scholarly journals Property as sequential exchange: definition and language issues

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOUGLAS W. ALLEN
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
State Involvement ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Language Issues

AbstractBenito Arrunãda's paper on the transaction cost problems involved with land, provides an excellent explanation of land legal institutions. This explanation revolves around the fact that land exists through time, and that various exchanges made with respect to land at one time affect exchanges in other times. Arrunãda refers to this as ‘sequential exchange’, and he argues that sequential exchange provides the explanation for state involvement in titling and the default nature of in rem rights. Unfortunately, Arrunãda frames his argument with an inappropriate notion of transaction costs. This creates a confusing language, and a faulty interpretation of Coasean logic. Reframing the first sections of his paper using the ‘property rights’ definition of transaction costs brings brevity and clarity to the ultimate point he is trying to make.

Property Rights and Transaction Costs in Marriage: Evidence from Prenuptial Contracts

1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian Hamilton
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Family Labor ◽  
Capital Acquisition ◽  
Marital Property ◽  
Joint Ownership

I examine prenuptial contracting behavior in early-nineteenth-centuiy Quebec to explore property rights within families and the efficacy of marital property laws. Drawing on a transaction cost framework, I examine the decision to sign a contract and couples' property rights choices. I find, for example, that couples signing contracts tended to choose joint ownership of property when wives were particularly important to the household. These findings illustrate the potential effects of legal institutions on individuals' behavior (such as the importance of family labor, human capital acquisition, and even mating decisions) and the value of a flexible legal environment.

scholarly journals How should we model property? Thinking with my critics

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 815-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENITO ARRUÑADA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Model Property ◽  
Private Ordering ◽  
Single Exchange ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Physical Dimensions

AbstractInspired by comments made by Allen (2017), Lueck (2017), Ménard (2017) and Smith (2017), this response clarifies and deepens the analysis in Arruñada (2017a). Its main argument is that to deal with the complexity of property we must abstract secondary elements, such as the physical dimensions of some types of assets, and focus on the interaction between transactions. This sequential-exchange framework captures the main problem of property in the current environment of impersonal markets. It also provides criteria to compare private and public ordering, as well as to organize public solutions that enable new forms of private ordering. The analysis applies the lessons in Coase (1960) to property by not only comparing realities but also maintaining his separate definition of property rights and transaction costs. However, it replaces his contractual, single-exchange, framework for one in which contracts interact, causing exchange externalities.

What Humpty Dumpty might have said about property rights – and the need to put them back together again: a response to critics

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Legal Compliance ◽  
Humpty Dumpty

AbstractThis is a response to the useful comments by Allen, Barzel and Cole on Hodgson (2015a) on property rights. One section deals with some misrepresentations by Allen and Barzel. For instance, contrary to one interpretation, Hodgson (2015a) did not accuse the ‘economics of property rights’ of ignoring legal institutions or of making them generally irrelevant. This response further clarifies the standard meaning of rights, showing that it is at variance with usages in the ‘economics of property rights’. The issue of moral motivation, and its relevance for legal compliance, are also elaborated. Some arguments in Hodgson (2015a) have been described by critics as mere semantics, but in response it is argued – contrary to philosophical nominalism – that changes in the meanings of words can be analytically significant, and we should treat traditional meanings more seriously, especially when dealing with other disciplines such as law. (The cryptic reference to Humpty Dumpty comes in here). Before concluding, there is also a brief discussion of different ways of interpreting transaction costs.

scholarly journals The Coase theorem: coherent, logical, and not disproved

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOUGLAS W. ALLEN
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Line ◽  
Adequate Definition ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract:There exists a long line of challengers to the ‘Coase Theorem’. All of these rest on fundamental misconceptions of property rights, transaction costs, and their interaction. Here I examine two attacks that have gone unchallenged: one by Halpin, the other by Usher. I argue that both, in failing to either use or understand an adequate definition of transaction costs, fail to deliver a fatal blow to Coase's famous idea.

scholarly journals Explaining agro-industrial contract breaches: the case of Brazilian tomatoes processing industry

2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Decio Zylbersztajn ◽  
Lygia B. Nadalini
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Processing Industry ◽  
Limited Dependent Variable ◽  
Brazilian Northeast

Three hundred small tomato growers located in Brazilian northeast states, supplied a processing industry. In view of the large number of contract hazards and weak enforcement of clauses, managers have decided to move to the Midwest, where a reduced number of larger farmers have been contracted. The industry blamed high transaction costs due to the weak mechanism of public enforcement of property rights. The industry blamed some farmers of selling the product at the market for fresh consumption. Also, farmers blamed the industry for taking advantage of asymmetric information related to quality. This study presents an analysis of contract architecture and an evaluation of effects of transaction costs related variables on the likelihood of contract breaches. A panel data study with 1,523 observations and limited dependent variable models has been formulated to test hypothesis based on transaction cost theory. Results show that opportunism and the absence of courts guarantees of property rights precluded the possibility of achieving a stable contract relationship in the region.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND SUBJECTIVIST ECONOMICS

1993 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 159-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN S. KAN
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Transportation Costs ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
General Impression ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Individual Choices

While researches along the lines of Austrian, Buchanan, and Coase’s teachings are thriving recently, they are not united. We show that conceptions of entrepreneurship and transaction costs are generally ambiguous regarding important exchange relationships because they are limited to the consideration of one-sided individual choices only. It is argued in the paper that the completion of an exchange necessarily involves at least two individuals acting in the role of the entrepreneur. In addition, transaction costs are subjective and cannot be treated as production or transportation costs. The paper distinguishes the concept of production cost from that of transaction cost, which is necessarily associated with alternative exchange or organizational opportunities, and therefore expands Buchanan’s subjectivist conception of individual cost to that of interactive transaction cost. A new definition of transaction cost and its implications to a testable theory of the determination of institutions are presented in the paper. Thus, in contrast to the general impression that entrepreneurship cannot be taught and studied, we show how it can be possible under our synthesis of entrepreneurship, transaction costs, and subjectivist economics. An example is also given to demonstrate how entrepreneurship can be taught and learned under our proposed framework.

scholarly journals FORMS OF MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE IN UZBEKISTAN: SCIENTIFIC AND THEORETICAL BASIS OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 50-60
Author(s):  
Dilorom Tadjibaeva
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Main Role ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Definition Of

During the early years of independence (1990s), agricultural and institutional changes in Uzbekistan were made based on the specific characteristics of our country. During transformation, almost nothing has changed in terms of effectivity in regards to transformation of state farms to collective farms still did not make these farms profitable. Only with the formation of dehkan farms (a form of individual farming) after 2004 did agricultural entities started becoming profitable. How can this be explained? Why are these agricultural forms of management more efficient and coincide with the mentality of our population? In this article, using the neo-institutional theory, we have discussed these questions in an attempt to answer these questions by justifying a theoretical point. This theory shows that major issue property rights and transaction costs play main role in the definition of forms of farms management. Statistical analysis of transaction costs and local specifics resulted in a conclusion that the dehkan farming form has significant advantages.

From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-81
Author(s):  
D. P. Frolov
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Transactional Analysis ◽  
Transaction Sector ◽  
Transaction Value

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.

Implications

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Property ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Taking Action ◽  
Disadvantaged People

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.

On a Fallacy in the Coase Theorem and the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven N. S. Cheung
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
General Version ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Rent Dissipation

AbstractThis paper first presents a historical account of the origin of the Coase Theorem. It then elaborates its significance in explaining the working of economic institutions. After expounding the concepts of transaction cost and rent dissipation, it points out an error in the Coase Theorem. Lastly, the paper propounds the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution as an extended and general version of the Coase Theorem.

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