The elephant in the China shop: When technical reasoning meets cumulative technological culture

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Osiurak ◽  
Emanuelle Reynaud

Abstract The commentaries have both revealed the implications of and challenged our approach. In this response, we reply to these concerns, discuss why the technical-reasoning hypothesis does not minimize the role of social-learning mechanisms – nor assume that technical-reasoning skills make individuals omniscient technically – and make suggestions for overcoming the classical opposition between the cultural versus cognitive niche hypothesis of cumulative technological culture.

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Netanel Weinstein ◽  
Dare Baldwin

Abstract Osiurak and Reynaud highlight the critical role of technical-reasoning skills in the emergence of human cumulative technological culture (CTC), in contrast to previous accounts foregrounding social-reasoning skills as key to CTC. We question their analysis of the available evidence, yet for other reasons applaud the emphasis on causal understanding as central to the adaptive and collaborative dynamics of CTC.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. O'Brien ◽  
R. Alexander Bentley

Abstract We agree that the emergence of cumulative technological culture was tied to nonsocial cognitive skills, namely, technical-reasoning skills, which allowed humans to constantly acquire and improve information. Our concern is with a reading of the history of cumulative technological culture that is based largely on modern experiments in simulated settings and less on phenomena crucial to the long-term dynamics of cultural evolution.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alba Motes-Rodrigo ◽  
Eva Reindl ◽  
Elisa Bandini

Abstract To support their claim for technical reasoning skills rather than imitation as the key for cumulative technological culture (CTC), Osiurak and Reynaud argue that chimpanzees can imitate mechanical actions, but do not have CTC. They also state that an increase in working memory in human evolution could not have been a key driver of CTC. We discuss why we disagree with these claims.


PeerJ ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. e8734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien Neadle ◽  
Elisa Bandini ◽  
Claudio Tennie

Nut-cracking is often cited as one of the most complex behaviours observed in wild chimpanzees. However, the cognitive mechanisms behind its acquisition are still debated. The current null hypothesis is that the form of nut-cracking behaviour relies on variants of social learning, with some researchers arguing, more precisely, that copying variants of social learning mechanisms are necessary. However, to date, very few experiments have directly investigated the potentially sufficient role of individual learning in explaining the behavioural form of nut-cracking. Despite this, the available data provides some evidence for the spontaneous acquisition of nut-cracking by chimpanzees; later group acquisition was then found to be at least facilitated by (unspecified) variants of social learning. The latter findings are in line with both suggested hypotheses, i.e., that copying social learning is required and that other (non-copying) social learning mechanisms are at play. Here we present the first study which focused (initially) on the role of individual learning for the acquisition of the nut-cracking behavioural form in chimpanzees. We tested task-naïve chimpanzees (N = 13) with an extended baseline condition to examine whether the behaviour would emerge spontaneously. After the baseline condition (which was unsuccessful), we tested for the role of social learning by providing social information in a step-wise fashion, culminating in a full action demonstration of nut-cracking by a human demonstrator (this last condition made it possible for the observers to copy all actions underlying the behaviour). Despite the opportunities to individually and/or socially learn nut-cracking, none of the chimpanzees tested here cracked nuts using tools in any of the conditions in our study; thus, providing no conclusive evidence for either competing hypothesis. We conclude that this failure was the product of an interplay of factors, including behavioural conservatism and the existence of a potential sensitive learning period for nut-cracking in chimpanzees. The possibility remains that nut-cracking is a behaviour that chimpanzees can individually learn. However, this behaviour might only be acquired when chimpanzees are still inside their sensitive learning period, and when ecological and developmental conditions allow for it. The possibility remains that nut-cracking is an example of a culture dependent trait in non-human great apes. Recommendations for future research projects to address this question are considered.


PeerJ ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. e9877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Bandini ◽  
Claudio Tennie

The notion that tool-use is unique to humans has long been refuted by the growing number of observations of animals using tools across various contexts. Yet, the mechanisms behind the emergence and sustenance of these tool-use repertoires are still heavily debated. We argue that the current animal behaviour literature is biased towards a social learning approach, in which animal, and in particular primate, tool-use repertoires are thought to require social learning mechanisms (copying variants of social learning are most often invoked). However, concrete evidence for a widespread dependency on social learning is still lacking. On the other hand, a growing body of observational and experimental data demonstrates that various animal species are capable of acquiring the forms of their tool-use behaviours via individual learning, with (non-copying) social learning regulating the frequencies of the behavioural forms within (and, indirectly, between) groups. As a first outline of the extent of the role of individual learning in animal tool-use, a literature review of reports of the spontaneous acquisition of animal tool-use behaviours was carried out across observational and experimental studies. The results of this review suggest that perhaps due to the pervasive focus on social learning in the literature, accounts of the individual learning of tool-use forms by naïve animals may have been largely overlooked, and their importance under-examined.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liane Gabora ◽  
Cameron M. Smith

Abstract The argument that cumulative technological culture originates in technical-reasoning skills is not the only alternative to social accounts; another possibility is that accumulation of both technical-reasoning skills and enhanced social skills stemmed from the onset of a more basic cognitive ability such as recursive representational redescription. The paper confuses individual learning of pre-existing information with creative generation of new information.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaud Gruber

Abstract The debate on cumulative technological culture (CTC) is dominated by social-learning discussions, at the expense of other cognitive processes, leading to flawed circular arguments. I welcome the authors' approach to decouple CTC from social-learning processes without minimizing their impact. Yet, this model will only be informative to understand the evolution of CTC if tested in other cultural species.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Robertson

Abstract Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.


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