Neuroimaging, Uncertainty, and the Problem of Dispositions

2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARDAR ÁRNASON

Brain research in neuroscience and related fields is changing our understanding of the brain and its relation to the mind and to human behavior, giving a new impetus to the problem of free will and moral responsibility. The reactions have covered the entire range, from claims to the effect that neuroscientific research is showing that our folk–psychological understanding of conscious free will and moral responsibility is deeply mistaken to claims to the effect that neuroscientific research is irrelevant to moral issues of free will and responsibility. In any case, neuroscience is posing some serious challenges to our conceptions of free will and moral responsibility.

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Cody

Brain research is intended to produce valuable results in medicine and information technology. All to the good. Nevertheless, the contentions made by both the BRAIN Initiative and the Human Brain Project are not only unproven, but indefensible. Their most egregious error lies in a doctrinal misconception of what the mind does. The mind is a matter of memory, belief, intention, desire, will, and the like—mentalities.


Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

Moral psychology, for purposes of this volume, encompasses issues in metaethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action, including questions concerning the objectivity of morality, the relationship between moral judgment and emotion, the nature of the emotions, free will, and moral responsibility, and the structure of the mind as that is relevant to the possibility of moral action and judgment. Nietzsche’s “naturalism” is introduced and explained, and certain confusions about its meaning are addressed. An overview of the volume follows


Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Jennifer Cole Wright

In Chapter 15, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Jennifer Cole Wright investigate the relationship between free will beliefs (or the lack thereof) and existential anxiety. In an attempt to shed light on this relationship, they set out to test whether trait humility can serve as a “buffer” between the two—that is, are people who are high in dispositional humility less likely to experience existential anxiety in the face of skepticism about free will? Given the perspectival and attitudinal nature of humility, Nadelhoffer and Wright predict that humble people will be less anxious in the face of stories about the purported death of free will (or the reduction of the mind to the brain). In a series of four studies, they test their hypothesis, with mixed results.,The findings, however, tell us something important about the current use of primes in studies designed to manipulate people’s belief in free will (usually to measure their pro- or antisocial effects).


1875 ◽  
Vol 21 (94) ◽  
pp. 251-266
Author(s):  
S. Messenger Bradley

Moral Responsibility, although often treated from a metaphysical point of view, has seldom been regarded from a physical or physiological side, and yet it is from this source alone that we are at present able to gain any accurate information respecting the working of the mind, and it is chiefly from this basis that I purpose here regarding it. The means of observation which metaphysicians employ have been known to, and employed by, philosophers for the last two thousand years, and yet it must be admitted with but a poor result. Until physiology came to their aid, they had not arrived at a knowledge of the fact that the grey cortical matter of the brain is the seat of the mind, and that intellectual action involves definite physico-chemical changes which we are to some extent capable of estimating. The psychologists, indeed, fixing their attention solely upon subjective phenomena, resemble those fatuous fakirs, who, intent upon a particular point in their own bodies, come to believe that the umbilicus is the seat of wisdom; or, rather, they resemble the horse in a threshing floor, which, however rapidly it may seem to advance, only retraces its steps in one small unending circle. It is a simple fact that, whatever positive knowledge we possess of the mental process has been obtained by the aid of physiology, and it is equally certain that all the knowledge we are likely to attain for a long time, if not always, must be derived from the same source.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-01
Author(s):  
James Welles

The brain of an infant may be the blank tablet envisaged by Locke,[1] but as it is shaped by both experience and language it develops into the mind of an adult. As the character of the maturing individual becomes defined, the mind shapes experiences decreasingly according to immediate stimuli themselves and increasingly according to linguistic interpretations of and emotional reactions to perceptions. Thus, the environment does not dictate human behavior but provides a context for its expression.


Author(s):  
Michael S Gazzaniga

In Chapter 12, Michael Gazzaniga tells us: “We are . . . animals with brains that carry out every . . . action automatically and outside our ability to describe how it works . . .. a soup of dispositions controlled by genetic mechanisms, some weakly and some strongly expressed.” He also tells us: “We humans have something called the interpreter, located in our left brain, that weaves a story about why we feel and act the way we do.” Gazzaniga explores the concepts of free will and moral responsibility in light of such facts, arguing that we all remain personally responsible for our actions because responsibility arises out of each person’s interaction with the social layer she is embedded in. “Responsibility is not to be found in the brain,” he concludes, rather it is “a needed consequence of more than one individual interacting with another.”


Author(s):  
Alan L. Mittleman

This chapter explores a key dimension of the portrayal developed in Chapter 2—namely, moral agency. Against the hard determinism of modern scientism, classic Jewish sources affirm in a nuanced way the concept of free will. Since these sources have also sometimes endorsed a “soft-determinist” view (sometimes known as compatibilism), there is some common ground to be found on this complicated issue. How can we continue to embrace a belief in free will, with all that such a belief entails, and still give credence to the new sciences of the brain that qualify or even negate free will at the same time? Although ultimately Jewish sources must affirm personhood, agency, and moral responsibility, there is more than one simplistic way to do so.


Author(s):  
Svetlana V. Polubinskaya

Modern neuroscience has long expanded beyond the framework of traditional biological and medical sciences that study the central nervous system and human brain. Nowadays researchers aim at exploring the links between the biological processes in the brain and human behavior. There is a growing number of research on social neuroscience investigating the neural basis of social behavior. The progress of such studies is facilitated by application of non-invasive neuroimaging techniques (magnetic resonance imaging, functional magnetic resonance imaging, positron emission tomography, etc.), which provide the data on brain structure and activity in the form of visual images. The task of criminal law is to conceptualize the results of brain studies used as evidence in criminal courts in a number of countries that have also revived discussions about free will and criminal responsibility. According to foreign authors, neurobiological evidence, including the results of brain imaging, is used in courts at various stages of the process, in particular when determining the defendant’s competency to stand trial and in insanity defense. However, more often they appear in criminal cases of serious violent and sexual crimes in order to confirm the diagnosis of a mental or neurological disorder and/ or brain damage of the defendant and thereby justify the mitigation of punishment. Such evidence is often combined with results of other expert examinations and appear to be a part of a wider picture describing the defendant. International studies also show that the courts are cautious in decisions concerning admissibility of brain scan evidence because of uncertainty about its scientific validity, reliability and relevance to the case. Moreover, the very practice of the presence of such evidence in courts is considered as ambiguous. The opponents refer to insufficient validity and reliability of such evidence and the subjectivity of experts while interpreting the results of brain imaging. There are also problems of reliability of expert conclusions when the group data is applied to the individual case considered in court. The opponents also refer to the complexity and interconnectedness of the human brain, the inability to link complex human behavior to a specific brain area not to mention a causal relationship between specific brain area and specific behavior. The progress of neuroscience has also given an impulse to a new wave of discussions on key issues of legal philosophy and criminal law doctrine. The results of some studies are interpreted as evidence on lack of voluntary nature of human actions and the illusion of free will, since the brain sends a signal to act before a person realizes it. In combination with findings concerning links between specific brain structures and aggression, impulsiveness and the ability to control one’s behavior, these data are used as the ground to justify the revision of traditional doctrinal ideas about guilt and criminal responsibility. However, majority of experts who analyze the use of the results of neurobiological studies in criminal law doctrine and practice disagree with these claims. They acknowledge that such research can contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms of human behavior and influence the doctrinal understanding of legal categories, such as guilt and insanity, but they do object against identification of the mind with the brain. The concepts of free will and responsibility are social constructs, and neurosciences are not able to convince society to abandon them.


1875 ◽  
Vol 21 (94) ◽  
pp. 251-266
Author(s):  
S. Messenger Bradley

Moral Responsibility, although often treated from a metaphysical point of view, has seldom been regarded from a physical or physiological side, and yet it is from this source alone that we are at present able to gain any accurate information respecting the working of the mind, and it is chiefly from this basis that I purpose here regarding it. The means of observation which metaphysicians employ have been known to, and employed by, philosophers for the last two thousand years, and yet it must be admitted with but a poor result. Until physiology came to their aid, they had not arrived at a knowledge of the fact that the grey cortical matter of the brain is the seat of the mind, and that intellectual action involves definite physico-chemical changes which we are to some extent capable of estimating. The psychologists, indeed, fixing their attention solely upon subjective phenomena, resemble those fatuous fakirs, who, intent upon a particular point in their own bodies, come to believe that the umbilicus is the seat of wisdom; or, rather, they resemble the horse in a threshing floor, which, however rapidly it may seem to advance, only retraces its steps in one small unending circle. It is a simple fact that, whatever positive knowledge we possess of the mental process has been obtained by the aid of physiology, and it is equally certain that all the knowledge we are likely to attain for a long time, if not always, must be derived from the same source.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250
Author(s):  
Eduardo Giannetti

Abstract Modern science has undermined belief in countless imaginary causalities. What is the nature of the relation between mind and brain? Philosophers have debated the issue for millennia, but it is only in the last twenty years that empirical evidence has begun to uncover some of the secrets of this ancient riddle. This lecture explores the possiblity that advances in neuroscience will undermine and subvert our intuitive, mentalist understanding of the mind-body relationship. Recent findings in neuroscience seem to support the notions that (i) mental events are a subclass of neurophysiological events, and (ii) they are devoid of causal efficacy upon the workings of the brain. If physicalism is true then the belief in the causal potency of conscious thoughts and free will are bound to join company with countless other imaginary causalities exploded by the progress of science.


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