CASE NOTE

2001 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick C. Osode

DEFINING THE LIMITS OF PERMISSIBLE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: HOFFMAN V. SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS [2000] 12 BLLR 1365.Perhaps the most positive and exciting aftermath of the apartheid era is the construction of the new South Africa upon the foundation of a Constitution and other legal instruments that are unanimous and unambiguous in two respects. The first is in their proscription of unfair discrimination and the second is in their permission of statutory and other measures aimed at eliminating the effects of past discrimination on those groups of persons who were at the receiving end of same. The provisions of these instruments as well as their tenor and spirit reveal an unmistakable national resolve to break from a culture of racial discrimination to a constitutionally protected culture of human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and colours. Without doubt, the most important of those provisions is the equality clause of the Bill of Rights contained in the second chapter of the Constitution. This probably follows from a realization of the fact that equality is fundamental to “the maintenance and propagation of human rights in a democratic body politic, particularly in an acutely divided society” such as South Africa.

Author(s):  
Felix Dube

The failure of the post-apartheid government to deliver on some of the promises of the South African Bill of Rights, coupled with the appropriation of the Bill of Rights by the international human rights movement, create the impression that the Bill of Rights is a neo-liberal instrument which is irrelevant to the needs of South Africans and the realities of their circumstances. If the people of South Africa are convinced that the Bill of Rights embraces a Western agenda more than it expresses their collective aspirations, it will lose its legitimacy. While acknowledging that the conception of the Bill of Rights is contested between the international human rights movement and some South Africans, this article shows that the Bill of Rights was neither adopted nor borrowed from the international human rights movement. South Africans did not assimilate the International Bill of Rights but conceived their own Bill of Rights in the early decades of the 20th Century. The conception of the South African Bill of Rights was a response to colonialism and apartheid and was not a consequence of tutelage by the international human rights movement.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Freddy Mnyongani

The adoption in 1993 of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (200 of 1993) as the supreme law of the Republic marked a watershed moment in the history of South Africa. It was a moment of transition for which the interim Constitution was to serve as a bridge. In the words of the post-amble: “This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.” (Under the section titled: “National Unity and Reconciliation”.) Given the volatile political context within which South Africa’s transition was negotiated, the drafters of the Constitution saw fit to append a postamble in which they called for the “need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation” (under the section titled: “National Unity and Reconciliation”). For a country where the traditional legal discourse has been the domain of Western liberal values, the inclusion of an African value of ubuntu in the Constitution was in itself “a historic bridge”. In the words ofEtienne Mureinik, if this bridge is to “span the open sewer of violent and contentious transition” those who are entrusted with its upkeep need to know where the bridge is from and where it is leading to. For Mureinik, the interim Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority to a culture of justification where every exercise of power must be justified.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Mangu

After several decades of apartheid rule, which denied human rights to the majority of the population on the ground of race and came to be regarded as a crime against humanity, South Africa adopted its first democratic Constitution in the early 1990s. The 1996 Constitution, which succeeded the 1993 interim Constitution, is considered one of the most progressive in the world. In its founding provisions, it states that South Africa is a democratic state founded on human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms. The Constitution enshrines fundamental human rights in a justiciable Bill of Rights as a cornerstone of democracy. Unfortunately, in the eyes of a number of politicians, officials and lay-persons, the rights in the Bill of Rights accrue to South African citizens only. Xenophobia, which has been rampant since the end of apartheid, seems to support the idea that foreigners should not enjoy these rights. Foreign nationals have often been accused of posing a threat to South African citizens with regard to employment opportunities. In light of the South African legislation and jurisprudence, this article affirms the position of the South African labour law that foreign nationals are indeed protected by the Constitution and entitled to rights in the Bill of Rights, including the rights to work and fair labour practices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-175
Author(s):  
Abiodun Jacob Osuntogun

This article examines the existing statutory and institutional framework for corporate human rights accountability in South Africa. It considers the questions whether corporations are duty bearers and whether they have responsibilities or obligations to respect human rights and the mode of corporate governance model adopted to regulate them. It argues that although the Bill of Rights adequately provides for the culture and entrenchment of corporate accountability for human rights, the possibility of achieving its objective is not certain because there is a wide gap between the fulfilment of the vision of the Constitution and the mechanism adopted for its realisation.


Author(s):  
N Gabru

Human life, as with all animal and plant life on the planet, is dependant upon fresh water. Water is not only needed to grow food, generate power and run industries, but it is also needed as a basic part of human life. Human dependency upon water is evident through history, which illustrates that human settlements have been closely linked to the availability and supply of fresh water. Access to the limited water resources in South Africa has been historically dominated by those with access to land and economic power, as a result of which the majority of South Africans have struggled to secure the right to water. Apartheid era legislation governing water did not discriminate directly on the grounds of race, but the racial imbalance in ownership of land resulted in the disproportionate denial to black people of the right to water. Beyond racial categorisations, the rural and poor urban populations were traditionally especially vulnerable in terms of the access to the right.  The enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, brought the South African legal system into a new era, by including a bill of fundamental human rights (Bill of Rights). The Bill of Rights makes provision for limited socio-economic rights. Besides making provision for these human rights, the Constitution also makes provision for the establishment of state institutions supporting constitutional democracy.  The Constitution has been in operation since May 1996. At this stage, it is important to take stock and measure the success of the implementation of these socio-economic rights. This assessment is important in more ways than one, especially in the light of the fact that many lawyers argued strongly against 1/2the inclusion of the second and third generation of human rights in a Bill of Rights. The argument was that these rights are not enforceable in a court of law and that they would create unnecessary expectations of food, shelter, health, water and the like; and that a clear distinction should be made between first generation and other rights, as well as the relationship of these rights to one another. It should be noted that there are many lawyers and non-lawyers who maintained that in order to confront poverty, brought about by the legacy of apartheid, the socio-economic rights should be included in a Bill of Rights. The inclusion of section 27 of the 1996 Constitution has granted each South African the right to have access to sufficient food and water and has resulted in the rare opportunity for South Africa to reform its water laws completely. It has resulted in the enactment of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 and the National Water Act 36 of 1998.In this paper the difference between first and second generation rights will be discussed. The justiciability of socio-economic rights also warrants an explanation before the constitutional implications related to water are briefly examined. Then the right to water in international and comparative law will be discussed, followed by a consideration of the South African approach to water and finally, a few concluding remarks will be made.


Author(s):  
M K Ingle

The Bill of Rights contained within South Africa’s Constitution features a number of ‘socio- economic rights’. Although these rights are justiciable they are subject to various limitations. They generally entail a positive onus on the part of the state to provide some good – not immediately, but ‘progressively’. Women have a direct interest in the realization of these rights and, where given effect to, they should exert a positive developmental impact. Some authorities are, however, of the opinion that socio-economic rights are not really enforceable. This article contends that the provision of social goods, by the state, should be the concomitant of the disciplined implementation of policy. Delivery should not therefore be contingent upon the legalistic vagaries of the human rights environment.Keywords: Socio-economic rights; justiciability; Bill of Rights; development; South African Constitution; womenDisciplines: Development Studies;Human Rights; Gender Studies; Political Science


The Lancet ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 374 (9705) ◽  
pp. 1867 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Lancet
Keyword(s):  

1991 ◽  
Vol 35 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 21-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albie Sachs

All revolutions are impossible until they happen; then they become inevitable. South Africa has for long been trembling between the impossible and the inevitable, and it is in this singularly unstable situation that the question of human rights and the basics of government in post-apartheid society demands attention.No longer is it necessary to spend much time analysing schemes to modernize, reform liberalize, privatize, or even democratize apartheid. Like slavery and colonialism, apartheid is regarded as irremediably bad. There cannot be good apartheid, or degrees of acceptable apartheid. The only questions are how to end the system as rapidly as possible and how to ensure that the new society which replaces it lives up to the ideals of the South African people and the world community. More specifically, at the constitutional level, the issue is no longer whether to have democracy and equal rights, but how fully to achieve these principles and how to ensure that within the overall democratic scheme, the cultural diversity of the country is accommodated and the individual rights of citizens respected.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Powell

In the early 1970s, the Black Consciousness movement called on black radicals to dissociate themselves from dissident white South Africans, who were accused of frustrating the anti-apartheid cause in order to safeguard their ill-gotten privileges. In turn, liberal whites condemned this separatism as a capitulation to apartheid’s vision of “separate development”, despite the movement’s avowed aspiration towards a nonracial South Africa. This article considers how black separatism affected Nadine Gordimer’s own perspective on the prospect of achieving this aspiration. For Gordimer, Black Consciousness was necessary for black liberation, and she sought ways of reconciling white dissidents with black separatism. Still, these efforts didn’t always sit well together with her continuing belief that if there were to be a place for whites in a majority-ruled South Africa, then they needed to join blacks in a “common culture”. I consider how this tension marks Gordimer’s portraits of whites responding to being rejected by blacks in Burger’s Daughter and July’s People. In both novels, white efforts to resist apartheid’s racial segregations appear to be at odds with black self-liberation, with the effect that whites must find a way of doing without the as-yet deferred prospect of establishing a “common culture” in South Africa.


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