Social preference experiments in animals: Strengthening the case for human preferences

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Jensen

AbstractGuala appears to take social preferences for granted in his discussion of reciprocity experiments. While he does not overtly claim that social preferences are only by-products that arise in testing environments, he does assert that whatever they are – and how they evolved – they have little value in the real world. Experiments on animals suggest that social preferences may be unique to humans, supporting the idea that they might play a prominent role in our world.

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne C. Pisor ◽  
Daniel M. T. Fessler

AbstractClaims regarding negative strong reciprocity do indeed rest on experiments lacking established external validity, often without even a small “menu of options.” Guala's review should prompt strong reciprocity proponents to extend the real-world validity of their work, exploring the preferences participants bring to experiments. That said, Guala's approach fails to differentiate among group selection approaches and glosses over cross-cultural variability.


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Chao

Social preference models emphasize that perceived intentions motivate reciprocity. However, laboratory tests of this theory typically manipulate perceived intentions through changes in wealth resulting from a sacrifice in pay by another. There is little evidence on whether reciprocity occurs in response to perceived intentions alone, independent of concurrent changes in pay and giver sacrifice (and any associated guilt from that sacrifice). This paper addresses this gap in the literature by implementing a modified dictator game where gifts to dictators are possible, but where gift transactions are also stochastically prevented by nature. This leads to instances of observed gift-giving intentions that yield no sacrifice or change in outcomes. In addition, this study uses both monetary and non-monetary gifts; previous studies typically use only monetary incentives, even though real-world applications of this literature often involve non-monetary incentives such as business or marketing gifts. The results show that on average, dictators reciprocated strongly to just the intention to give a gift, and they also reciprocated similarly to both monetary and non-monetary gifts. These results are consistent with intentions-based models of social preferences and with much of the marketing literature on business gifts.


2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven D Levitt ◽  
John A List

A critical question facing experimental economists is whether behavior inside the laboratory is a good indicator of behavior outside the laboratory. To address that question, we build a model in which the choices that individuals make depend not just on financial implications, but also on the nature and extent of scrutiny by others, the particular context in which a decision is embedded, and the manner in which participants and tasks are selected. We present empirical evidence demonstrating the importance of these various factors. To the extent that lab and naturally occurring environments systematically differ on any of these dimensions, the results obtained inside and outside the lab need not correspond. Focusing on experiments designed to measure social preferences, we discuss the extent to which the existing laboratory results generalize to naturally-occurring markets. We summarize cases where the lab may understate the importance of social preferences as well as instances in which the lab might exaggerate their importance. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of interpreting laboratory and field data through the lens of theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-116
Author(s):  
ROBERTA MURAMATSU ◽  
ANA MARIA A. F. BIANCHI

ABSTRACT This paper holds that the standard economic accounts of corruption based on expected costs and benefits are insufficient to understand and to tackle dishonesty in the real world. It embarks on a survey of the literature to discuss the major roles automatic judgments and decisions, as well as cognitive biases and social preferences might play in deviations from honest behavior. The paper further discusses the implications of behavioral economics to the debate over how to fight corruption and foster integrity.


2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 100-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne K. Bothe

This article presents some streamlined and intentionally oversimplified ideas about educating future communication disorders professionals to use some of the most basic principles of evidence-based practice. Working from a popular five-step approach, modifications are suggested that may make the ideas more accessible, and therefore more useful, for university faculty, other supervisors, and future professionals in speech-language pathology, audiology, and related fields.


2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (7) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
LEE SAVIO BEERS
Keyword(s):  

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