Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELINOR OSTROM
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Interdisciplinary Field ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Public Economies ◽  
The Individual

Abstract:This article briefly describes some of the intellectual challenges during the last half-century to the traditional fields of economics and political science: the public choice approach, the tragedy of the commons debate, the ‘new’ institutional economics, and behavioral game theory. Then, the components of a basic institutional analysis framework are presented that provide a general method for analyzing public economies and diverse forms of collective action. Empirical research related to metropolitan public economies, common-pool resources, and behavioral game theory is summarized that has contributed to the field of institutional analysis. The last section concludes that the macro foundations of institutional analysis appear firmer than the micro foundations related to the model of the individual to be used and discusses this puzzle.

scholarly journals Coevolving institutions and the paradox of informal constraints

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Daniel Seligson ◽  
Anne E. C. McCants
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamical Systems ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Dynamical Systems Theory ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Long Run

Abstract We can all agree that institutions matter, though as to which institutions matter most, and how much any of them matter, the matter is, paraphrasing Douglass North's words at the Nobel podium, unresolved after seven decades of immense effort. We suggest that the obstacle to progress is the paradigm of the New Institutional Economics itself. In this paper, we propose a new theory that is: grounded in institutions as coevolving sources of economic growth rather than as rules constraining growth; and deployed in dynamical systems theory rather than game theory. We show that with our approach some long-standing problems are resolved, in particular, the paradoxical and perplexingly pervasive influence of informal constraints on the long-run character of economies.

Wissensteilung: Thünen- Vorlesung bei der Jahrestagung 2000 des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Berlin 20. September 2000

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Helmstädter
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Implicit Knowledge ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Interactive Process ◽  
Important Resource ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Knowledge Problem ◽  
The Individual

AbstractFriedrich A. Hayek’s notion of division of knowledge arouses new interest in an economy for which knowledge represents the most important resource. Hayek’s problem was how to use the knowledge scattered in society efficiently. In Hayek’s solution the prices emerging by competition play the crucial role. They indicate to the individual agents what they can do expediently for their own advantage and also for society, even though they dispose only of limited (implicit) knowledge. But which conditions must be fulfilled in order that the agents are prepared to engage in an interactive process of division of knowledge? - New Institutional Economics does not yet answer this question. It is only interested in questions of interactions in view of a division of labor. Its central notion of transaction is not appropriate for the analysis of the interactive process of division of knowledge, where sharing of knowledge matters. The contribution of the article mainly consists in the attempt to provide a New Institutional Economics basis to the division of knowledge problem. ß

scholarly journals Bringing Institutional Economics to Bear in Understanding Ghana’s Performance on Multi-Stakeholder Interventions

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 157
Author(s):  
Kafui Afi Ocloo ◽  
Charles Yaw Oduro ◽  
Ronald Adamtey
Keyword(s):  
Development Strategy ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Planning System ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Endogenous Development ◽  
Case Study Methodology ◽  
The Individual

Existing literature on Ghana’s performance on the decentralized planning system hardly explores the role of individual rationality and organizational rationality in explaining performance on development efforts. This article examines whether the proposition of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that decisions that individuals make constitute trans-actions in which costs and debts are incurred has a bearing on the performance of institutions involved in endogenous development processes at the local level. The case study methodology was employed using two purposively selected water supply schemes in Ghana. In-depth interviews and questionnaires were used to collect primary data. Secondary data was obtained from project reports. The findings indicated that even during the pursuit of an endogenous development strategy at the local level, the performance of the local stakeholders was determined by the state of intra-stakeholder structures. This in turn, was a sum of the decisions and actions of the individual members of the entities that were the main actors (i.e. the stakeholders). The NIE’s proposition that trans-action cost is key basis for individuals’ decisions and action was clearly evident in the decisions and actions of individuals (i.e. staff of the main actors), but it also was evident in the decisions and actions of the main actors (the entities that were the stakeholders). The study recommends that key development actors and the Ministry of Water Resources Works and Housing devote more attention to researching into how internal organizational conditions affect and shape the performance of stakeholders on the systems and how the existing intra and inter-stakeholder mechanisms can be improved to foster the success of development efforts at the local level.

A Multidisciplinary Framework to Model Complex Team-Based Product Development

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Takai
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Product Development ◽  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Design Decision ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Model Complex ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Team Project

This paper investigates a multidisciplinary framework that simulates design decisions in a complex team-based product development in which engineers simultaneously work in a team project and individual projects. The proposed framework integrates cooperative and noncooperative design models with (1) equilibrium analysis, (2) uncertainty modeling based on behavioral game-theory results, and (3) decision-making using decision analysis. In the proposed framework, noncooperative design is used to simulate engineers’ decisions about team project commitment and to analyze potential free-riding; cooperative design is used to model design outcomes when engineers collaborate in the team project; equilibrium analysis and behavioral game-theory results are used to infer about other engineers’ decisions; and decision analysis is used to calculate expected values of decision alternatives. The proposed framework and the design decision-making model are illustrated using a pressure vessel design as a team project conducted by two engineers: a design engineer and a materials engineer.

scholarly journals Progress in Behavioral Game Theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin F Camerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Experimental Findings

Behavioral game theory aims to predict how people actually behave by incorporating psychological elements and learning into game theory. With this goal in mind, experimental findings can be organized into three categories: players have systematic 'reciprocated social values,' like desires for fairness and revenge. Phenomena discovered in studies of individual judgments and choices, like 'framing' and overconfidence, are also evident in games. Strategic principles, like irrelevance of strategy labels and timing of moves, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and backward induction, are violated. Future research should incorporate these findings, along with learning and 'pregame theory,' into formal game theory.

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