What’s the problem, Mr. Smith? Shedding more light (than Heat) on Adam Smith’s view of man *

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Emmanoel de Oliveira Boff
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Abstract Why has the “Adam Smith Problem” recently been discussed in the literature? Although most historians of economic thought regard the problem solved, these discussions cast doubt on this apparent solution. This article suggests that the “Adam Smith Problem” may originate from the concept of the human being developed by Smith in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments”: in this book, human beings can be understood as composed of an empirical and a (quasi) transcendental side, in the form of the impartial spectator. It is argued that it is the tension between these two parts which creates supposed inconsistencies between aspects of the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” and the “Wealth of Nations” like, for example, the role of sympathy and self-interest in each of these books.

The productive-unproductive puzzle in Adam Smith: what have we missed?

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-182
Author(s):  
Nimai M. Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Durable Goods ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Measurement Scale ◽  
Household Welfare ◽  
Modern Theory ◽  
Durable Good ◽  
Capital Productivity ◽  
Economic Progress ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Over Time

This paper returns to Adam Smith's much maligned distinction of productive versus unproductive labour to flesh out a dimension of capital productivity that has been missed by the modern theory of production and welfare. The puzzle lies in Smith's use of a binary measurement scale to suggest opposing productivity, and household welfare outcomes obtained with a durable versus non-durable good. A durable good generates a permanent fund of labour savings and service spillovers over time. This dimension of productivity exists separate from, and beyond, any marginal productivity attributed to capital or labour services within the neoclassical production function. And, it forms the basis of improvements in household welfare that Smith described in the Wealth of Nations – in terms of continual net increases in the consumption-production possibility frontier enjoyed by the household, as a result of service spillovers obtained with a durable good over time. In contrast, no such spillovers are obtained with a non-durable good. A preference-bias for non-durable goods, instead, proves to be welfare-reducing – by having households under-invest and/or fail in maintaining the accumulated stock of durable-goods-as-capital. Both lead to a loss of production-consumption possibilities available within the household economy. An exploration of Smith's concern with 'unproductive labour' brings back into focus the broad set of behavioural traits and ethical-legal restraints that underlie economic progress and have been missed by neoclassical theory.

On the Economy of Specialization and Division of Labour in Plato’s Republic

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Greco
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Division Of Labour ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Modern Theory ◽  
Technological Advancement ◽  
Economic Competitiveness ◽  
Economic Behaviour ◽  
Economic Reality ◽  
Political Association ◽  
Fundamental Forces

This essay takes issue with a common interpretation of Book II of Plato’s Republic as anticipating the modern theory of division of labour, first promoted by Adam Smith. It is argued that, far from anticipating Adam Smith, Plato developed original reflections which, though naturally shaped by the economic reality of his time, reveal a concern for fundamental issues of economic thought: the value of labour, the nature of economic interdependence in a political association, the relation between economic behaviour and justice. However, despite having recognized some of the fundamental forces behind human economic behaviour, Plato ends up with an envisioned ideal state in which those forces are given no scope, for he makes no room for economic competitiveness and technological advancement.

Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence – Justice, Law, and the Moral Economy

ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter J Kendall
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Economy ◽  
Economic Expansion ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Legal Theorist ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

AbstractAdam Smith, a leading thinker of the British Enlightenment, is universally known as the author of the ‘Wealth of Nations’ and an economic theorist. He is less well known as the author of ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ and an ethicist. And known almost not at all for his ‘Lectures on Jurisprudence’ or as a legal theorist.This essay looks at Smith’s thought through the lens of his Lectures on Jurisprudence. It highlights the almost paradoxical positions Smith had on self-interest, markets, govern­ment, and economic expansion. Obscured by his reputation and these paradoxes are his views on justice, equality, and power. This essay concludes that Smith’s ‘justice’ is deficient and no substitute for the ‘bread nexus’ of the moral economy.

Adam Smith: Scottish moral philosopher as political economist

1992 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Winch
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Political Economist ◽  
Commutative Justice ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Autonomous Science

AbstractBy contrast with those for whom the Wealth of nations marks the origin of economics as an autonomous science, this article argues that Smith's significance lies in his attempt to repossess political economy by restoring its links with the sciences of morals and natural jurisprudence — those concerns which are characteristic of his writings as a moral philosopher. The case proceeds by re-examining two topics derived from these sciences. The first begins with Smith's ungenerous treatment of his mercantile predecessors as a clue to what he believed was distinctive about his own system. Smith was antagonistic to precisely those rationalist, utilitarian and reductive models of behaviour based on self-interest that he is held to have in common with mercantile writers; he was answering rather than joining those who felt it necessary to isolate and legitimate rational economic self-seeking. The second topic turns on Smith's natural jurisprudence: his application of the criteria of natural justice when criticizing mercantile policies and institutions, where the emphasis falls on the negative injunctions of commutative justice rather than the positive ones of distributive justice. The separation of the ethics of the Theory of moral sentiments from the Wealth of nations, therefore, tells us more about Smith's successors than Smith himself.

scholarly journals Taming Egoism: Adam Smith on Empathy, Imagination and Justice

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 29-37
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Czarnecka
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Life Experiences ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Role Playing ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Social Morality ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest

I argue that the construction of the social order, as shown by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, depends on people’s ability to tame their inborn egoism. According to the philosopher’s anthropological assumptions a human being learns through life experiences how to control his self- interest so that it does not threaten societal existence. During socialization, a human being – still an egoist to some extent – continues role-playing by the use of the psychological mechanisms of empathy and imagination. As a result he develops sympathy, at first, as a reaction to real people’s emotions experienced in a particular context. Finally, he naturally and more and more unconsciously takes under consideration the perspective of an impartial spectator. The gradually developing process brings about consequences that improve social morality, such as control over the expression of intense emotions, which is a condition for experiencing emotional harmony, or a refrain from pursuing one’s self-interest at the expense of someone else, so as not to become a subject of social contempt. One should also bear in mind that none of these consequences was carefully planned in advance nor purposefully executed.

Smith, Adam (1723–90)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Knud Haakonssen
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Moral Identity ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Commercial Society ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Eyewitness Reports ◽  
Autobiographical Accounts ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Wealth Of Nations

Despite his reputation as the founder of political economy, Adam Smith was a philosopher who constructed a general system of morals in which political economy was but one part. The philosophical foundation of his system was a Humean theory of imagination that encompassed a distinctive idea of sympathy. Smith saw sympathy as our ability to understand the situation of the other person, a form of knowledge that constitutes the basis for all assessment of the behaviour of others. Our spontaneous tendency to observe others is inevitably turned upon ourselves, and this is Smith’s key to understanding the moral identity of the individual through social interaction. On this basis he suggested a theory of moral judgment and moral virtue in which justice was the key to jurisprudence. Smith developed an original theory of rights as the core of ‘negative’ justice, and a theory of government as, primarily, the upholder of justice. But he maintained the political significance of ‘positive’ virtues in a public, non-governmental sphere. Within this framework he saw a market economy developing as an expression of humanity’s prudent self-interest. Such self-interest was a basic feature of human nature and therefore at work in any form of society; but commercial society was special because it made the pursuit of self-interest compatible with individual liberty; in the market the poor are not personally dependent upon the rich. At the same time, he recognized dangers in commercial society that needed careful institutional and political management. Smith’s basic philosophy is contained in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), but a major part concerning law and government was never completed to Smith’s satisfaction and he burnt the manuscript before he died. Consequently the connection to the Wealth of Nations (1776) can only be partially reconstructed from two sets of students’ notes (1762–3 and 1763–4) from his Lectures on Jurisprudence at Glasgow (Smith [1762–6] 1978). These writings are complemented by a volume of essays and student-notes from lectures on rhetoric and belles-lettres. Although a philosopher of public life and in some measure a public figure, Adam Smith adhered to the Enlightenment ideal of privacy to a degree rarely achieved by his contemporaries. He left no autobiographical accounts and, given his national and international fame, the surviving correspondence is meagre. The numerous eyewitness reports of him mostly relate particular episodes and individual traits of character. Just as there are only a few portraits of the man’s appearance, there are no extensive accounts of the personality, except Dugald Stewart’s ‘Life of Adam Smith’ (1793), written after Smith’s death and designed to fit Stewart’s eclectic supplementation of common sense philosophy. While Smith was a fairly sociable man, his friendships were few and close only with men who respected his desire for privacy. David Hume was pre-eminent among them.

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