Suppression, attention, and effort: A proposed enhancement for a promising theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-37
Author(s):  
David A. Schwartz ◽  
J. Eric Ivancich ◽  
Stephen Kaplan

Although Glenberg's theory benefits from the incorporation of a suppression concept, a more differentiated view of suppression would be even more effective. We propose such a concept (based on the attention framework first developed by William James in the late nineteenth century), showing how it accounts for phenomena that Glenberg describes and also for phenomena that he ignores.

On Purpose ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 166-194
Author(s):  
Michael Ruse

This chapter focuses on the writer Thomas Hardy who was raised a good Christian, a member of the established church. Then he read The Origin of Species and it all came crashing down. His poem “Hap,” written in 1866, tells it all, implying that God does not exist but that with his going, humans lose all meaning to life. The chapter also discusses crucial issues about how philosophers handled mind and meaning, about knowledge and morality. Not just the nonexistence of God— agnosticism or atheism pretty much became the norm in the profession—but the lack of meaning. The American pragmatists rode with things pretty well. Whether this was part of the general, late-nineteenth-century American vigor and rise to prominence and power, they found the challenge of Darwinism stimulating and thought provoking. For someone like William James, the struggle for existence and natural selection translated readily into a theory of knowledge—ideas fight it out just as organisms fight it out.


post(s) ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 134-153
Author(s):  
John Peters ◽  
Hugo Burgos

Josiah Royce, the American idealist philosopher (1855-1916), is best known to readers of Borges in connection with a recursive map-within-a-map drawn upon the soil of England. Indeed, Borges ranks ​​"el mapa de Royce" side-by-side with his beloved Zeno´´´ s  paradox in “Otro poema de los dones” (336), a Whitmanesque catalog of a few of his favorite things. Borges appreciated Royce as a fellow-wanderer through the late nineteenth-century thickets of both Anglo-American idealism and the new mathematics of transfinite numbers. Royce was not so much an influence on Borges as a fellow traveler who had arrived in a somewhat similar place after passing through Berkeley, Schopenhauer, and Cantor. After cataloging connections between the two thinkers and explicating Royce's map, I will suggest that both figures are theorists of infinity and metaphysicians of the copy who offer fertile suggestions to our understanding of media in general and maps in particular. Though Royce and Borges both can strike some readers as architects of suffocating idealistic structures, there is a difference. Royce thinks his figures of infinity really do disclose the truth about the universe. Borges sees in such figures the paradoxes and slippages involved in any project of perfect duplication, and his skepticism about philosophical representation is designed, ultimately, to provide oxygen and exit from totalitarian systems. In this I would view Borges as a follower of Royce's close friend, Harvard colleague and philosophical antagonist: William James.  


Author(s):  
Clare Hanson

The Introduction begins by arguing for the significance of psychology as part of Mansfield’s intellectual background, noting her description of a story as a ‘psychological study’ in 1908, well in advance of her likely knowledge of Freud and probably with reference to the wider network of late nineteenth century psychology. This rapidly growing discipline generated widespread public interest in the question of mind and the relationship between consciousness and sensation and, in consequence, several contributors to this volume argue for convergences between Mansfield’s fiction and the work of psychologists such as William James, Henri Bergson and Théodule Ribot. Having positioned Mansfield in relation to psychology the Introduction goes on to map the diverse ways in which the contributors to this volume mobilise psychoanalysis for readings of Mansfield’s work.


Author(s):  
John Deigh

Until the late nineteenth century the classical empiricist concept of emotions dominated modern philosophy and psychology. The work of William James and Sigmund Freud rendered this concept obsolete and gave rise to the concepts that now prevail in philosophy and psychology. This essay explains the conceptual changes in the theory of emotion that James and Freud brought about and then critically examines the concepts of emotion to which their work gave rise and that now prevail in philosophy and psychology. The examination focuses on the concepts central to cognitivist theories of emotion that take emotions to be or to contain essentially judgments, cognitivist theories that take emotions to be or to contain essentially perceptions, affective theories that take emotions to be information bearing feelings, and theories that take the intentionality of emotions to have an essentially affective character.


Author(s):  
Letícia Pumar

Epistemological considerations of philosophers and scientists from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century guided Brazilian physiologist Miguel Ozório de Almeida (1890-1953) in formulating his researches and participating in national and international scientific debates. With his siblings, Álvaro Ozório de Almeida and Branca de Almeida Fialho, he participated in debates on Brazilian educational and scientific system’s reform and in international organizations. The family’s residence in Rio de Janeiro housed a laboratory that became a reference in experimental physiology researches in Brazil. This article aims to present Miguel Ozório de Almeida’s conception of science, constructed mainly within the private laboratory’s sociability, providing new aspects of scientific work production in Brazil in the early twentieth century. I argue that Ozório de Almeida’s stand as an internationalist physiologist in national and international contexts was related to his reading of texts by Ernest Mach, Pierre Duhem, Henri Poincaré and William James.


1975 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-291
Author(s):  
James R. Horne

Since the late nineteenth century, studies of mysticism have presented us with two contrasting conclusions. The first is that mystics all over the world report basically the same experience, and the second is that there are great differences among the reports, and possibly among the experiences. On the positive side there are such works as Huxley's The Perennial Philosophy, with its claim that all mystics say that all beings are manifestations of a Divine Ground, that men learn of this by direct intuition, that men have two natures, one phenomenal and one eternal, and that identification with his eternal nature is the purpose of man. Walter Stace supports this view, in a modified way, with his observation that, while each mystic seems to advance a peculiar explanation of his experience, their statements collectively exhibit strong similarities. Mystics commonly report a consciousness of unity, carrying with it feelings of objectivity, blessedness, and holiness. They describe their experience in paradoxical language, and say that ultimately it is ineffable. These twentieth-century observations are repetitions of those of William James, so that this basic point has become a cliché, and, as R. C. Zaehner says, ‘We have been told ad nauseum that mysticism is the highest expression of religion and that it appears in all ages and in all places in a more or less identical form, often in a religious milieu that would seem to be the reverse of propitious.’


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