Google Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget about Freedom of Expression?

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Kulk ◽  
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius
Keyword(s):  
Search Engine ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The European Union ◽  
High Court ◽  
Search Results ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Data Protection Directive ◽  
Job Application ◽  
The Right

When reviewing a job application letter, going on a first date, or considering doing business with someone, the first thing many people do is entering the person's name in a search engine. A search engine can point searchers to information that would otherwise have remained obscure. If somebody searched for the name of Spanish lawyer Mario Costeja González, Google showed search results that included a link to a 1998 newspaper announcement implying he had financial troubles at the time. González wanted Google to stop showing those links and started a procedure in Spain. After some legal wrangling, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional (National High Court) asked the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for advice on the application of the Data Protection Directive, which led to the controversial judgment in Google Spain. In its judgment, the CJEU holds that people, under certain conditions, have the right to have search results for their name delisted. This right can also extend to lawfully published information.

scholarly journals Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL)

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Monika Zalnieriute
Keyword(s):  
Search Engine ◽  
Data Privacy ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Data ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

In Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) held that the EU law only requires valid “right to be forgotten” de-referencing requests to be carried out by a search engine operator on search engine versions accessible in EU member states, as opposed to all versions of its search engine worldwide. While the ruling has been perceived as a “win” for Google and other interveners, such as Microsoft and the Wikimedia Foundation, who argued against worldwide de-referencing, the Court also made clear that that while the EU law does not currently require worldwide de-referencing, “it also does not prohibit such a practice” (para. 72). As a result, the CJEU found that an order by a national supervisory or judicial authority of an EU member state requiring worldwide de-referencing in accordance with its own national data protection laws would not be inconsistent with EU law where the data subject's right to privacy is adequately balanced against the right to freedom of information. By leaving the door to extraterritorial de-referencing wide open, the CJEU continues to pursue its post-Snowden hard-line stance on data privacy in a manner that is likely to transform the data privacy landscape.

The Right To Be Forgotten

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.

scholarly journals Right to be forgotten: european data imperialism, national privilege, or universal human right?

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-152
Author(s):  
Oskar J. Gstrein
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Data ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

The Digital Age has fundamentally reshaped the preconditions for privacy and freedom of expression. This transpires in the debate about a "right to be forgotten". While the 2014 decision of the European Court of Justice in "Google Spain" touches upon the underlying issue of how increasing amounts of personal data affects individuals over time, the topic has also become one of the salient problems of Internet Governance. On 24th September 2019 the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in "Google vs CNIL" (C-507/17) which was supposed to clarify the territorial scope of the right. However, this judgment has raised doubts about the enforceability of the General Data Protection Regulation, and reveals the complex, multi-layered governance structure of the European Union. Acknowledging such complexity at a substantive and institutional level, this article starts by analysing the judgment. Additionally, to better understand the current situation in the European Union and its member states, recently produced draft guidelines by the European Data Protection Board are presented and discussed, as well as two judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court. Subsequently, the European developments are put in international context. Finally, the insights from these sections are combined which allows to develop several conceptual ideas. In conclusion, it is argued that the right to be forgotten remains complex and evolving. Its success depends on effective multi-layer and multistakeholder interaction. In this sense, it has become a prominent study object that reveals potential venues and pitfalls on a path towards more sophisticated data protection frameworks.

Reconsidering the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ – memory rights and the right to memory in the new media era

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 644-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam Tirosh
Keyword(s):  
New Media ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Memory Studies ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Origins ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) established the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ (RtbF). Since its establishment, more than 500,000 people filed requests with Google to be ‘de-listed’ from its search. At the same time, the Court’s decision has stirred debates focused on the tension the decision raised between a person’s right to privacy and freedom of expression. This study offers, yet, a different reading of the decision and its meaning. It first outlines the theoretical foundations of the concept of memory and its relation to rights. Then, it focuses on media, memory, and the RtbF. Afterward, the study discusses the legal origins of the RtbF and claims that the right is actually a right to construct one’s narrative. Therefore, in order to analyze the RtbF, this study places it within memory studies and analyzes it through its tools. From this perspective, this study criticizes the emphasis placed on forgetting in the definition of the right and problematizes its focus on individuals. Eventually, this study uses the legitimization the RtbF gives to a new discourse about memory in relation to rights in order to suggest an extended ‘right to memory’ that will answer the memory needs of our time.

scholarly journals GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND OF THE RIGHT NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO ONE’S OWN INCRIMINATION IN ROMANIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (83) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana Domocos
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Right

The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the defendant in the criminal trial.The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must be necessary in a democratic Romanian society.The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.

scholarly journals Academic Freedom and Its Protection in the Law of European States

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 254-345
Author(s):  
Klaus D. Beiter ◽  
Terence Karran ◽  
Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Academic Freedom ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
International Human ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Focusing on those countries that are members of the European Union, it may be noted that these countries are bound under international human rights agreements, such as the International Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights, to safeguard academic freedom under provisions providing for the right to freedom of expression, the right to education, and respect for ‘the freedom indispensable for scientific research.’ unesco’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, a ‘soft-law’ document of 1997, concretises international human rights requirements to be complied with to make the protection of the right to academic freedom effective. Relying on a set of human rights indicators, the present article assesses the extent to which the constitutions, laws on higher education, and other relevant legislation of eu states implement the Recommendation’s criteria. The situation of academic freedom in practice will not be assessed here. The results for the various countries have been quantified and countries ranked in accordance with ‘their performance.’ The assessment demonstrates that, overall, the state of the protection of the right to academic freedom in the law of European states is one of ‘ill-health.’ Institutional autonomy is being misconstrued as exhausting the concept of academic freedom, self-governance in higher education institutions sacrificed for ‘executive-style’ management, and employment security abrogated to cater for ‘changing employment needs’ in higher education.

Article 43 CFR

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Martin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Legal Person ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Registered Office ◽  
The Right ◽  
Judicial Role

Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role.

Taricco principles beyond Taricco

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
Fabio Giuffrida
Keyword(s):  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Form Part ◽  
The Right ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
Alleged Incompatibility ◽  
The Eu

This contribution examines whether the principles laid down in M.A.S., M.B. (‘ Taricco II’) may play a role in some forthcoming decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In Scialdone, the Court will be asked to strike a balance between the effectiveness of national legislation on VAT offences and the principle of lex mitior. The key difference between Taricco and Scialdone lies in the fact that the lex mitior principle, unlike the regulation of the statute of limitation, falls within the scope of the principle of legality at the European level. Kolev concerns instead an alleged incompatibility between Article 325 TFEU and the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike Taricco, therefore, the CJEU will have to deal with national rules that form part of procedural criminal law. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the Court may reach a Taricco II-like conclusion (i.e. disapplication in theory, exception to the disapplication in practice), especially if the reasoning of the CJEU will rely on the importance of foreseeability and legal certainty in criminal matters. These same principles could lead the CJEU, in Menci, not to endorse the partial revirement of the European Court of Human Rights in the A. and B v. Norway ruling and, as a consequence, not to lower the EU standard of protection of the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence.

The case of Konrad Erzberger v TUI AG. Comment to Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 July 2017, Case C-566/15

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 333-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Seifert
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Parent Company ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the workers employed in the establishments of a group located in the territory of that Member State are deprived of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections of workers’ representatives to the supervisory board of the parent company of that group, which is established in that Member State, and as the case may be, of the right to act or to continue to act as representative on that board, where those workers leave their employment in such an establishment and are employed by a subsidiary belonging to the same group established in another Member State.

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