‘Presidentialism’ in the Ex-Soviet Union

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. BLONDEL

AbstractWhen the Soviet Union fell in 1990, three of its 15 components, the Baltic States, joined the European Union, and a fourth, Moldova, may well join in the future. The other 11 quickly became presidential republics, following the lead given by Boris Yeltsin, the president of the largest among them, Russia. By 1994, all 11 were headed by a president elected by universal suffrage. These ex-Soviet countries contribute significantly to the number of presidential republics in the world. Presidential republics form a clear majority, being predominant in Latin America and Africa, alongside the ex-Soviet Union. They are rare in Europe, the main cases being France, Romania, and, though seemingly temporarily, some Balkan states; in Asia, outside the ex-Soviet Union, they are a small minority.Like many presidential republics elsewhere, those in the ex-Soviet Union are mostly authoritarian, but with variations: this is primarily so in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan and Belarus. These presidencies have been very stable, with some of their leaders, especially in Central Asia, being repeatedly re-elected, often without opposition. There has been a regular turnover in Armenia (but less so in Georgia) and in Ukraine (but not in Belarus). The Russian case is peculiar, as is well known: Putin became prime minister because he could no longer be constitutionally re-elected as president, at least without a break. The power of these presidents has varied over time: outside Central Asia (except Kyrgyzstan) and Azerbaijan, where they have been uniformly strong, their strength has declined in Georgia, increased in Russia and Belarus, and had ups and downs in Armenia and Ukraine.

Author(s):  
Martin Ehala

The focus of intergroup communication research in the Baltic countries is on interethnic relations. All three countries have Russian-speaking urban minorities whose process of integration with Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian majorities has been extensively studied. During the Soviet era when the Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic countries were formed, they enjoyed majority status and privileges. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a status reversal as Russian speakers become minorities in the newly emerged national states. The integration of once monolingual Russian-speaking communities has been the major social challenge for the Baltic states, particularly for Estonia and Latvia where they constitute about 30% of the population. Besides the Russian-speaking minorities, each of the Baltic countries has also one other significant minority. In Estonia it is Võro, a linguistically closely related group to Estonians; in Latvia it is Latgalians, closely related to Latvians; and in Lithuania, it is the Polish minority. Unlike the Russian-speaking urban minorities of fairly recent origin, the other minorities are largely rural and native in their territories. The intergroup communication between the majorities and Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic countries has often analyzed by a triadic nexus consisting of the minority, the nationalizing state, and the external homeland (Russia). In recent analyses, the European Union (through its institutions) has often been added as an additional player. The intergroup communication between the majorities and the Russian-speaking communities is strongly affected by conflicting collective memories over 20th-century history. While the titular nations see the Soviet time as occupation, the Russian speakers prefer to see the positive role of the Soviet Union in defeating Hitler and reconstructing the countries’ economy. These differences have resulted in some symbolic violence such as relocation of the Bronze Soldier monument in Estonia and the riots that it provoked. Recent annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the role of the Ukrainian Russian speakers in the secessionist war in the Eastern Ukraine have raised fears that Russia is trying to use its influence over its compatriots in the Baltic countries for similar ends. At the same time, the native minorities of Võro and Latgalians are going through emancipation and have demanded more recognition. This movement is seen by some among the Estonian and Latvian majorities as attempts to weaken the national communities that are already in trouble with integrating the Russian speakers. In Lithuania, some historical disagreements exist also between the Lithuanians and Polish, since the area of their settlement around capital Vilnius used to be part of Poland before World War II. The Baltic setting is particularly interesting for intergroup communication purposes, since the three countries have several historical parallels: the Russian-speaking communities have fairly similar origin, but different size and prominence, as do the titular groups. These differences in the power balance between the majority and minority have been one of the major factors that have motivated different rhetoric by the nationalizing states, which has resulted in noticeably different outcomes in each setting.


Author(s):  
Tanel Kerikmäe ◽  
Archil Chochia ◽  
Max Atallah

Integration with the European Union has been far less distressing for the three Baltic States than for numerous other accessing countries owing to their strong societal impetus to (re)join Western political, economic, and legal culture after they regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. However, the accession of these states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—had several distinctive features related to constitutional background and settings, which heavily influenced problem solving between government and the EU institutions. In general, the controversial issues regarding how to solve the problems with supranational power have never been dramatic with regard to the Baltic States, which leads to the assumption that often the governments have taken rather compliant positions. The latest cases, such as the European Stabilization Mechanism, indicate the change in paradigm: the three Baltic States are more aware of the margin of appreciation and actual borderlines between policy making- and decision making. Today, in setting up an EU-related agenda, more skills than previously are needed in finding allies and choosing partners. The road the Baltic States took in joining the EU was a difficult one, nor has their role in the EU been easy. Should a small state with a big initiative be allowed to mentor other member states regarding that initiative, meaning in particular Estonia and its digital development? Another peculiar aspect of the Baltic States is their (inter)relationship with Russia. Considering themselves a bridge between East and West, the Baltics have been active in Eastern Partnership and Development Aid initiatives and have also spoken out strongly against intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. This position sometimes complicates any EU attempt to achieve consensus on foreign policy.


Author(s):  
S. Rıdvan Karluk

After the dispersion of the Soviet Union, the European Union embarked upon an intense relationship with the Central and Eastern European Countries. The transition into capital market and democratization of these countries had been supported by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1989 before the collapse of the Soviet Union System. The European Agreements were signed between the EU and Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on December 16th, 1991. 10 Central and Eastern Europe Countries became the members of the EU on May 1st, 2004. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU on January 1st, 2007, the number of the EU member countries reached up to 27, and finally extending to 28 with the membership of Croatia to the EU on July 1st, 2013. Removing the Western Balkan States, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from the scope of external relations, the EU included these countries in the enlargement process in 2005.The European Commission has determined 2014 enlargement policy priorities as dealing with the fundamentals on preferential basis. In this context, the developments in the Balkans will be closely monitored within the scope of a new approach giving priority to the superiority of law. The enlargement process of the EU towards the Balkans and whether or not the Western Balkan States will join the Union will be analyzed.


Author(s):  
Robert R. Bianchi

In building the New Silk Road, China is looking for partners, not rivals. But, in the case of Turkey, it has found both. After the fall of the Soviet Union, China and Turkey sparred for influence in Central Asia before Ankara decided to focus on Caspian Sea countries closer to home. During the reign of Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, Turkey and China have traded accusations over recurrent violence in Xinjiang. In spite of these clashes, Turkey has moved closer to China’s overtures because both countries are eager to counterbalance what they view as mounting hostility from the United States and the European Union. Erdoǧan claims to welcome membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, hoping to dampen Western criticism of his antidemocratic behavior at home. But Chinese leaders are skeptical of allying with Erdoǧan because his domestic support is shrinking precisely when he is trying to grab dictatorial powers.


Author(s):  
Katherine Graney

This chapter examines the process of EU expansion into the former Soviet Union since 1989, identifying the different criteria that have been used to judge candidates for EU membership. The Central European and Baltic states successfully made arguments about their “intrinsic Europeanness” and “belonging” to Europe and the EU, while the Balkan states have had a harder time proving their suitability for Europe. Unlike the Baltic states, the other ex-Soviet republics, like Ukraine and Georgia, have had a harder time convincing the EU of their fitness for membership, that is, their “intrinsic Europeanness,” and have had to settle for being made “Eastern Partners” of the EU and signers of Association Agreements with the EU. Russia has sought a form of partnership with the EU, while rejecting any idea of conditionality. Finally, the EU shows little concern for the ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, not seeing them as fundamentally European in any way.


1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-120
Author(s):  
M. E. Ahrari

The sudden independence of five Muslim Central Asian countries-Khazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-and one Muslim country in the Transcaucasus regionAzerbaijan-has surprised even the international scholarly community.When the former Soviet Union was alive and well, there were "Sovietscholars," a rubric that largely included specialists on Russia, Ukraine,and the Baltic states. Western scholars were almost never inclined tospecialize in, or to give any serious attention to, the Muslim regions ofthe Soviet Union. This neglect was also reflected in their evaluations ofthe problems of this region, as can be seen by the uncritical acceptanceof the Soviet vocabulary. For instance, the Qorabashi armed resistancein Muslim Central Asia was labeled the "Basmachi" (or bandit) movementby the Soviet Union and its scholars. This phrase was also used bywestern scholars.Now there is no more Soviet Union, the cold war has entered history,and there are six new Muslim republics. These developments haveengendered a renewed interest in these republics, as can be seen by thenumber of recently published books that have been devoted to them.Although some of them have been hurriedly compiled, others have beenwritten with a lot of forethought and balanced analysis.Eickelman's present anthology definitely falls into the latter category.In fact, to the best of my knowledge, his anthology is one of thefirst books that raises the question of whether the above-mentionedQorabashi movement was indeed an armed struggle against the Sovietimperial masters or was a "bandit" movement as portrayed by Sovietscholars. This book comprises four parts: "International and RegionalPerspectives," "Central Asia " "Afghanistan and Iran," and "Pakistan."The first two sections formulate the essence of this study. Eickelman'sintroduction, in my estimation, is certainly one of the best chapters. Itis unfortunate that he did not include more of his writing in this book.His review of the literature on modernization theories and orientalismin this chapter will be read by students of Central Asia and the MiddleEast with interest.Other noteworthy contributions are the two essays by RichardCottam and Gregory Kornyenko. It is refreshing to read Cottam's ...


Author(s):  
Vinod Saighal

The parting of ways had to take place at some time or the other. The differences had started emerging almost since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the disastrous Yeltsin years, even Russia bereft of the Soviet possessions in Central Asia appeared to be falling apart. This state of affairs continued till almost the turn of the century when Boris Yeltsin nominated Vladimir Putin as his successor. It has to be noted, however, that to this day Mr. Putin having pulled Russia up by the bootstraps has never spoken ill of his erstwhile benefactor.


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