Investor-State Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11

2000 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 99-137
Author(s):  
J. C. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The Other ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
The North ◽  
Legislative Activity ◽  
Nafta Chapter 11 ◽  
Extraordinary Means

SummaryChapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides for suits by foreign investors from the NAFTA Parties against one of the other Parties. The author reviews this provision and discusses its possible ambit in light of the decisions so far rendered. The author considers that, properly interpreted, Chapter 11 will provide an extraordinary means of redress and will not open the floodgates to all kinds of claims that second-guess legitimate governmental legislative activity or policymaking.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: The Shape of Things to Come?

1998 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 263-290
Author(s):  
J. Anthony VanDuzer
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Minimum Standards ◽  
The North ◽  
State Behaviour ◽  
Nafta Chapter 11 ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Right

SummaryRecently, there has been a proliferation of international agreements imposing minimum standards on states in respect of their treatment of foreign investors and allowing investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings where a state violates these standards. Of greatest significance to Canada is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which provides both standards for state behaviour and the right to initiate binding arbitration. Since 1996, four cases have been brought under Chapter 11. This note describes the Chapter 11 process and suggests some of the issues that may arise as it is increasingly resorted to by investors.

Part 2 Determining the Applicable Attorney–Client Privilege Standard, 9 Applicable Privilege Standard in Investor–State Arbitration and Comparison with International Commercial Arbitration

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Möckesch Annabelle
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Commercial Arbitration ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
International Commercial Arbitration ◽  
The North ◽  
Multilateral Treaties

In investor–state arbitrations, which are concerned with the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and states parties over the state’s exercise of its public authority in relation to legislative, administrative, or judicial measures, the parties often invoke attorney–client privilege as a defence to document production requests. This chapter therefore examines how arbitral tribunals have determined the applicable attorney–client privilege standard in investor–state arbitration. It reports on several procedural orders and decisions issued by arbitral tribunals constituted under the North American Free Trade Agreement and other bilateral or multilateral treaties. As in these proceedings attorney–client privilege claims often arise together with Cabinet privilege claims, the tribunals’ findings on the applicable Cabinet privilege standard are presented as well. Lastly, the chapter explores whether the solution proposed for international commercial arbitration can also be adopted in investor–state arbitration.

Optimization of the consumption function under the North American Free Trade Agreement

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-103
Author(s):  
Dora Ledesma ◽  
Lidia Hernández-Hernández ◽  
María Teresa Leonor Muciño-Porras
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Optimization Model ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The Other ◽  
Support Programs ◽  
Consumption Function ◽  
The North ◽  
The Government

In the last 40 years, the country has turned to developing the primary and tertiary sectors with a tax policy heavily taxing goods outside the basic basket and generalizing others. On the other hand, Government implemented support programs for vulnerable sectors. The imbalance between what the government receives and grants created greater poverty, affecting mainly households in the first three income deciles. This work shows this imbalance in different scenarios using an optimization model.

scholarly journals Understanding NAFTA’s ISDS: A Challenge for Mexican Attorneys

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (20) ◽  
pp. 89
Author(s):  
Rosa Haydee Castro Peña
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Practical Experience ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
The Other ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
The North ◽  
20Th Anniversary

In the context of the 20th anniversary of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), this article will analyze its Chapter XI: Investor- State Dispute Settlement. Chapter XI embodies the investor’s real and practical experience under NAFTA rules. An examination of the historical record demonstrates that Mexican lawyers have been passive participants in defending investors’ rights. On the other side of the coin, Mexican investors have not been active participants in NAFTA’s Chapter XI, in contrast to Canadian and US investors. Finally, Mexico’s experience in international arbitration has not always been negative, but Mexico has been criticized for a lack of transparency and due process for foreign investors.

The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ◽  
Laura W. Arnold ◽  
Christopher J. W. Zorn
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Critical Element ◽  
Vote Model ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The North ◽  
Timing Model

A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.

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