Game Theory and the History of Ideas about Rationality: An Introductory Survey

1993 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann E. Cudd

Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality that claim it is fundamentally social and aims at understanding and molding all facets of human psychological life, game theory takes rationality to be essentially located in individuals and to concern only the means to achieve predetermined ends. Thus, there are some thinkers who have made important contributions to this history who do not appear in the story of game theory at all, among them, Plato, Kant, and Hegel. There is, however, a clear trail to follow linking theories of instrumental rationality from Aristotle to the nineteenth-century marginalist economists and ultimately to von Neumann and Morgenstern and contemporary game theorists, that historically grounds game theory as a model of rational interaction.

2015 ◽  
pp. 1849-1872
Author(s):  
Ben Tran

In 1954, the British philosopher Richard Braithwaite gave his inaugural lecture, Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite predicted game theory would fundamentally change moral philosophy. However, in hindsight, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour was the moment modern game theory entered the discipline of ethics. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between game theory and business ethics. In other words, this chapter explains how game theory plays a role in business ethics and affects business ethics for emerging economies and covers in detail: 1) the history of game theory; 2) types of/definition(s) of games; 3) business ethics; 4) business; and 5) ethics. The chapter concludes with the role that game theory and business ethics play in emerging economies.


Author(s):  
Stephen K. Reed

The power of abstract thinking is captured by the brilliance of John von Neumann who made many contributions to mathematics, computer science, and game theory. One definition of abstraction is that an instance exists only in the mind (the word truth) rather than in the environment (the word car). An advantage of the latter, concrete examples is they support the formation of visual images to aid recall. A second definition of abstraction is a focus on the most important attributes of an instance. These attributes include those that differentiate one object from another or one category from another. A third definition of abstraction is that an abstract idea applies to many particular instances of a category. Prototypes, rules, and schema are examples.


Author(s):  
Ben Tran

In 1954, the British philosopher Richard Braithwaite gave his inaugural lecture, Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite predicted game theory would fundamentally change moral philosophy. However, in hindsight, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour was the moment modern game theory entered the discipline of ethics. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between game theory and business ethics. In other words, this chapter explains how game theory plays a role in business ethics and affects business ethics for emerging economies and covers in detail: 1) the history of game theory; 2) types of/definition(s) of games; 3) business ethics; 4) business; and 5) ethics. The chapter concludes with the role that game theory and business ethics play in emerging economies.


2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry McMullin

In the late 1940s John von Neumann began to work on what he intended as a comprehensive “theory of [complex] automata.” He started to develop a book length manuscript on the subject in 1952. However, he put it aside in 1953, apparently due to pressure of other work. Due to his tragically early death in 1957, he was never to return to it. The draft manuscript was eventually edited, and combined for publication with some related lecture transcripts, by Burks in 1966. It is clear from the time and effort that von Neumann invested in it that he considered this to be a very significant and substantial piece of work. However, subsequent commentators (beginning even with Burks) have found it surprisingly difficult to articulate this substance. Indeed, it has since been suggested that von Neumann's results in this area either are trivial, or, at the very least, could have been achieved by much simpler means. It is an enigma. In this paper I review the history of this debate (briefly) and then present my own attempt at resolving the issue by focusing on an analysis of von Neumann's problem situation. I claim that this reveals the true depth of von Neumann's achievement and influence on the subsequent development of this field, and further that it generates a whole family of new consequent problems, which can still serve to inform—if not actually define—the field of artificial life for many years to come.


2019 ◽  
pp. 199-230
Author(s):  
Alan Bollard

In Japan conventional bombing had not proved sufficient: it was the atom bomb that ultimately brought surrender. The brilliant Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann had worked on the Manhattan Project and identified Hiroshima as a bombing target. He went on to design computers that helped build bigger bombs. In addition he developed an original mathematical approach to modelling a dynamic economy that helped economists advance their modelling. With the Cold War looming, he and colleague Oskar Morgenstern pioneered the new subject of game theory which the big powers used to model their post-war defence tactics, and led to the classic 1950s strategy of ‘mutually-assured destruction’.


Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare

This chapter addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior. Using one of perfect deterrence theory’s constituent models, a logically consistent game-theoretic explanation for the absence of a superpower conflict during the Cold War era is provided. As well, the chapter discusses a prescription based on an incorrect prediction attributed to John von Neumann, one of the cofounders of game theory. It also examines a logically inconsistent explanation of the long peace offered by Thomas Schelling, the game theorist many consider the most important strategic thinker in the field of security studies. The argument is made that a predictively inaccurate or logically inconsistent game model in no way undermines the utility of game theory as a potentially powerful methodological tool.


2005 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
konrad hirschler

this article examines whether it is possible to trace eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revivalist thought to earlier ‘medieval’ examples. the discussion is centred on the issue of ijtiha¯d/taqli¯d, which featured prominently in revivalist thought. taking the example of scholars in thirteenth-century damascus, it firstly compares the respective readings of ijtiha¯d/taqli¯d, by focusing on one individual, abu¯ sha¯ma (d. 1267). it secondly asks whether a scholar like abu¯ sha¯ma, who had adopted a reading similar to later revivalists, also took a critical and oppositional stand against large sections of his contemporary society, i.e. a revivalist posture. it is this article's main contention that the example of abu¯ sha¯ma shows the need to study in more detail possible revivalist traditions prior to the ‘grand’ movements. the combination of the history of ideas and social history might allow a deeper understanding of how and in what contexts calls for reform and opposition to the current state of affairs were expressed.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Fanning ◽  
Michelle Assay

It is well known that Nielsen’s two-movement Fifth Symphony is strongly dualistic in character. The composer himself commented that ‘A title such as “Dreams and Deeds” [Drøm og Daad] could maybe sum up the inner picture I had in front of my eyes when composing’. But it is by no means clear at what level that duality and others he mentioned are actually embodied in the work, or where it stands in relation to other two-movement symphonies composed before and after. Building on an essay by David Fanning in Carl Nielsen Studies 4, the present article fi rst considers these questions in the light of the model for symphonism proposed by the Russian scholar Mark Aranovsky. The Fifth Symphony and those two-movement symphonies found to contain the most fundamental and polarised dualities are then variously related to religious and philosophical traditions that stress dualism – from Zoroastrianism, through Yin and Yang, to Sufism, touching in passing on the philosophy of the mind and on Jung. The aim is to gain a richer and clearer picture of the uniqueness of Nielsen’s Fifth in relation both to symphonic tradition and to the history of ideas.


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