Reconsidering the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ – memory rights and the right to memory in the new media era

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 644-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam Tirosh
Keyword(s):  
New Media ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Memory Studies ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Origins ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) established the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ (RtbF). Since its establishment, more than 500,000 people filed requests with Google to be ‘de-listed’ from its search. At the same time, the Court’s decision has stirred debates focused on the tension the decision raised between a person’s right to privacy and freedom of expression. This study offers, yet, a different reading of the decision and its meaning. It first outlines the theoretical foundations of the concept of memory and its relation to rights. Then, it focuses on media, memory, and the RtbF. Afterward, the study discusses the legal origins of the RtbF and claims that the right is actually a right to construct one’s narrative. Therefore, in order to analyze the RtbF, this study places it within memory studies and analyzes it through its tools. From this perspective, this study criticizes the emphasis placed on forgetting in the definition of the right and problematizes its focus on individuals. Eventually, this study uses the legitimization the RtbF gives to a new discourse about memory in relation to rights in order to suggest an extended ‘right to memory’ that will answer the memory needs of our time.

The Right To Be Forgotten

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.

scholarly journals Right to be forgotten: european data imperialism, national privilege, or universal human right?

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-152
Author(s):  
Oskar J. Gstrein
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Data ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

The Digital Age has fundamentally reshaped the preconditions for privacy and freedom of expression. This transpires in the debate about a "right to be forgotten". While the 2014 decision of the European Court of Justice in "Google Spain" touches upon the underlying issue of how increasing amounts of personal data affects individuals over time, the topic has also become one of the salient problems of Internet Governance. On 24th September 2019 the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in "Google vs CNIL" (C-507/17) which was supposed to clarify the territorial scope of the right. However, this judgment has raised doubts about the enforceability of the General Data Protection Regulation, and reveals the complex, multi-layered governance structure of the European Union. Acknowledging such complexity at a substantive and institutional level, this article starts by analysing the judgment. Additionally, to better understand the current situation in the European Union and its member states, recently produced draft guidelines by the European Data Protection Board are presented and discussed, as well as two judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court. Subsequently, the European developments are put in international context. Finally, the insights from these sections are combined which allows to develop several conceptual ideas. In conclusion, it is argued that the right to be forgotten remains complex and evolving. Its success depends on effective multi-layer and multistakeholder interaction. In this sense, it has become a prominent study object that reveals potential venues and pitfalls on a path towards more sophisticated data protection frameworks.

scholarly journals Collective memory or the right to be forgotten? Cultures of digital memory and forgetting in the European Union

2021 ◽  
pp. 175069802110447
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Stainforth
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Collective Memory ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Memory Studies ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Regulation ◽  
Digital Memory ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Google Books ◽  
The Right

This article investigates cultures of digital memory and forgetting in the European Union. The article first gives some background to key debates in media memory studies, before going on to analyse the shaping of European Commission and European Union initiatives in relation to Google’s activities from the period 2004–present. The focus of inquiry for the discussion of memory is the Google Books project and Europeana, a database of digitized cultural collections drawn from European museums, libraries and archives. Attention is then given to questions of forgetting by exploring the tension between Google’s search and indexing mechanisms and the right to be forgotten. The article ends by reflecting on the scale of the shift in contemporary cultures of memory and forgetting, and considers how far European regulation enables possible interventions in this domain.

Google Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget about Freedom of Expression?

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Kulk ◽  
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius
Keyword(s):  
Search Engine ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The European Union ◽  
High Court ◽  
Search Results ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Data Protection Directive ◽  
Job Application ◽  
The Right

When reviewing a job application letter, going on a first date, or considering doing business with someone, the first thing many people do is entering the person's name in a search engine. A search engine can point searchers to information that would otherwise have remained obscure. If somebody searched for the name of Spanish lawyer Mario Costeja González, Google showed search results that included a link to a 1998 newspaper announcement implying he had financial troubles at the time. González wanted Google to stop showing those links and started a procedure in Spain. After some legal wrangling, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional (National High Court) asked the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for advice on the application of the Data Protection Directive, which led to the controversial judgment in Google Spain. In its judgment, the CJEU holds that people, under certain conditions, have the right to have search results for their name delisted. This right can also extend to lawfully published information.

scholarly journals Public policy: united in diversity... within the marriage?

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1022-1031
Author(s):  
Silvia Marino
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Judicial Cooperation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact

The present paper tackles the development of the notion of public policy in the definition of the concept of marriage. It starts from brief remarks on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the field of the right to free movement of people and of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to private and family life. Then, it analyses the uncertainties stemming from the national divergences. Further, the impact of the Coman case on the applicability of EU measures on civil judicial cooperation and on the notion of public policy is examined. Conclusively, the paper submits some considerations on the modern function of the public policy.

scholarly journals The Right to Be Forgotten in the European Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-76
Author(s):  
Yulia Razmetaeva
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Legitimate Interests ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract The article focuses on the right to be forgotten, which is at the center of changes in the concept of human rights in the digital age. The origins of the right to be forgotten in European legal doctrine and judicial practice, as well as its relationship with autonomy and identity, are analyzed. The article also examines the significance of the new understanding of “time” and “data” for the adoption of this right, considering the influence of two key cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union, such as Google v. Spain [2014] and Google v. CNIL [2019] on the concept of the right to be forgotten. The place of this right, its connection with privacy and European data protection law is debated. The article focuses on jurisdictional issues, paying particular attention to both the right to be forgotten and the understanding of the relationship between privacy a nd freedom of expression in the European Union and the United States, and possible jurisdictional disputes around the world. The article also addresses the issue of balancing rights and legitimate interests, as well as the proportionality for applying the right to be forgotten, both in the European and global contexts.

scholarly journals Right to Be Forgotten: Much Ado About Nothing

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Frosio
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Critical Issue ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Much Ado About Nothing ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Protection Legislation ◽  
The Right

In the information society, the role of private sector entities in gathering information for and about users has long been a most critical issue. Therefore, intermediaries have become a main focus of privacy regulations, especially in jurisdictions with a strong tradition of privacy protection such as Europe. In a landmark case, the ECJ ruled that an internet search engine operator is responsible for the processing that it carries out of personal data which appear on web pages published by third parties. The recognition by the European Union of a so called “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) has ignited disgruntled reactions from civil society and legal scholars, especially in the United States. Meanwhile, proposals for the adoption of a similar right have appeared in several jurisdictions, including Brazil, Japan, Korea, and Russia. Supposedly, the right to be forgotten would endanger freedom of expression (FoE) and access to information. Apparently, factoids — defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “an item of unreliable information that is reported and repeated so often that it becomes accepted as fact” — dominated the recent debate surrounding the right to be forgotten. This paper will discuss and debunk these factoids, review data protection legislation in Europe, and explore the legal and policy implications of the newly emerging right to be forgotten. Finally, the idea that extra-territorial application of the RTBF might unleash a kraken that can break down the Internet will be contextualized within the present political scenario. The extra-territorial application of the RTBF follows in the footsteps of a global move towards data protectionism against the de facto market dominance of US Internet conglomerates. Global blocking governed by a nationality principle — as suggested by CNiL and other EU institutions — would put to rest these protectionist concerns.

Governing Fake News: The Regulation of Social Media and the Right to Freedom of Expression in the Era of Emergency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-41
Author(s):  
Donato VESE
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Social Media Platforms ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Media Censorship

Governments around the world are strictly regulating information on social media in the interests of addressing fake news. There is, however, a risk that the uncontrolled spread of information could increase the adverse effects of the COVID-19 health emergency through the influence of false and misleading news. Yet governments may well use health emergency regulation as a pretext for implementing draconian restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, as well as increasing social media censorship (ie chilling effects). This article seeks to challenge the stringent legislative and administrative measures governments have recently put in place in order to analyse their negative implications for the right to freedom of expression and to suggest different regulatory approaches in the context of public law. These controversial government policies are discussed in order to clarify why freedom of expression cannot be allowed to be jeopardised in the process of trying to manage fake news. Firstly, an analysis of the legal definition of fake news in academia is presented in order to establish the essential characteristics of the phenomenon (Section II). Secondly, the legislative and administrative measures implemented by governments at both international (Section III) and European Union (EU) levels (Section IV) are assessed, showing how they may undermine a core human right by curtailing freedom of expression. Then, starting from the premise of social media as a “watchdog” of democracy and moving on to the contention that fake news is a phenomenon of “mature” democracy, the article argues that public law already protects freedom of expression and ensures its effectiveness at the international and EU levels through some fundamental rules (Section V). There follows a discussion of the key regulatory approaches, and, as alternatives to government intervention, self-regulation and especially empowering users are proposed as strategies to effectively manage fake news by mitigating the risks of undue interference by regulators in the right to freedom of expression (Section VI). The article concludes by offering some remarks on the proposed solution and in particular by recommending the implementation of reliability ratings on social media platforms (Section VII).

scholarly journals GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND OF THE RIGHT NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO ONE’S OWN INCRIMINATION IN ROMANIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (83) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana Domocos
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Right

The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the defendant in the criminal trial.The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must be necessary in a democratic Romanian society.The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.

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