Intervening Agency and the Right of Non-Sacrifice

2019 ◽  
pp. 195-211
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
The Right ◽  
Primary Agent

This chapter argues for the extension of an idea from the previous chapter, that of a right of non-sacrifice. It argues that this right exists in certain cases of intervening agency: when the intervening agent presents the primary agent with a choice either to submit to suffering a harm or to resist, knowing that the intervening agent will then harm others. The argument proceeds in four parts. First, the chapter explains why such a case is puzzling; second, it dismisses two unsuccessful attempts to resolve the puzzle; third, it explains why intervening agency sometimes has the effect of changing the nature of the causal structure in which an agent acts, though noting as well that intervening agency is not unique in having that effect; and finally, it explores how these ideas might be relevant to just war theory and eliminative killing in that context.

Dimensions of Intentions

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Tadros
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Double Effect ◽  
Doctrine Of Double Effect ◽  
Military Action ◽  
Terror Bombing ◽  
The Right

This chapter partially defends the significance of intentions to permissibility against critics and explores some different views about their relevance by exploring a range of contexts in just war theory where views about the significance of intentions make a difference in our judgments about the permissibility of military action. It clarifies two components of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) and distinguishes different versions of it. It then compares the DDE with some competing explanations of the intuitive difference between terror bombing and tactical bombing, arguing that the DDE is an important component of the right overall view of the permissibility of killing in war.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Current State ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right

Much contemporary just war theory is modeled on the theory of self-defense. The dominant account of rights used by people interested in the right of self-defense is doubly problematic: its internal tensions undermine the plausibility of the views people try to defend, and it is in some ways morally distorting. This book is primarily concerned with developing and then deploying a new account of rights, one that will put the discussion of the right to defend against threats on more solid footing. The introductory chapter covers four themes. First, to explain why the current state of just war theory calls for a new account of rights, the chapter traces a brief history of recent discussions of the right of self-defense. Second, the chapter describes when it is permissible to defend against threats. Third, it explains how this relates to current law and to other philosophical work on the topic. Finally, it sketches an outline of the rest of the book.

Internecine War Killings

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
CÉCILE FABRE
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Interesting Issue ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Military ◽  
Self Defence

In his recent bookKilling in War, McMahan develops a powerful argument for the view that soldiers on opposite sides of a conflict are not morally on a par once the war has started: whether they have the right to kill depends on the justness of their war. In line with just war theory in general, McMahan scrutinizes the ethics of killing the enemy. In this article, I accept McMahan's account, but bring it to bear on the entirely neglected, but nevertheless interesting, issue of what the military call ‘blue-on-blue’ killings or, as I refer to such acts here, internecine war killings. I focus on the case of the soldier who is ordered by his officer, at gunpoint, to go into action or to kill innocent civilians, and who kills his officer in self-defence. I argue that, at the bar of McMahan's account of the right to kill in self-defence, the officer lacks a justification for attacking the soldier as a means of enforcing his order, and the soldier thus sometimes (but not always) has the right to kill his officer should the latter so act.

scholarly journals ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF ARMED STRUGGLE IN ISLAM

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-135
Author(s):  
Sami Ud Din ◽  
Dr. Dost Muhammad
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Armed Struggle ◽  
Life And Death ◽  
The Holy Quran ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

Armed struggle is an issue of life- and -death judgments and that’s why it needs solid justification from ethical and religious principles. Defending human life and preserving the society from anarchy, disintegration and destruction sometimes waging armed struggle become necessary and a group of people or nation is compelled to do so. Now one of the important aspects in this regard is, in which circumstances the nation is allowed for an armed struggle. All of the major world religions provide guidelines in this domain from strong militancy to absolute pacifism and just war theory. Islam too acknowledges the right of defense and preserving life to human beings. This paper seeks to map out the ideological approaches to armed struggle in Islam. The important scriptures from the holy Quran, Narrations of the holy prophet are briefly introduced and the relevant verses are extracted and summarized in the light of exegesis.

Beyond National Defense

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rodin
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Moral Authority ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
The Right

In War and Self-Defense I attempt to generate a dilemma for the just war theory by arguing that the right of national defense cannot be reduced to personal rights of self-defense, nor can it be explained through an analogy with them. Jeff McMahan, David Mapel, and Fernando Tesón doubt this conclusion. In response I argue, first, that their objections are not as opposed to my basic project as they may at first appear. This is because they are premised on a conception of national defense that differs substantially from mainstream just war theory and international law. Second, I argue that McMahan's and Mapel's defense of the reductive argument is unconvincing because (among other things) it is premised on an inadequate view of the norm of proportionality. On the other hand Tesón's defense of the analogical view, based on a conception of the moral value of the just institutions of a legitimate state, cannot account for certain basic features of the international legal and moral order. These include the presumption that even unjust states can possess the right of self-defense against aggression and that it is impermissible for one just state to conquer and rule another just state. Finally I argue that the attempt to bolster the right of national defense through the concept of punishment is inappropriate because it ignores the crucial requirement for proper moral authority in the agent of punishment.

Debating Targeted Killing

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Meisels ◽  
Jeremy Waldron
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Targeted Killing ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Right

In this “for and against” book, Jeremy Waldron and Tamar Meisels defend competing positions on the legitimacy of targeted killing. The volume begins with a joint introduction, briefly setting out the terms of discussion, and presenting a short historical overview of the practice—i.e. what is targeted killing, and how has it been used in which conflicts and by whom. The debate opens with Meisels’ defense of targeted killing as a legitimate and desirable defensive anti-terrorism strategy, in keeping with both just war theory and international law. Meisels unreservedly defends the named killing of irregular combatants, most notably terrorists, during armed conflict. Additionally, she offers a possible moral justification for rare instances of assassination outside that framework, specifically with reference to recent cases of nuclear scientists developing weapons of mass destruction for the Iranian and Syrian governments. The debate continues with Waldron’s arguments focusing on the dangers and the inherent wrongness of governments’ having the right to maintain death lists—lists of named individuals who are to be hunted down and killed. Waldron notes the many differences between individualized targeting and ordinary combat, and he resists the attempt to assimilate targeted killing to killings in combat. Waldron also cautions us to consider carefully what a world of targeted killings will be like, the many abuses it is liable to, and why we should be very cautious, morally and strategically, in our thinking about it.

The Right to Wage Private Wars of Subsistence

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Johan Olsthoorn
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Grounding Resistance ◽  
Basic Rights ◽  
Central Tenet ◽  
Just War Doctrine ◽  
The Right

Some philosophers have recently argued for the revisionist just war doctrine that individuals can have the right to initiate war in defense of their human rights when their government fails in its duty to protect them. It was a central tenet of early modern just war theory, too, that when judicial recourse is not available, individuals are entitled to enforce their basic rights by force of war. How should we conceptualize such remedial rights to secure basic rights by armed force? And where to fit such rights within ethical theories of war? This chapter explores these questions by critically contrasting two ways to ground individual rights to wage so-called “private subsistence wars”: via “modern” duties of global justice and via “old” rights of necessity. I argue that the right-of-necessity model—for better or worse—can sidestep problems of indeterminate and underdetermined moral liability by grounding resistance rights in enforceable rights (of subsistence) rather than in enforceable duties (of global justice). My analysis thus charts normative implications of dispensing with the legitimate authority condition by analyzing what it means for rights and duties to be enforceable.

Basic Premises and Method

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Just War ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
High Level

The reigning method in moral philosophy is the search for reflective equilibrium. An interesting feature of contemporary moral philosophy is how much weight most theorists put on matching intuitions in test cases, rather than finding plausible, relevant, high-level moral principles that can be used to generate mid-level principles and judgments in particular situations. This chapter covers four themes in two groups. The first group concerns the author’s general approach to moral theory. It includes the role of theory and cases in the author’s own work and the role of evidence and facts in justification. The second group concerns two topics specifically relevant to just war theory: reductive individualism and the distinctive causal structure of eliminative killing.

Intending war rightly: Right intentions, public intentions, and consent

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 634-653
Author(s):  
Eric Grynaviski
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
History Of Political Thought ◽  
Political Issue ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Normative Status

AbstractThis article defends the normative status of the right intentions requirement in just war theory. Before we turn to many ethical questions about a conflict – whether there was just cause or whether a war was fought well – we often begin by asking whether the war was rightly intended. Particularly in the contemporary world, where questions of humanitarian intentions and their place in international law is an important political issue, clarifying what we mean by right intentions and showing why they matter is politically very important. Unfortunately, despite the importance of right intentions in the history of political thought, recent discussions give the concept mixed attention, leaving it obscure and difficult to apply. The first section reviews four traditional accounts, showing their underlying (and important) differences and respective weaknesses. The second section of the article argues that these models fail because they are rooted in private instead of public reason. A model of right intentions as public intentions is described and justified, where an intention is only right when the motives that underlie it can be endorsed by the group it is supposed to aid, and the opportunities it provides that group are endorsable by the intervener.

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