LIBERAL ASSOCIATIONISM AND THE RIGHTS OF STATES

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 425-449
Author(s):  
David Estlund
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The Right

AbstractIt is often argued that if one holds a liberal political philosophy about individual rights against the state and the community, then one cannot consistently say that a state that violates those principles is owed the right of noninterference. How could the rights of the collective trump the rights of individuals in a liberal view? I believe that this debate calls for more reflection, on the relation between liberalism and individualism. I will sketch a conception of liberalism (“liberal associationism”) in which there is nothing awkward about saying that associations, as such, have some moral (not just, say, legal) rights to noninterference. If liberal associationism is compelling in general terms then, if states (or some of them) can be shown to be associations in the relevant respects, then liberalism itself will supply the moral basis for a right of that kind, held by a state or people as such, to nonintervention.

“Promising” Ideas: Hobbes and contract in Spinoza’s political philosophy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Garrett
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
The State ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Good And Evil

Like Hobbes, Spinoza prominently invokes promising and contracts (covenants) in his discussion of the foundations of the state—primarily, but not exclusively, in his Theological-Political Treatise. His understanding of their nature and significance, however, differs in important ways from that of Hobbes. This chapter poses four related puzzles concerning Spinoza’s claims about promises and contracts as they invoke or relate specifically to Hobbes: “whether the right of nature is preserved intact”; whether “reason urges peace in all circumstances”; whether breaking a promise is ever “in accordance with reason”; and whether one is obligated to keep a pledge extorted by a robber. Next, it analyzes and compares the doctrines of Hobbes and Spinoza on several key topics: rights and powers, good and evil, reason and passion, and faith and deception (both “evil deception” [“dolus malus”] and “good deception” [“dolus bonus”]). Finally, it employs these doctrines to resolve the four puzzles.

Recht und Pflicht – Einschränkungen von Freiheit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.

The Principles Governing Public Authority Liability in Poland

2020 ◽  
pp. 66-68
Author(s):  
Marek Wierzbowski ◽  
Marek Grzywacz ◽  
Joanna Róg Dyrda ◽  
Katarzyna Ziółkowska
Keyword(s):  
General Principle ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
The State ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Administrative Procedures ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
The Right

Before 1989, Polish courts in some cases affirmed the liability of the State on the basis of existing legislative provisions. After 1989, the Constitution admits administrative liability in very general terms, because everyone shall have the right to be awarded damages for any harm done by administrative action contrary to the law. The more detailed provisions of the Civil Code implement such general principle. More generally, the liability of administrative authorities is regarded as being subject to private law standards. However, in some cases illegality per se will not suffice for liability. This is the case, in particular, for administrative acts that are characterized by real discretion. Moreover, administrative procedures are regulated by parliamentary legislation. Another particular feature of Polish law is that, to prove the unlawfulness of the action taken by administrative authorities, on both procedural and substantive grounds, claimants must bring an action before administrative courts.

scholarly journals THE EDUCATIONAL POLICIES OF THE SERBIAN STATE TO THE ALBANIAN MINORITY IN SERBIA

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-136
Author(s):  
Liburn Mustafë Mustafa
Keyword(s):  
Mother Tongue ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Right To Education ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
The Past ◽  
Mother Country ◽  
International Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
Culture Tradition

The right to be educated in mother tongue is considered among the most important human rights in the contemporary world. Such a right is guaranteed to the all world communities in spite of the state and international rights, regardless of the location, extent, and size of the community. Every state is obliged to respect and make possible the realization of the rights to be educated in their language to every minority within it, because the right to education in mother tongue is now considered a crucial tool for preserving and strengthening the cultural and ethnic identity, and vice versa, the non-implementation of these rights to certain communities implies the state's tendency towards these communities. Also, minorities are predestined that the educations in their language attend similar to their mother country, based on textbooks and curricula of the respective states, as such a right is guaranteed by international norms and conventions. But such a thing, very often faces a strong resistance from the states where these minorities are, because in these textbooks is reflected the history, culture and tradition of the past, which in most cases is a clash between identities and produce numerous value controversies between the parties. This situation is particularly reflected in some Balkan countries where ethnic minorities are not "bridges" between communities but are "quarrelsome" among communities. In such a situation is the Albanian minority in Serbia, who because of the conflicting past between the two nationalities, the Albanian and the Serbs, are victimized by preventing the right to learn their history, culture, tradition and their mother tongue. Thus the Serbian state, because of the past between the two nations and issues still open with the state of Kosovo, denies Albanians in Serbia using textbooks from this country. This form of approach reflects state policies on curricula and textbooks currently being implemented by the Albanian minority. In this paper we will explain the problems faced by the Albanian minority in Serbia in the field of education, respectively the problems of the lack of textbooks in Albanian language. We will present the causes and obstacles of the lack of school textbooks in Albanian language in Presheva Valley schools, strategies developed by various factors to solve this problem, implicated parties, legal rights issues and the possible solution of this problem.

Autonomy in Political Philosophy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Elster
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Large Degree ◽  
The State ◽  
Mental Abilities ◽  
Relational Aspect ◽  
Laws And Policies ◽  
The Right ◽  
Common Understanding ◽  
Instrumental Reasons

The concept of autonomy is one of the key concepts of political philosophy. It plays an important role in discussions of the limits of state coercion, in particular in arguments against paternalistic laws and policies, and in questions concerning the legitimacy and authority of the state. Although the term “autonomy” is used in different ways, a common understanding of the concept of autonomy relates to the idea of leading one’s own life: the autonomous person develops her own understanding of how her life should be and acts accordingly, without interference by others. Autonomy plays three main roles in political philosophy. First, autonomy provides a goal, to be realized through political means; this requires that the state protect people from interference with their autonomy, ensure the availability of sufficient resources, and foster the mental abilities necessary for autonomy. Not least, promoting autonomy can entail that the form of government be democratic, as citizens’ autonomy is best protected in a democratic regime. Next, autonomy can impose a set of constraints, limiting the legitimate use of coercion in realizing political goals. First, coercion can only be used for certain purposes. The most well-known constraint of this kind involves the rejection of paternalism: coercion may never be used to promote a person’s own good against her will. Next, there are constraints connected with the kind of justification that can be given for coercive actions: in order to be compatible with autonomy, these must be justified in ways that the coerced have actually accepted or could have accepted. Finally, autonomy can play a role in arguments about the grounds for political authority. Although authority and autonomy might seem to be inimical, autonomy can ground the right to command either through citizens’ consent or through their voluntary actions by which they become committed to follow a common set of rules. Autonomy can only play these roles if it is valuable, and there are several arguments why autonomy is valuable. First, there are instrumental reasons: the good both of individuals and of society is best served if people have a large degree of autonomy. Next, people have an interest in their choices and actions being their own, representative of who they are. Also, there is a strong symbolic and relational aspect to the right to autonomy: being denied this right is insulting and amounts to a denial of one’s equal standing. Finally, there might be an intrinsic value to autonomy, as only autonomy allows us to be fully human.

Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Free Market ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
The State ◽  
Marxist Theory ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Central Value ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
The Right

In political philosophy ‘libertarianism’ is a name given to a range of views that take as their central value liberty or freedom. Although occasionally the term is applied to versions of anti-authoritarian Marxist theory (the ‘libertarian left’), more commonly it is associated with views that champion individual rights to ‘self-ownership’ and oppose paternalistic or moralistic legislation (for example, laws regulating sexual behaviour or the consumption of alcohol or drugs). In the contemporary literature libertarianism comes in two main forms: ‘right libertarianism’, which endorses particularly pure forms of capitalism, and ‘left libertarianism’ which combines an endorsement of self-ownership with the view that distribution of natural resources should be regulated on some sort of egalitarian basis. Right libertarians endorse the free market and unfettered free exchange. Liberty, on such a view, is identified with the absence of interference by the state or by others. The legitimate state exists purely to guard individual rights, protecting people and their property from force, theft and fraud. This is the ‘minimal state’ or ‘nightwatchman state’ of classical liberalism. The state has no authority to engage in the redistribution of property (except to rectify the effects of theft, and so on) or, in certain versions at least, to pursue policies designed to further the common good. Such activities are viewed by the right libertarian as illegitimate interferences with an individual’s right to do what they wish with their own person or property. Left libertarianism modifies this picture considerably, by arguing that extensive state intervention is needed to enforce those principles of justice that are necessary to ensure some form of egalitarian distribution of the world’s resources.

scholarly journals The Nexus between State Liability Principle and WTO Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-342
Author(s):  
Intan Innayatun Soeparna
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Liability ◽  
The Right

Abstract There are two functions of the state liability principle. The first is to secure individual rights (including economic rights) from a wrongful act conducted by a government, and the second is to compensate for damage caused by the infringement of individual right. Economic right is inherently allowing an individual to pursue economic interest both domestically or globally. In order to accommodate this right, a government is obliged to provide trade rules and mechanisms for every individual to conduct their global economic activities by participating in the WTO. The objective of the WTO significantly corresponds to the individual’s right in order to obtain trade benefits. Hence, when a government infringes trade rules and mechanisms underlined in WTO Law, it will directly restrict individuals from gaining trade benefits under the WTO or, moreover, it will restrain individuals from enjoying their inviolable economic rights. When the right is violated, and the damage occurs, it thus leads to the obligation for the government to compensate the damage according to the state liability principle. This article discusses the nexus between the state liability principle and WTO Law, in order to encourage national courts to exercise the function of state liability by referring to the infringement of economic rights caused by the violation of WTO Law.

Liberalism, Democracy, and Development: Philosophical Dilemmas in Third World Politics

1982 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Third World ◽  
World Politics ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Democratic Equality

In Western societies, the democratic franchise came after the liberal state was firmly established. In Third World countries, the imposition of liberal democracy may generate contradictions between the market and traditional sectors of the polity. Furthermore, liberalism favours restrictive authority in order to safeguard individual rights against the state. In Third World contexts, the more urgent need may be for an interventionist state that will create conditions of minimum democratic equality for all. A government subject to constitutional checks and judicial review may cut across the developmental requirement of permissive authority. These abstract issues of political philosophy can be profitably discussed with respect to recent controversies in India.

LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION

Legal Theory ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 156-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
American Constitution ◽  
State Coercion ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACTThe article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in the same-sex marriage caseObergefell v. Hodgesas the springboard for a general enquiry into the nature and existence of a constitutional right to liberty under the American Constitution. The discussion is divided into two main parts. The first examines the meaning and the justifiability of there being a moral right to liberty as a matter of political philosophy. Two such rights are distinguished and defended: first, a right not to be coerced by the state when the state is motivated by improper reasons (prominent among which are paternalistic reasons); and second, a right not to be coerced by the state when there are insufficient justifying reasons for the state to do so, irrespective of how such state coercion may be motivated. Neither right is regarded as “absolute,” and so it is morally permissible for the state to override such rights in certain circumstances. The second part of the article examines the distinct and additional considerations that must be taken into account when these two moral rights to liberty are fashioned into corresponding legal rights under American constitutional law. Both such rights survive the transformation, but each becomes altered somewhat in its content. This legal transformation includes recognition of the nonabsolute nature of moral rights, such recognition taking the form of some doctrine of “compelling state interests.” The discussion in these two main parts of the article is prefaced with a defense of the article's use of political philosophy to inform constitutional law, a defense motivated by Chief Justice Robert's denunciation of such an approach to constitutional law in his opinion inObergefell.

The right to space production and the right to necessity: Insurgent versus legal rights of Palestinians in Jerusalem

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yosef Jabareen
Keyword(s):  
Space Structure ◽  
The State ◽  
State Of Exception ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Production Of Space ◽  
Alternative Source ◽  
Disadvantaged Groups ◽  
Basic Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
Space Production

The major problem with theories of the right to the city is that they inherently assume that states are the sole provider of rights and that, in liberal–democratic countries, legal rights are conceptually universal and apply to all individuals equally. I challenge these assumptions and maintain that in some situations, when the state and its governing apparatus violate or deny the very basic rights of a social or ethnic collective, the group itself becomes an alternative source of informal rights. I conceive this violation of basic needs as a necessity state of affairs, which constitutes a true and proper source of law and it makes the right to space production and the right to necessity. Thus, the state of necessity is the source of these informal rights and law, and necessity gives them the legitimation they needs. The disadvantaged groups, the community, not the State, give it the legitimation they need. As Agamben suggests in his State of Exception, that necessity has no law and necessity creates it own law. From this perspective, the right to the production of space is a plane of contradictions and struggle over the distribution of resources and rights among people in general, and between the state and its local government and planning and development institutions in particular. Seen in this light, it is clear that the right to the production of space entails not only formal legal rights but also the informal rights, the right to necessity, generated and invoked by disadvantaged groups. The production of space, then, is born and reborn at the heart of the contradictions between formal and informal rights, and between the state’s planning apparatus and spatial agenda on the one hand and the status of disadvantaged groups on the other. The conceptual framework offered here seeks to resolve and overcome these contradictions through its contingent relations between legal rights, which are produced and distributed by the state, and the rights of necessity generated and invoked by the collective. From this perspective, the right to the production of space offers a normative framework for illuminating the relationship between the production of space, structure, and power relations at the state and city level and their relations with collective groups, as well as a means of struggle for basic rights of recognition and of the reorganization of urban society.

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