Many ways to awareness: A developmental perspective on cognitive access

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 506-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carroll E. Izard ◽  
Paul C. Quinn ◽  
Steven B. Most
Keyword(s):  
Significant Contribution ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Developmental Perspective ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Developmental Science ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Neural Bases ◽  
Visual Cognitive

AbstractBlock's target article makes a significant contribution toward sorting the neural bases of phenomenal consciousness from the neural systems that underlie cognitive access to it. However, data from developmental science suggest that cognitive access may be only one of several ways to access phenomenology. These data may also have implications for the visual-cognitive phenomena that Block uses to support his case.

Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 520-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Kevin O'Regan ◽  
Erik Myin
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Cortical Processing ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
New Form

AbstractThe target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 481-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Block
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Cognitive Accessibility ◽  
Clear Cases

AbstractHow can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases – when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority – and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is “Yes,” then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is “Yes”? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.

scholarly journals Reorganization of the connectivity between elementary functions as a common mechanism of phenomenal consciousness and working memory: from functions to strategies

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Mogensen ◽  
Morten Overgaard
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Situational Factors ◽  
Surface Phenomenon ◽  
Common Mechanism ◽  
Elementary Functions ◽  
Connectionist Networks ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Present Context ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

In the present communication, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness and the closely related concept of working memory are presented in the context of a neurocognitive model—the REF (reorganization of elementary functions) framework. The REF framework is based on connectionist networks within which the ‘units’ are advanced processing modules called elementary functions (EFs). In this framework, the focus is on dynamically changeable ‘strategies’—based on reorganizations of the connectivity between EFs—rather than on the more traditional ‘cognitive functions’. The background for the REF framework and especially how the neural correlate of consciousness is understood within these models is summarized. According to the REF framework, phenomenal consciousness cannot ‘overflow’ availability of information for action. Phenomenal consciousness may, however, overflow working memory because working memory in the present context is seen as a surface phenomenon reflecting underlying dynamic strategies—influenced by both experience and situational factors. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

scholarly journals A developmental science commentary on Charney's “Behavior genetics and postgenomics”

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
pp. 371-372
Author(s):  
George F. Michel
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Behavior Genetics ◽  
Developmental Psychobiology ◽  
Developmental Science ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Program Characteristic

AbstractCharney's target article convincingly demonstrates the need for the discipline of quantitative human behavior genetics to discard its false assumptions and to employ the techniques, assumptions, and research program characteristic of modern developmental psychobiology.

The Neural Bases of Placebo Effects in Pain

2005 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tor D. Wager
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Brain Imaging ◽  
Emotional Processing ◽  
Treatment Process ◽  
Biological Action ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Placebo Effects ◽  
Beneficial Effects ◽  
Painful Stimulation ◽  
Neural Bases

Placebo effects are beneficial effects of treatment caused not by the biological action of the treatment but by one's response to the treatment process itself. One possible mechanism of placebo treatments is that they create positive expectations, which change one's appraisal of the situation and may thereby shape sensory and emotional processing. Recent brain-imaging evidence suggests that placebo-induced expectations of analgesia increase activity in the prefrontal cortex in anticipation of pain and decrease the brain's response to painful stimulation. These findings suggest that placebo treatments can alter experience, not just alter what participants are willing to report about pain. To the extent that they involve neural systems mediating expectancy and appraisal, placebo effects in pain may share common circuitry with placebo effects in depression, Parkinson's disease, and other disorders.

scholarly journals A developmental perspective on the neural bases of human empathy

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 5-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Béatrice Tousignant ◽  
Fanny Eugène ◽  
Philip L. Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Perspective ◽  
Neural Bases

scholarly journals The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Negative Answer ◽  
Partial Report ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Theoretical Proposal

Is phenomenal consciousness constitutively related to cognitive access? Despite being a fundamental issue for any science of consciousness, its empirical study faces a severe methodological puzzle. Recent years have seen numerous attempts to address this puzzle, either in practice, by offering evidence for a positive or negative answer, or in principle, by proposing a framework for eventual resolution. The present paper critically considers these endeavours, including partial-report, metacognitive and no-report paradigms, as well as the theoretical proposal that we can make progress by studying phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. It is argued that the methodological puzzle remains obdurately with us and that, for now, we must adopt an attitude of humility towards the phenomenal. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

A dynamic duo: Emotion and development

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-222
Author(s):  
Arlene S. Walker-Andrews ◽  
Jeannette Haviland-Jones
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Systems ◽  
Emotional Development ◽  
Developmental Perspective ◽  
Developmental Science ◽  
Intermodal Perception ◽  
Emotional Systems

A dynamic systems (DS) approach uncovers important connections between emotion and neurophysiology. It is critical, however, to include a developmental perspective. Strides in the understanding of emotional development, as well as the present use of DS in developmental science, add significantly to the study of emotion. Examples include stranger fear during infancy, intermodal perception of emotion, and development of individual emotional systems.

On a confusion about a function of consciousness

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Block
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Target Article ◽  
The Brain

AbstractConsciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different “consciousnesses.” Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of “consciousness” based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct “guesses.” They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field arebothaccess-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of accessconsciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness.

Emotional responses in mother-infant musical interactions: A developmental perspective

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 586-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Longhi
Keyword(s):  
Emotional Responses ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Developmental Perspective ◽  
Young Infants ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Musical Interactions ◽  
Multimodal Information

AbstractWith this commentary, I raise two issues relevant to the theoretical framework from a developmental perspective. First, the infants' emotional responses are induced by the music as well as by the multimodal information they perceive in interaction with their mothers, and these responses change with time. Second, contrary to what is suggested in the target article, musical expectancy is already experienced by young infants.

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