Can Kant’s Theory of Radical Evil Be Saved?

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-419
Author(s):  
Zachary J. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Radical Evil ◽  
Adequate Theory ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractIn this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in order to evaluate whether his theory can be saved. Critics argue that Kant does not adequately distinguish between evil and mundane wrongdoing, making his use of the term ‘evil’ emotional hyperbole; by defining evil as the subordination of the moral law to self-love his analysis is seemingly overly simplistic and empirically false; and by focusing solely on the moral character of the perpetrator of evil, Kant’s theory apparently ignores the most salient aspect of evil – the suffering of victims. While I will not claim that Kant provides us with a fully adequate theory of evil, I respond to each of these criticisms and conclude that Kant’s theory can still provide significant insight into both the nature of evil and the moral psychology of perpetrators of evil.

The Tradition of Socrates

1932 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 151-157
Author(s):  
Dorothy Tarrant
Keyword(s):  
Moral Character ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Political Views ◽  
Greek World ◽  
Insight Into

No other personality of the ancient Greek world proved so interesting to his own and to later generations as that of Socrates. Plato and Xenophon, both closely associated with him in his later years, made their first-hand portraits soon after his death. Xenophon's is a plain outline devised to bring out Socrates' moral character and his social and political views; it gives us many sayings but little of picturesque detail. Plato's representation is infinitely more rich and varied, drawn with fuller insight into a many-sided character, and enhanced by his own marvellous dramatic gift. From the point of view of precise truth Plato has no doubt given us too much. The problem of ‘the historical Socrates’ is ever with us; and while discussion centres chiefly on the philosophical doctrines which he expresses in the dialogues, and the question whether they (taken severally or as a whole) were actually conceived by him or by Plato, the same misgiving necessarily arises about the purely personal behaviour and sayings which Plato attaches to his hero. If we attempt to correct Xenophon and Plato, so to speak, by each other, and to arrive between them at a simpler composite picture, we may well be reminded that each observer of a great man has his own angle of vision, and sees as true for him what he is best able to see. Each kind of portrait has its own truth and its own value. It is probable that we shall all continue to find mainly what we seek, and that no one will now succeed in getting behind Xenophon and Plato.

scholarly journals Radical Evil (radikal Böse)

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-106
Author(s):  
Pablo Muchnik
Keyword(s):  
Moral Law ◽  
Spatial Metaphor ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
Radical Evil ◽  
Radical Nature ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Dark Shadow ◽  
Evil Person ◽  
Power Of Choice

By “evil,” Kant does not designate any set of particularly pernicious acts, but the type of volition that underlies and makes possible immorality in all its forms. The evil person, Kant believes, “makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law –whereas it is the latter that, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, should have been incorporated into the universal maxim of the power of choice as the sole incentive” (R 6:36). This inversion of the ethical order of priority does not entail the repudiation of “the moral law (…) in rebellious attitude (by revoking obedience to it)” (R 6:36), but its conditional respect. This fraudulent relation to morality is based on complex strategies of deception, self-deception, and rationalization. The “radical “nature of these tendencies has nothing to do with the intensity or magnitude of observable wrongdoing. Evil’s radicalism is a spatial metaphor intended to designate the locus of immorality (its “root”) in an agent’s “disposition (Gesinnung). What is most baffling the Kantian view is that evil so construed is perfectly compatible with good conduct. Indeed, under the conditions of civilization, Kant believes, it is impossible to distinguish a man of good conduct from a morally good man (RGV 6:30), for the dictates of self-love generally overlap with the prescriptions of duty. The persistence of war, poverty, oppression, and the infinity of vices which cast a dark shadow over the contemporary world speak of the prescience of the Kantian approach.

Kant on Radical Evil

2019 ◽  
pp. 117-137
Author(s):  
Gavin Rae
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Conception ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Conceptual Schema ◽  
Radical Evil ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Individual

This chapter argues that with Kant’s critical philosophy, the metaphysical and epistemological premises of the Christian tradition were severely criticised, which, in turn, led to a new conception of morality and evil based on the decision of autonomous, moral agents. Focusing on the late Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason reveals that Kant’s alternative conception of radical evil refers to the choice of a moral maxim that turns away from the moral law. The chapter outlines the conceptual schema and problematic orientating Kant’s analysis, namely his claim that the individual is constituted by an original natural disposition (Anlage) to the good and an innate propensity (Hang) to evil, before concluding by examining Kant’s claim that overcoming ‘evil’ is possible, despite his recognition that its grounding in individual noumenal freedom means that it is not possible to explain how this is possible.

scholarly journals Principles of Moral Accounting: How our Intuitive Moral Sense Balances Rights and Wrongs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Gregory Blane Johnson ◽  
Jaye Jungmin Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Person Perception ◽  
Temporal Order ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Do So

We are all saints and sinners: Some of our actions benefit other people, while other actions harm people. How do people balance moral rights against moral wrongs when evaluating others’ actions? Across 9 studies, we contrast the predictions of three conceptions of intuitive morality—outcome- based (utilitarian), act-based (deontologist), and person-based (virtue ethics) approaches. Although good acts can partly offset bad acts—consistent with utilitarianism—they do so incompletely and in a manner relatively insensitive to magnitude, but sensitive to temporal order and the match between who is helped and harmed. Inferences about personal moral character best predicted blame judgments, explaining variance across items and across participants. However, there was modest evidence for both deontological and utilitarian processes too. These findings contribute to conversations about moral psychology and person perception, and may have policy implications.

Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
The Voice ◽  
Ethical Systems

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.

scholarly journals “Beyond the Pale”: Tainted Whiteness, Cognitive Disability, and Eugenic Sterilization

Hypatia ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Stubblefield
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cognitive Disability ◽  
White Race ◽  
White Ethnicity ◽  
Early Twentieth Century ◽  
Eugenic Sterilization ◽  
Insight Into

The aim of the eugenics movement in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century was to prevent the degeneration of the white race. A central tactic of the movement was the involuntary sterilization of people labeled as feebleminded. An analysis of the practice of eugenic sterilization provides insight into how the concepts of gender, race, class, and dislability are fundamentally intertwined. I argue that in the early twentieth century, the concept of feeblemindedness came to operate as an umbrella concept that linked off-white ethnicity, poverty, and gendered conceptions of lack of moral character together and that feeblemindedness thus understood functioned as the signifier of tainted whiteness.

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