Perpetual War/Perpetual Peace: Kant, Hegel and the End of History

1991 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 39-50
Author(s):  
Kimberly Hutchings

Recently our particular end of history has been characterized as the coming of age of a post-communist, liberal nation-state system and global political economy. On this interpretation of history and international relations, the philosophy of world history is no longer needed, since the meaning of history, its goal and end, are already known. In essence, we have arrived at the Kantian regulative ideal of perpetual peace, not in the form of a world state, but of an international order in which commerce can take over the role of war and deterrence in ensuring progress. In this paper, I will be arguing for a different understanding of the end of history, one which recalls the philosopher's attention to world history as the realm of the self-relation of spirit most in need of philosophical comprehension. In order to do this, I will be examining the differences between Kant's treatment of history and war in the critical philosophy, and Hegel's speculative transformation of that treatment in his own work. It will be argued that in Kant's work a posited end of history serves to undermine the philosophical comprehension of history, by removing that comprehension from history. Whereas in Hegel's work the experienced end of history opens up the understanding of history by acknowledging the philosopher's identity with his time. The paper falls into three sections. In the first part I will present a reading of Kant's philosophy of history and war, and try to illustrate its consequences for attempts to theorise and moralise about world history in the present. In the second part I will demonstrate how Hegel's philosophy of history and war differs from Kant's, giving us an alternative starting point for our contemporary comprehension of the end of history. Finally, I will comment on a recent Hegelian reading of world history by Hayo Krombach, Hegelian Reflections on the Idea of Nuclear War.

1991 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 24-38
Author(s):  
Leon Pompa

The apparent implication of Hegel's conception of philosophical history, that the future must be foreclosed or that history must come to an end, has long been a source of difficulty both for Hegelians themselves and for commentators on Hegel's philosophy. The suggestion that the truth of history can be understood only when reason has actualised itself in the state seems to carry an implication, that there is no further work either for reason or philosophy to do, which is hard to accept given the obvious fact that the present world hardly seems beyond the possibility of rational improvement. It is not my intention in this paper to engage in any direct discussion of previous interpretations. Instead I shall address the substantial problem itself by trying to explain certain requirements of Hegel's philosophy of history and then to develop and examine their consequences for the concept of an end of history.I shall begin by examining some initial reasons why it might be thought that Hegel is committed to the notion of an end of history. A convenient way of doing this is by noting very briefly some features of the philosophical route which leads him to the idea of philosophical history in the Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. As is well known, he begins by identifying a number of different kinds of history, the distinguishing feature of each of which is the historian's viewpoint. Thus the first, original history, is history as written by those who are involved in it and who share the spirit of its time. It is really a kind of contemporary history in which, since the historian shares the spirit of his time, he writes from that viewpoint. But because he writes from within it, he cannot be conscious of his viewpoint and cannot, therefore, transcend it in the sense of understanding it as part of a larger whole. Next come the four forms of reflective history, ie. universal history, pragmatic history, critical history and specialised history, in which each kind of historian tries to transcend the viewpoint of his time in an attempt to view history reflectively. But, for a series of different reasons, each is unsuccessful.


2020 ◽  
Vol 141 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Christian Vassallo

Abstract This paper addresses the following questions about Plato’s concept of ‘history’: (a) is there a ‘philosophy of history’ in Plato’s thought?; (b) if this concept exists, do the dialogues lay out a single, cohesive understanding of ‘history’ or does it vary from text to text?; (c) how does Plato understand the word ‘history’? This inquiry also addresses the role of ‘progress’ in some of the main Platonic dialogues. An in-depth analysis of these texts can also help us find a solution to the problem of the end of ‘history’, when a civilization either physically collapses (due to a catastrophic event) or morally decays (because of the corruption of its citizens and politicians). I argue that Plato’s ‘philosophy of history’ is not necessarily Sisyphean, but that it attempts to work out how to avoid the entropic decay of civilization and to preserve cultural – almost ‘genetic’ – ‘memory’ in order to counter the danger of cyclical regression.


Author(s):  
Will Kynes

The introduction sets this study in the context of the three recent critical approaches it combines: (1) “metacritical” studies of biblical criticism that identify and critically analyze the “historically effected consciousness” that inspired a particular approach to biblical interpretation; (2) “biographies” of texts that examine their origins and effects; and (3) “end- of” books, which, following the lead of Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” (1989), argue, among other things, that old concepts may fade away as perceptions change. The role of genre methodology in perpetuating the Wisdom Literature category and now in challenging it is introduced. Finally, terminological distinctions are made between the Wisdom Literature category and Wisdom as a genre, the Wisdom Schools associated with it, and wisdom as a concept.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 116-128
Author(s):  
Saroj Giri

In The Shock Doctrine Naomi Klein rightly critiques capitalism in its repressive ‘market fundamentalist’ avatar. But she does not problematise ‘democratic capitalism’ or the very form of capitalist democracy. Instead she advocates the latter. Thus for her the role of social movements is limited to the extension of democracy, from the political sphere, to the economic. No problem as such there – until we find that her advocacy for social movements derives from the need to make sure “disillusioned citizens would not go looking once again for a more appealing ideology, whether fascism or Communism” (p. 54). It is hard to overlook her liberal rationale. Neoliberalism must be challenged, since it is a bad candidate to keep the ‘hard left’ in check. Klein functions within the paradigm of the ‘end of ideology’ and the ‘end of history’: anything beyond liberal capitalist democracy takes us to ‘totalitarianism’, where fascism and communism merge. Social movements and people's subjectivity that tend towards the ‘hard left’ (for example, those on the left of Allende's democratic socialism in Chile who were fighting the coup), finds mention in her analysis, if at all, only to be repudiated as a danger. En su La Doctrina del Shock, Naomi Klein critica correctamente al capitalismo en su versión represiva, de ‘fundamentalismo de mercado’, pero no problema-tiza sobre ‘el capitalismo democrático’, o sobre la forma de la democracia capitalista misma. De lo contrario, la apoya. Es decir que para ella el rol de los movimientos sociales se limita a extender la democracia desde la esfera de la política hacia la de la economía. Hasta ahí no hay problema, hasta que nos encontramos con que su apoyo a los movimientos sociales es un resultado de la necesidad de asegurar que “ciudadanxs desilusinadxs no se [metan] en la búsqueda de una ideología más cercana a sus intereses, sea el facismo o el comunismo” (p. 54). Resulta difícil dejar de lado su racionalidad liberal: hay que desafiar al neoliberalismo porque no es buen candidato a mantener a la ‘izquierda dura’ bajo control. Klein funciona claramente dentro del paradigma del ‘fin de las ideologías’ y del ‘fin de la historia’: todo lo que existe más allá de la democracia liberal capitalista es el ‘totalitarismo’, adonde !facismo y comunismo se fusionan! Los movimientos sociales y la subjetividad de quienes tienden hacia la ‘izquierda dura’ (por ejemplo, aquellxs a la izquierda del socialismo democrático de Allende en Chile que lucharon contra el golpe) son mencionados en su análisis (si es que son mencionados) sólo para ser repudiados por ser considerados como un peligro.


1991 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 15-23
Author(s):  
Rüdiger Bubner

In what follows Hegel's philosophy of history as the zenith in historical thinking will be considered from three perspectives.II will begin by discussing the two major reactions among Hegel's nineteenth century successors to the problem of historical finality.IIThen I will go back to Hegel himself in order the analyze the speculative claims of his system with regard to historical time.IIIAnd finally, I will clarify the role played by those formal structures in historical reflexion which continue to fuel the controversy over what Hegel meant by the end of history.


Author(s):  
Vladimir P. Rozhkov ◽  

The article explores the problem of constructing concepts of the end of history. The author draws attention to the anthropogenic, social and historical factors of the emergence and increasing of interest to the topic of finiteness of the historical process. He notes its manifestation in eschatological intentions of theological comprehension and philosophical reflection of the meanings of completing the path of humanity from the past to the present. The author reveals the variable dynamics in the methodology of the philosophy of history, the peculiarity of which at the turn of the second and third millennia is seen in the fact that civilizational projects become dominant. F. Fukuyama and S. Huntington create competing concepts of the end of history in their parameters. The article provides a comparative analysis of methodological tools for designing the proposed models. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion about the limitations of the methodological resource of the civilizational approach, the conceptual implementation of which catalyzes the risk-generating character of the functioning of the international community. Developing the ideas of previous publications, he suggests applying a multi-level methodological synthesis based on the principles of differentiation and complementarity. In his opinion, the synthesis of elements of civilizational and formational methodology with moral and axiological semantic orientations of Christian exegetics can present an interesting perspective in this regard.


2020 ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Artem Khamidulin ◽  

The article analyzes the philosophy of history of N. A. Berdyaev. The starting point of the article is the thesis about the relationship between the problematics of time and historical science. It is noted that for Berdyaev, the philosophy of time is one of the main themes of his philosophy of history. Attention is drawn to the feeling of dissatisfaction experienced by Berdyaev with the fluidity and mobility of time. The perception of the philosopher of time as solicitude and, to a large extent, as an evil or a disease that must be overcome is explicated. The reality of the past and future times equal to the present is revealed. The author demonstrates the bliss inspired by actual experience and philosophy of time. Concept of psychological time of Augustine, which justifies the reality of the past, present and future. Teaching about the instantaneity of the present as a point of interaction between time (historical and cosmic) and eternity (celestial time) of Berdyaev is considered. The possibility of experiencing this kind of moment is considered by Berdyaev on the basis of the existential dimension of time that flows in the depths of the human spirit. The author notes the influence of the teaching about the moment by Danish philosopher Sшren Kierkegaard on Berdyaev. A parallel is drawn between teaching on the meaning of the moment by Berdyaev and the concept of "kairos" of German theologian Paul Tillich. The article analyzes eschatology of Berdyaev, which determines his belonging to the traditions of the Russian religious philosophy of history. Two possible ways to overcome time are revealed: in an instant, i.e. repeatedly during human life, and as a result of the total end of history, which, according to Berdyaev, is also to a large extent a phenomenon of the existential sphere of being. According to Berdyaev, this kind of exit from time gives the opportunity to learn the meaning of history, on the one hand, and to free oneself from the enslaving power of time, on the other. It is concluded that Berdyaev understood the end of history existentially as a special spiritual experience that allows us to overcome time and look at history in terms of eternity.


Napredak ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-140
Author(s):  
Srđan Perišić

The author analyzes the geopolitical restoration of Russia during the first two decades of the 21st century. The starting point is that liberalism and globalism have been trying for four decades to remove all forms of geopolitical differences from the public, societal and political sphere, i.e. all cultural, national, religious, ideological, state variances. This was labelled the end of history. However, despite this, for the last 20 years we have witnessed a return of history. The author shows that the return of history is reflected in the return of Russia to the world stage not only as a great power, but by a general geopolitical renewal in Russia itself. The paper gives three descriptions and analyses of that return. First, the paper analyzes the character of the new Russia. The geopolitical identity and certain geopolitical practices of Russia are examined. Second, the ideological character of the Russian return is considered, which as such represents an alternative to Western liberalism and globalization. Third, the doctrinal determinants of the security and military dimensions of Russia's geopolitics are analyzed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
David Martin Jones

This chapter examines the economic, technological and financial changes that facilitated liberal globalization. To understand, The technological advances of the 1980’s that facilitated globalization rendered rigid, closed, bureaucratic regimes redundant. The economic process established the structural preconditions that enabled the idea that history had ended and a new borderless world of political and economic convergence had emerged. The rise of the middle classes under global market conditions inexorably presaged modernization leading to democratization. Although, for a brief period after 1989, it seemed there might be an illiberal Asian alternative to the end of history, the Asian Financial Crisis (1997) demonstrated the ultimate redundancy of authoritarian alternatives to global liberalism. At the millennium, a democracy friendly ‘golden straightjacket’ shrank the state everywhere and opened it to a liberal institutional order, affording the preconditions for what Immanuel Kant foresaw in 1794 as a universal cosmopolitan and perpetual peace. However, the fact that some undeveloped countries and the blue collar working classes within developed states had lost out in this process of globalization, required, not more liberalization but a new borderless, post ideological, post historical third way in politics to realize perpetual global peace.


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