A Deconstruction of the Notion of Acquisitive Prescription and Its Implications for the Diaoyu Islands Dispute

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-338
Author(s):  
Zuxing ZHANG

“Acquisitive prescription” should be denied as a rule of international law governing the acquisition of territorial sovereignty. It is useless in practice and confusing in theory. Replacing it should be the concepts of “historical title” and “tacit agreement”, which would thus expand the traditional five modes for legally acquiring territory to six. This rearrangement would be useful for us to get a clear and correct understanding of this part of international law, and would thus enable international law to play a positive role in dealing with territorial disputes. It would also prevent, hopefully, an exacerbation of the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan as caused by a misunderstanding of this part of international law.

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 581-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Thuo Gathii

This article reviews the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island with reference to acquisition of title to territory under international law. It traces the ICJ's use of evidence of African use and occupation to establish territorial sovereignty in a European state. The tests adopted by the Court are based on Eurocentric assumptions that only the consent of European states is necessary to adjudicate nineteenth century claims of title to territory. International law still carries forward within it the colonial notion that treaties between colonial powers in the nineteenth century extinguished pre-existing title to territory based on African use and occupation. The decision gives probative value to economic intentions of colonizing powers and geographical and scientific evidence in determining title to the disputed island while Africa use and occupation of territory is sidelined. Africa is treated as an unconscious geographical entity – a feature referred to as geographical Hegelianism in this article.


Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

This book offers a qualified defense of a territorial states system. It argues that three core values—occupancy, basic justice, and collective self-determination—are served by an international system made up of self-governing, spatially defined political units. The defense is qualified because the book does not actually justify all of the sovereignty rights states currently claim and that are recognized in international law. Instead, the book proposes important changes to states’ sovereign prerogatives, particularly with respect to internal autonomy for political minorities, immigration, and natural resources. Part I of the book argues for a right of occupancy, holding that a legitimate function of the international system is to specify and protect people’s preinstitutional claims to specific geographical places. Part II turns to the question of how a state might acquire legitimate jurisdiction over a population of occupants. It argues that the state will have a right to rule a population and its territory if it satisfies conditions of basic justice and facilitates its people’s collective self-determination. Finally, Parts III and IV of this book argue that the exclusionary sovereignty rights to control over borders and natural resources that can plausibly be justified on the basis of the three core values are more limited than has traditionally been thought.


Author(s):  
Gerald Goldstein

SummaryState sovereignty manifests itself through all the powers a state exercises over its territory: it is one of the basic components of sovereignty according to international law. Sovereign power involves controlling territory with a degree of efficiency sufficient to prove the existence of the state. But according to some, state sovereignty has now become less and less a matter of territorial control, and international law is now witnessing an erosion of the significance of territory. While the author admits the plausibility of this opinion when applied to states belonging to closely linked economic unions as the EEC, he challenges this statement when applied to Canada, even given the framework of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. In Part I, this article gives a full account of the Canadian positions dealing with legally valid acquisition of territories through effective control and other means. It points out how Canada has been coherently committed to protect its territorial sovereignty in all the border and territorial disputes in which it was and is still involved. It explores how this country deliberately also committed itself to effectively controlling its vast terrestrial, aerial, and maritime territories.From this perspective, the author exposes in Part II the rather protective Canadian legal attitude when dealing with private international interests in Canada: how foreign investors are selectively allowed to own, control, possess, or otherwise acquire an interest in any part of Canadian land or real property through specific substantial rules or conflict of law rules; how Canadian federal and provincial laws deal with expropriating foreign-owned property or with foreign judgments affecting the same. In the view of the author, all these territorialist features strongly convey the idea that Canada still attributes a prime role to securing close control over its territory within its global policy of sovereignty and independence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 128-157
Author(s):  
Louise Kazemi Shariat Panahi

The current article aims to study on the concept of sovereignty in international law. To this end, sovereignty is historically examined and compared in different legal doctrines. In fact, there is a verity of legal theories on the formulation and conceptualization of sovereignty. The dominant perspective of the contemporary legal doctrines sees sovereignty as wornout and outdated concept which belongs to classical legal doctrines. This article argues such accounts and shows how the concept of sovereignty survived through historically legal developments and has still been influential in the sphere of international law. Although the main legal events comprising Westphalian truce, world wars, the foundation of United Nation organization and so on have changed the nature and content of sovereignty in the history of international law, it has remained as a fundamental principle of international law. The lack of correct understanding of this concept can reinforce the obstacles for legal modeling and doctrines. So, through such a historical comparison, the research elaborates the reconceptualization process in the concept of sovereignty and elucidates how sovereignty means in the contemporary international law and how this concept defined by the modern legal doctrine influences international law and globally affects the legal order among states. Discussing the different legal doctrines on the concept of sovereignty in different historical periods, the article reveals the present considerations on sovereignty in contemporary international law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 69 (02) ◽  
pp. 187-221
Author(s):  
Isabelle Surun

Abstract This article focuses on the modes of territorial appropriation that characterized the transition from the old to the new colonial regime, when Europeans built their empires in Africa. It analyzes the juridical construction of colonial territorialities based on a corpus of treaties concluded between agents of the French colonial authority and African chiefs, an instrument of legal appropriation that has to date been little explored by historians of international law. Studying the terminology used in these treaties reveals the instability of these categories and the uncertainty of European negotiators regarding the meaning of the legal frameworks they sought to impose on African chiefs. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the protectorate emerged as the most common legal arrangement for regulating the sharing or transfer of sovereignty, based on a distinction between its external and internal dimensions. The consent of African chiefs to such arrangements therefore hung on whether they considered their territorial sovereignty to be divisible or indivisible.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B Carter ◽  
Rachel L Wellhausen ◽  
Paul K Huth

1924 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-280
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott

There are certain preliminary observations which should be made before we can take up the question of codifying international law or the method of codification, for without a correct understanding of certain matters, which may be considered fundamental, we may not know whether we are to deal with a system of law or a system of philosophy. As a matter of fact we are dealing with both, for law develops unconsciously or consciously in accordance with the principles of philosophy. If the law of nations is to be considered law in the strict sense of the word, we must deal with it as a system of law. If, on the other hand, it is a system of philosophy rather than of law, we must deal with it as philosophy, and the point of approach and the method of treatment will be different. But, above and beyond law, we are dealing with justice, and with those principles of justice, which, expressed in rules of law, we call the law of nations. Justice is the source; the principles of justice applicable to the conduct of nations constitute the law of nations, and the rules of law based upon these principles change with conditions, or to meet new conditions, and form the body and substance of international law at any given period.


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