On Pierre Duhem

1987 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. J. Gurevich

Duhem's great contribution to the study of the history of medieval science is indisputable. His book remains an excellent source of information concerning the ideas of the epoch's thinkers about the foundations of the universe. Ariew's painstaking translation of a considerable portion of Duhem's ten-volume work deserves the deep gratitude of all those interested in medieval science. Le Systéme du monde regains its actuality. Nevertheless, to write now about a book produced by this great scholar at the beginning of the century is not an easy undertaking, and involves some risk. Too many changes have taken place in the principles of studying the history of science during the seventy-odd years since the book was written, and some notions that seemed then to be perfectly clear are not so simple and indisputable now. With profound respect for this feat of scholarship, I should like to make some observations in connection with the recent English publication of Duhem's book.

1987 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven J. Livesey

The publication of this volume appears to be the most recent in a group of works whose appearance marks renewed interest in Duhem. Over the past ten years, attention has been focused on Duhem's life (Jaki 1984), his physics (Jaki 1984; Nye 1986, 208–23), his philosophy of science (Jaki 1984, chap. 9; Paul 1979, chap. 5; Ariew 1984),' and his history of science (Jaki 1984, chap. 10; Martin 1976). But the significance of this translation is that - leaving asideTo Save the Phenomena– for the first time we have a partial translation into English of one of the two great historical works that revitalized the study of medieval science.


Among the Blagden papers recently acquired by the Royal Society is a considerable portion of the diary of Sir Charles Blagden himself, closely written in difficult handwriting from edge to edge of the paper on hundreds of small sheets. The complete decipherment and transcription of this diary may take a long time, if it is ever done. But it was thought that the Fellows and those engaged in the history of science at the close of the eighteenth century might be interested in a sample of the diary of this man, Secretary of the Royal Society from 1784 to 1797, who was closely associated with many of the persons and events which made those days memorable in the history of science. Even before his appointment to the Secretaryship of the Royal Society, when he was acting as Secretary to Henry Cavendish, it was he who informed Lavoisier in June 1783 that Cavendish had burned inflammable air and obtained water. On this information Lavoisier repeated the experiment and solved the problem of the composition of water.


2002 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 291-299
Author(s):  
Milan M. Ćirković

Recent intriguing discussion of heat death by Kutrovátz is critically examined. It is shown that there exists another way of answering the heat death puzzle, already present in the ancient philosophical tradition. This alternative route relies not only on the final duration of time (which has been re-discovered in modern times), but also on the notion of observational self-selection, which has received wide publicity in the last several decades under the title of the anthropic principle(s). We comment here on some further deficiencies of the account of Kutrovátz. Although the questions Kutrovátz raises are important and welcome, there are several errors in his treatment of cosmology which mar his account of the entire topic. In addition, the nascent discipline of physical eschatology holds promise of answering the basic explanatory task concerning the future evolution of the universe without appealing to metaphysics. This is a completely novel feature in the history of science, in contradistinction to the historical examples discussed by Kutrovátz.


KronoScope ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-111
Author(s):  
Christophe Bouton

Abstract This paper deals with the problem of the emergence of time in three different ways, at the intersection of the history of philosophy and the history of science: 1) the emergence of time with subjectivity examined on the basis of Kant’s idealism; 2) the emergence of time with life, considered in the light of the work of Bergson; 3) the emergence of time with the Universe, in relation to the notions of ‘The Big Bang’ and ‘The Planck Wall’. It concludes that the idea of the emergence of time is inconsistent in a diachronic sense, and problematic in a synchronic sense. One meaning could, however, be accorded to this notion: with life, a new relation to time has emerged and has attained one of its most developed forms with the human being.


2008 ◽  
Vol 17 (06) ◽  
pp. 831-856
Author(s):  
VIRGINIA TRIMBLE

The history of science can be recounted in many ways: by addressing the work of one person or school; by starting with the ancients and working chronologically up to the present; by focusing on a particular century; or by tracing a particular important idea as far back and forward as it can be found. The present discussion does none of these. Rather, it adopts the ordering of a standard introductory astronomy textbook, from the solar system via stars and galaxies, to the universe as a whole, and in each regime picks out a few issues that were controversial or wrongly decided for a long time. For each, I attempt to identify a duration of the period of uncertainty or error and some of the causes of the confusion. This is surely not an original idea, though I am not aware of having encountered it elsewhere, and it is not one that is likely to appeal to most 21st century historians of science, for whom the question "Who first got it right?" is not necessarily an important, or even appropriate, one. Some of the stories have been told as historical introductions to conferences and are here summarized and brought up to date. Others I had not previously addressed.


Author(s):  
J. D. North

This chapter examines the progress of British study on the history of medieval science and medicine during the twentieth century. It explains that the history of science has been moderately well represented within the universities of the western world for rather more than a century, and has enjoyed a secure place in British universities for about half of that time. It describes major British publications on these subjects and discusses international precedents, the role of the University College London and the historical instruments and alchemy.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 186-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Thijssen

AbstractThe so-called 'Buridan school' at the University of Paris has obtained a considerable fame in the history of science. Pierre Duhem had made some bold claims about the achievements by John Buridan and his 'pupils' Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony in the field of medieval dynamics. Although generally, Duhem's views are no longer accepted, the idea of a 'Buridan school' has survived. This idea is, however, misleading. John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony should rather be viewed as members of an intellectual network. While interested in similar philosophical themes and understanding each other's conceptual language, they also disagreed about numerous topics. One case in point is the nature of motion, as discussed in their respective Questions on the Physics. Despite the common features of the language in which they discuss motion, the three thinkers defend different positions. This article compares the three sets of Questions on the Physics and presents a critical edition of Buridan's "ultima lectura", Book III, q. 7.


1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem Kellner

An interesting question arises in the context of the typically medieval description of the universe presented at the beginning of Maimonides' (1138–1204) great law code, the Mishneh Torah. What was Maimonides' own attitude towards that account? Was it meant only as a statement of the best description of nature available at the time (and thus radically distinct from the halakhic (i.e. Jewish legal) matters which make up the bulk of the Mishneh Torah) or was it meant to be a description of the true nature of the universe as it really is, not subject to revision in the light of new paradigms or new models (and thus essentially similar to the halakhic matters in the text)? Answering this question will lead us to a better understanding of Maimonides' understanding of the nature of science and of what I shall call, for lack of a better term, scientific progress. Maimonides will be shown to hold that while sublunar science can reach perfection and completion such is not possible for superlunar science and that to the extent that the scientific matters in the Mishneh Torah deal with the latter they could not have been presented as the final description of the universe as it truly is.


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