Lift High the Cross? An American Perspective on Lautsi v Italy

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-343
Author(s):  
John Witte

The European Court of Human Rights has upheld Italy's policy of displaying crucifixes in its public school classrooms. In Lautsi v Italy, an atheist mother of two state school children challenged this policy, in place since 1924. After losing in the Italian courts, she appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the presence of these crucifixes in schools violated her and her children's rights to religious freedom and to a secular education guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. On 3 November 2009, a unanimous seven-judge chamber of the European Court held for Ms Lautsi. On 18 March 2011, the Grand Chamber reversed this decision and held 15 to 2 in favour of the Government of Italy.

Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis

This chapter discusses whether there is a non-religious justification for limiting religiously offensive speech. The most commonly used argument is that the right to freedom of religion includes a more specific right to be protected from offence to one’s religious sensibilities. If this is correct, it provides a non-religious reason for censorship: even those who are hostile to religion can accept that religious freedom is an important right and that the government is justified in giving effect to rights. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly upheld restrictions on expression which insults religious feelings, reasoning that religious freedom, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, protects the religious sensibilities of believers from offence. I suggest that this interpretation is mistaken. After exploring how rights give rise to claims, I argue that there is no right-based claim to be protected from the unpleasant feelings caused by religious insults. Therefore, it is unpersuasive to describe cases of religious offence as involving the conflict of two fundamental rights—speech and religion—which require a balancing exercise to decide which one will prevail each time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Kaushik Paul

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Donoghue ◽  
Claire-Michelle Smyth

Abstract Abortion has been a controversial topic in Irish law and one which the Government has been forced to address following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A, B and C v. Ireland. The Working Group established to make recommendations have specifically been instructed to deal only with the issues raised in the A, B and C judgment and legislate on the basic of the ‘X case’. This restricted approach calls for legalisation of abortion only where the life of the mother is at risk, a position unique only to Ireland and Andorra within Europe. The vast majority of member states to the European Convention on Human Rights allow for legal abortion on the basis of foetal abnormality and with this emerging consensus the margin of appreciation hitherto afforded by the European Court to member states is diminishing. The advancement and availability of non-invasive genetic tests that can determine foetal abnormalities together with the ruling in R. R. v. Poland leaves Ireland in a precarious position for omitting any reference to foetal abnormalities in any proposed legislation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-280
Author(s):  
Jill I. Goldenziel

In Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber or Court) released a landmark opinion with broad implications for how states must respect the individual rights of migrants. In the judgment, issued on December 15, 2016, the Court held that Italy's treatment of migrants after the Arab Spring violated the requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that migrants receive procedural guarantees that enable them to challenge their detention and expulsion. The Court also held that Italy's treatment of migrants in detention centers did not violate the ECHR's prohibition on cruel and inhuman treatment, in part due to the emergency circumstances involved. The Court further held that Italy's return of migrants to Tunisia did not violate the prohibition on collective expulsion in Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR. Enforcement of the judgment would require many European states to provide a clear basis in domestic law for the detention of migrants and asylum-seekers. Given the global diffusion of state practices involving migrants, and other states’ desires to restrict migration, this case has broad implications for delineating the obligations of states to migrants and the rights of migrants within receiving countries.


2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman

Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to identify in the constant central core of Christian faith, despite the inquisition, despite anti-Semitism and despite the crusades, the principles of human dignity, tolerance and freedom, including religious freedom, and therefore, in the last analysis, the foundations of the secular State.A European court should not be called upon to bankrupt centuries of European tradition. No court, certainly not this Court, should rob the Italians of part of their cultural personality.In March, 2011, after five years of working its way through various levels of national and European courts, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decided that a crucifix hanging at the front of a classroom did not violate the right to religious freedom under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Specifically, Ms. Soile Lautsi had complained that the presence of the crucifix violated her and her children's right to religious freedom and that its presence amounted to an enforced religious regime. The Grand Chamber, reversing the lower Chamber's decision, held that while admittedly a religious symbol, the crucifix also represented the cultural heritage of Italians.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 3-13 ◽  

The right to freedom of religion, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights has been frequently tested, both in UK courts and in the European Court of Human Rights, where successive decisions over a number of years led to the establishment of several well-known principles. However, in recent years religious extremism has brought into focus a tension between the right of freedom of religious expression and the well-being of individuals (not least children) and society. The Strasbourg court requires neutrality on the part of the state and its courts. However, unlike the European Court of Human Rights, the domestic courts have had to face situations where religious observance can be seen to be causing serious harm and where interference in religious freedom and family life has been shown to be justified.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-370
Author(s):  
Corina Heri

On November 15, 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued its judgment in Navalnyy v. Russia. The applicant in the case argued that the Russian authorities had targeted him for arrest and administrative sanctions because of his political activism. In its judgment, the Grand Chamber confirmed its recent change in approach to Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), including the normalization of the provision's scope and burden of proof. However, it displayed continued uncertainty about how to deal with measures based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate purposes.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerem Altiparmak ◽  
Onur Karahanogullari

On 10 November 2005 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘Court’) decided the long-running headscarf battle between Muslim students and Turkish universities in the Şahin judgment. On appeal, it held that the prohibition against wearing headscarves on university premises did not violate Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘Convention’) on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It thereby confirmed the decision of the Fourth Section of the Court of 29 June 2004.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irini Papanicolopulu

In a unanimous judgment in the case Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Court) held that Italy’s “push back” operations interdicting intending migrants and refugees at sea and returning them to Libya amounted to a violation of the prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or Convention), the prohibition of collective expulsions under Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the Convention, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention. Hirsi Jamaa is the Court’s first judgment on the interception of migrants at sea and it addresses issues concerning the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as well as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.


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