In Congress Reassembled: Reconciliation and the Legislative Process

1981 ◽  
Vol 14 (04) ◽  
pp. 748-751
Author(s):  
Allen Schick

Reconciliation forces Congress to consider issues in redistributive terms and alters traditional roles and relationships, but this legislative technique may be short-lived.The 1981 battle of the budget might leave a deeper imprint on legislative behavior than on federal programs and expenditures. The process that produced the omnibus reconciliation bill was extraordinary in its scope and in its integration of diverse legislative activities. More than 30 House and Senate committees were drawn into the reconciliation process and more than half of the Members of Congress participated in the conferences that resulted in the reconciliation decision. The outcome was not a perfectly consistent set of budget decisions, but for a legislature that thrives on the dispersion of power, reconciliation demanded much more cohesion and coordination than Congress normally achieves.It is too early to determine whether reconciliation will become a permanent feature of the congressional budget process or whether it will be applied as extensively in the future as it was in 1981. If it were confined to a few committees and only changed the budget at the margins, reconciliation might not affect basic legislative roles and relationships. But if it continues to demand the active cooperation of numerous committees and tries to change major parts of the budget, reconciliation would certainly lead to a redistribution of legislative power.

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 1135-1162
Author(s):  
Rebecca M. Kysar

This paper compares the enactment and implementation process for the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) to prior tax reform acts, as well as situates it within other developments in the legislative process more generally. It details how the 2017 enactment process solidifies reconciliation as the primary vehicle for the enactment of major tax measures, a trend nearly two decades in the making. The ambitious scope of the TCJA, as well as the rushed and partisan reconciliation process by which it was enacted, has led to ambiguities and instability in the legislation. These features have, in turn, posed an enormous implementation challenge for Treasury, which has led to some troubling results. Finally, reconciliation has set up the opportunity for Congress to engage in budget gimmicks in the future. This paper discusses these trends and proposes solutions to them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Taylor ◽  
Paul S. Herrnson ◽  
James M. Curry

This study demonstrates that district magnitude (the number of officials elected from an electoral district) affects the behavioral choices and policymaking contributions of legislators. We theorize that legislators elected from districts of larger magnitudes focus much of their efforts on relatively low-cost, high-visibility activities that allow for easy credit claiming, while their colleagues from lower magnitude districts focus more on relatively high-cost, low-visibility work required to move policy proposals through the legislative process. We test our hypotheses using data recording the legislative activities of members of the Maryland House of Delegates, which elects its member from districts of different magnitudes. The results, which are mostly supportive, have implications for the impact of institutional structures on representation and policymaking.


1985 ◽  
Vol 18 (04) ◽  
pp. 816-819
Author(s):  
James A. Thurber
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 3(164) ◽  
pp. 143-165
Author(s):  
Piotr Stanisz

The purpose of the present study is to analyse the restrictions on the freedom of religious worship introduced by the Polish executive authorities in the face of the spreading COVID-19 epidemic. The analysis aims to answer questions not only concerning the conformity of these actions with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and statutory laws, but also pertaining to the issue of the level of preparation of Polish law for an epidemic. In reference to these questions, the author concludes that the introduction of restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion by acts of worship in the regulations issued by the Minister of Health and the Council of Ministers exceeds the bounds of statutory authorisation and is inconsistent with the Polish Constitution. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, passing a law remains the only admissible way of introducing restrictions on the freedom of manifestation of religion, and there are no exceptions to this rule even in states of emergency. On the other hand, the author also points out that if the effectiveness of combating this kind of epidemic really depends on possibility of introducing the above-mentioned restrictions without a long legislative process, it means that Polish executive authorities have been confronted by the constitutional legislator and the legislature with a choice between being efficient and acting in conformity with the Constitution and statutory laws. Therefore, the article postulates that it is necessary to make deep changes to the current law. Elaborating a broad concept of these changes requires further analysis, and the relevant discussion needs to take into account the experience gained so far in combating the coronavirus epidemic, the importance of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the solutions adopted in other countries. A clear and balanced, as well as properly sequenced and democratically justified specification of the rules that should be followed by the executive when introducing restrictions related to the spread of the epidemic, even with regard to such important values as the freedom to manifest religion through acts of worship, is undoubtedly more appropriate than formally ruling out the possibility of taking action that may turn out necessary in the future.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chandrasekaran Mridul Bhardwaj

Abstract Ordinances making power is one of the most controversial powers that has been vested with executive in India. This power is a substitute of legislative power of the legislature and is meant to be used only in situations comprising of exigencies. However, in practicality this power has often been misused by the executive, and is used to circumvent the legislative process. Due the misuse of this power, it is imperative to examine its history and scope. The power to make ordinance have been a reminiscent of the British rule in India. It was conceptualized through the various Government of India acts, and then post-independence it was adopted under the Indian Constitution. Though the present form of ordinance making power is much more curtailed when compared to the British era, still it leaves ample discretion at the hand of executive to use it erroneously for political gains.


Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi

For almost thirty years, political scientists have believed that the US Senate would be less affected by partisan polarization due to the existence of a handful of moderate senators who would act as power brokers between the two sides, yet year after year we see partisan gridlock. Life in the Middle argues that the belief in the powerful, pivotal moderate neglects their electoral circumstances and overestimates their legislative power. Indeed, not all senators are elected under equal circumstances where the modern centrist has to balance between two conflicting constituencies like Susan Collins in Maine, or represents a state where the opposition outnumbers their base like Joe Manchin in West Virginia. Using data compiled from the Congressional Record, the book examines the legislative behavior of moderates and finds that they seldom amend legislation to their preferences, rarely speak on the record, and often lose on final votes. Using unique interview data with nineteen legislative directors and six retired centrist senators, it also finds that the behind-the-scenes conversations mirror the on-stage behavior where centrists are not influential or viewed as pivotal by party leaders. Furthermore, moderates reported less satisfaction with legislative outcomes than their peers. Life in the Middle suggests that lawmaking needs to be re-evaluated as being much more variable and less reliant on the work of moderates and more on party leaders. Indeed, the mainstream concerns about polarization and its negative effects of increased gridlock and ideological legislation may be true.


2005 ◽  
pp. 99-119
Author(s):  
Federico Ferrara ◽  
Erik S. Herron ◽  
Misa Nishikawa

2019 ◽  
pp. 176-188
Author(s):  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter focuses upon the European Parliament (EP), an institution that has seen its power dramatically increase in recent times. The EP has been transformed from being a relatively powerless institution into one that is able to have a genuine say in the legislative process and hold the European Union’s executive bodies (the Commission and Council, introduced in Chapters 9 and 10) to account in a range of policy areas. However, increases in the Parliament’s formal powers have not been matched by an increase in popular legitimacy: turnout in European elections is falling. Thus, while the EP’s legislative power is comparable to that enjoyed by many national parliaments, it has struggled to connect with the wider European public. The chapter explores these issues in detail. In the first section, the EP’s evolution from talking shop to co-legislator is reviewed; its powers and influence are explained in the next section; the EP’s internal structure and organization are then discussed with a focus upon the role and behaviour of the political groups, and finally, the European Parliament’s representative function as the EU’s only directly elected institution is discussed.


2019 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter focuses on parliamentary sovereignty. The term ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’ is normally defined as the ‘legislative supremacy of Parliament’. Since the constitutional settlement brought about by the Bill of Rights 1689, the UK Parliament has had unchallenged authority to create primary law. Parliament's legislative supremacy means, therefore, that there is no competing body with equal or greater law-making power and there are no legal limits on Parliament's legislative competence. Parliament has broad legislative power but cannot make unchangeable statutes, and a current parliament can reverse laws made by a previous parliament. Nobody but Parliament can override Acts of Parliament. The Enrolled Bill rule requires that, if a Bill has passed through the House of Commons and House of Lords and received royal assent, the courts will not enquire into what happened before or during the legislative process.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Limongi ◽  
Argelina Figueiredo

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.


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