Cost-benefit models as the next, best option for understanding subjective effort

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 707-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Kurzban ◽  
Angela Duckworth ◽  
Joseph W. Kable ◽  
Justus Myers

AbstractThe commentaries on our target article are surprisingly sympathetic to our overall approach to explaining subjective effort, though disagreement with particulars inevitably emerged. Here, in our response, we first review the few disagreements concerning the basic structure of our proposal, highlighting areas in which little or no resistance was voiced. Opposition to the assumptions that underlie our opportunity cost model is noticeably limited. Areas of genuine disagreement, however, include: (1) the inputs to and outputs of the relevant decision-making systems; (2) how to interpret data regarding individual differences in performance; (3) how to explain persistence on tasks that give rise to the sensation of subjective effort; and (4) the details of the relevant neuropsychological systems. Throughout we point to empirical issues raised by the commentaries and suggest research that will be useful in arbitrating points of disagreement.

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S80-S80
Author(s):  
Sarah Saperia ◽  
Daniel Felsky ◽  
Susana Da Silva ◽  
Ishraq Siddiqui ◽  
Zafiris Daskalakis ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Reductions in motivation figure prominently in the clinical presentation of schizophrenia (SZ) and major depressive disorder (MDD). One critical nexus in the motivation system that drives real-world behaviour is effort-based decision-making (EBDM), which refers to the cost-benefit calculations involved in computing the amount of effort one is willing to expend in order to obtain a desired reward. Important individual differences are associated with these processes, and impairments in motivation can arise if any relevant cost-benefit information is not properly computed, appraised, or integrated. Thus, in order to better understand the computations guiding choice behaviour, the present study sought to utilize a more person-centric approach to characterize individual differences in the effort-cost computations that underlie cost-benefit decision-making in individuals with SZ and MDD. Methods A sample of 51 individuals with SZ, 43 individuals with MDD, and 51 healthy control (HC) participants underwent a comprehensive clinical and cognitive characterization, and completed the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT) as a measure of EBDM. Random effects modelling was conducted to estimate the subject-specific predictors of reward magnitude, probability, and perceived cost on choice behaviour. Cluster analysis was subsequently applied to these predictors in order to identify subtypes of impairments within the entire sample, irrespective of diagnostic status. Results Data-driven cluster analysis identified unique subgroups of individuals with distinct patterns of utilizing cost-benefit information to guide effort-based decision-making. Analyses of variance revealed significant differences between clusters with respect to their utilization of reward (F (3, 133) = 51.58, p < .001), probability (F (3, 133) = 48.71, p < .001), and cost (F (3, 133) = 45.24, p < .001). The first cluster was characterized by an indifference to all cost-benefit information, the second cluster was more influenced by perceived cost, the third cluster demonstrated a preference for reward-based information, and the fourth cluster mainly utilized probability to guide their decision-making. While the clusters did not differ in their severity of clinical amotivation (p = .11), there was a significant effect for cognition, specifically with impairments in clusters 1 and 2. All diagnostic groups were represented in each cluster, but the distribution of SZ, MDD, and HC participants was significantly different (X2 (6, N = 137) = 16.18, p = .013). Discussion The emergence of four distinct subgroups in our sample suggests that there are individual differences amongst SZ, MDD, and HC participants in their utilization of cost-benefit information to guide choice behaviour. Moreover, with elevated levels of clinical amotivation present in all four clusters, it is possible that these unique cost-benefit decision-making patterns represent different underlying motivational impairments, the nature of which depending on how reward magnitude, probability, and perceived cost are weighed. Thus, by characterizing the specific mechanisms underlying EBDM in SZ and MDD, the results of this work may be able to help guide the identification of more precise targets for the effective treatment of motivation deficits.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Dora ◽  
Madelon van Hooff ◽  
Sabine A. E. Geurts ◽  
Michiel A. J. Kompier ◽  
Erik Bijleveld

Most people experience the feeling of mental fatigue on a daily basis. Previous research shows that mental fatigue impacts information processing and decision making. However, the proximal causes of mental fatigue are not yet well understood. In this research, we test the opportunity cost model of mental fatigue, which proposes that people become more fatigued when the next-best alternative to the current task is higher in value. In three preregistered experiments (total N = 300), participants repeatedly reported their current level of fatigue and chose to perform a paid labor task vs an unpaid leisure task. In Study 1, all participants were offered the same labor/leisure choice. In Studies 2 and 3, we manipulated the opportunity costs of a labor task through the value of an alternative leisure task. In all studies, we found that people were more likely to choose for leisure as they became more fatigued. We did not find that the manipulated leisure value influenced the amount of fatigue participants experienced nor the likelihood to choose for leisure. However, in exploratory analyses, we found (and replicated) that participants who reported to value the leisure task more got more fatigued during labor and less fatigued during leisure. Collectively, these results provide cautious support for the opportunity cost model, but they also show that cost-benefit analyses relating to labor and leisure tasks are fleeting.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 687-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin S. Hagger

AbstractI contend that Kurzban et al.'s model is silent on three issues. First, the extent to which opportunity-cost computations are automatic or deliberative is unclear. Second, the role of individual differences in biasing opportunity-cost computations needs elucidating. Third, in the absence of “next-best” tasks, task persistence will be indefinite, which seems unfeasible, so perhaps integration with a limited-resource account is necessary.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (10) ◽  
pp. 2130-2157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Kustra

This article views death in battle as an opportunity cost whose size is determined by the number of years a rebel would have lived as a civilian. As civilian life expectancy declines, this opportunity cost does too, increasing the probability of rebellion. This theory is tested with a tragic natural experiment: the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Using male circumcision rates as an instrument for life expectancy, the analysis shows that a one-year increase in life expectancy decreases the probability of civil war by 2.6 percentage points. This supports the theory that opportunity costs are important determinants of conflict onset and that nonpecuniary opportunity costs should be taken into account. This article concludes by noting that cost–benefit analyses of public health interventions should include decreases in the probability of civil war, and the attendant benefits in terms of lives saved and material damage prevented, in their calculations.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyunji Kim ◽  
Arnd Florack

People construct self-representation beyond the experiential self and the self-concept can expand to interpersonal as well as intrapersonal dimensions. The cognitive ability to project oneself onto expanded selves in different time points and places plays a crucial role in planning and decision making situations. However, no research to date has shown evidence explaining the early mechanism of how processing the experiential self-information differs from processing the expanded self-information across temporal, social, spatial, and probability domains. We report novel effects showing a systematic information prioritization towards the experiential selves (i.e., The self that is now, here, and with highest certainty) compared to the expanded selves (i.e., The self that is in the future, at a distant location, and with lower certainty; Experiments 1a, 2, and 3). Implicit prioritization biases lasted over time (Experiment 1b; i.e., 4 months) indicating a trait-like more than a state-like measure of individual differences. Different biases, however, did not consistently correlate with each other (Experiments 1a to 3) suggesting separate underlying mechanisms. We discuss potential links to the basic structure of self-representation and individual differences for implications.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 661-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Kurzban ◽  
Angela Duckworth ◽  
Joseph W. Kable ◽  
Justus Myers

AbstractWhy does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational mechanisms carries an opportunity cost – that is, the next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position, we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished.


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 674-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vittorio Girotto

I discuss an aspect of individual differences which has not been considered adequately in the target article, despite its potential role in the rationality debate. Besides having different intellectual abilities, different individuals may produce different erroneous responses to the same problem. In deductive reasoning, different response patterns contradict deterministic views of deductive inferences. In decision-making, variations in nonoptimal choice may explain successful collective actions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110042
Author(s):  
Hyunji Kim ◽  
Arnd Florack

People construct self-representation beyond the experiential self and the self-concept can expand to interpersonal as well as intrapersonal dimensions. The cognitive ability to project oneself onto expanded selves in different time points and places plays a crucial role in planning and decision-making situations. However, no research to date has shown evidence explaining the early mechanism of how processing the experiential self-information differs from processing the expanded self-information across temporal, social, spatial, and probability domains. We report novel effects showing a systematic information prioritization toward the experiential selves (i.e., the self that is now, here, and with highest certainty) compared to the expanded selves (i.e., the self that is in the future, at a distant location, and with lower certainty; Experiments 1a, 2, and 3). Implicit prioritization biases lasted over time (Experiment 1b; i.e., 4 months) indicating a trait-like more than a state-like measure of individual differences. Different biases, however, did not consistently correlate with each other (Experiments 1a to 3) suggesting separate underlying mechanisms. We discuss potential links to the basic structure of self-representation and individual differences for implications.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Danks

AbstractThe target article uses a mathematical framework derived from Bayesian decision making to demonstrate suboptimal decision making but then attributes psychological reality to the framework components. Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) positive proposal thus risks ignoring plausible psychological theories that could implement complex perceptual decision making. We must be careful not to slide from success with an analytical tool to the reality of the tool components.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document