New Transitions from Human Rights to the Environment to the Rights of Nature

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susana Borràs

AbstractThe weaknesses of our environmental laws stem in large part from the fact that legal systems treat the natural world as property that can be exploited and degraded, rather than as an integral ecological partner with its own rights to exist and thrive. This article analyzes the recent rise of a new generation of environmental laws which reject the ‘false dogma’ of ‘humans over nature’ and instead recognize our interconnectedness with the natural world and acknowledge its rights to exist, persist, and maintain its vital cycles. The article focuses on the transition from an anthropocentric approach, denoted by the ‘right to the environment’, to a biocentric approach constructed around ‘rights of nature’. This transition is evident in various new legal instruments – the Ecuadorian Constitution, certain Bolivian laws, and numerous ordinances of the United States – which incorporate and respect rights of nature, and grant legal rights to the natural world and enforcement rights to affected communities. These instruments serve as models for legal systems which can steer us towards more robust and effective environmental laws.

Author(s):  
Susana Borràs

The well-being of humans and nature are inextricably linked. Nature is particularly mistreated in light of its characterization as merely “property” to be bought, sold, and ultimately degraded for profit. Reinforcing this misperception is the fact that modern environmental laws themselves implicitly accept this claim of “nature as property.” They legalize nature's destruction by dictating how much of the environment can be exploited and degraded, rather than as an integral ecological partner with its own rights to exist and thrive. Instead, we need laws grounded in the inherent rights of natural world to exist, thrive, and evolve. The article focuses on the transition from the ‘right to the environment' to a biocentric approach constructed around ‘rights of nature.' This transition is evident in various new legal instruments, which serve as models for legal systems that can steer us towards more robust and effective environmental laws.


Author(s):  
Susana Borràs

The well-being of humans and nature are inextricably linked. Nature is particularly mistreated in light of its characterization as merely “property” to be bought, sold, and ultimately degraded for profit. Reinforcing this misperception is the fact that modern environmental laws themselves implicitly accept this claim of “nature as property.” They legalize nature's destruction by dictating how much of the environment can be exploited and degraded, rather than as an integral ecological partner with its own rights to exist and thrive. Instead, we need laws grounded in the inherent rights of natural world to exist, thrive, and evolve. The article focuses on the transition from the ‘right to the environment' to a biocentric approach constructed around ‘rights of nature.' This transition is evident in various new legal instruments, which serve as models for legal systems that can steer us towards more robust and effective environmental laws.


2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Lykes ◽  
Erin McDonald ◽  
Cesar Boc

As the number of immigrants in the United States has increased dramatically in recent decades, so has the number of human rights violations against immigrants in the form of arrests without warrants, detention and deportation of parents without consideration of the well-being of their children, and incarceration without bail or the right to a public attorney. The Post-Deportation Human Rights Project (PDHRP) at Boston College was developed to investigate and respond to the legal and psychological effects of deportation policies on migrants living in or deported from the United States. This unique multidisciplinary project involves lawyers, social science faculty, and graduate students—all of whom are bilingual, one of whom is trilingual, and many of whom are bicultural—working together in partnership with local immigrant organizations to address the psychosocial impact of deportation on Latino and Maya families and communities. Our work includes psycho-educational and rights education workshops with immigrant parents and their children in southern New England as well as a cross-national project based in the U.S. and Guatemala supporting transnational families through participatory research, educational workshops, and legal resources.


1974 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gareth Evans

Governments have been increasingly preoccupied with the task of reconciling claims to preferential treatment with the principle of equality. The social and philosophical issues raised by this apparent paradox are considered, and the compatibility of benign discrimination with the concept of equality demonstrated by developing a complex normative notion of equality. An analysis is then undertaken of the various attempts made by lawyers, in nearly one hundred existing bills of rights, to give formal expression to these principles. Ultimately the problem of benign discrimination falls for resolution by the courts, and the jurisprudence developed in this respect by the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States is critically discussed and compared. Having exhaustively developed an appreciation of world experience regarding the interaction of bills of rights equality clauses and benign discrimination, consideration is given to the formulation of the Australian Human Rights Bill—a bill of which Gareth Evans was one of the principal draftsmen.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Jane Macpherson

An international consensus of scientific experts is now demanding "immediate action" in response to the environmental, climate, and biodiversity crises. But are our legal and regulatory frameworks equipped to respond to the rapid pace of environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and climate change? What incidence is there, transnationally, of laws that seek to protect the Earth from the humans that inhabit it? In the past few decades, there is a growing social, legal, and political movement towards more ecocentric regulation of the planet, where new laws and institutions seek to protect natural resources for their own intrinsic value. In this paper, I consider recent efforts to protect the rights of rivers in the U.S. and Mexico, which are novel and emerging attempts to discover new pathways for enhanced protection of vulnerable waterways. These attempts are being pragmatically driven from the bottom up to the highest levels of the legislature or judiciary as local communities (and sometimes Indigenous Peoples) become increasingly frustrated with apathetic and complacent governmental responses to environmental challenges, using whatever legal tools and processes are available to them. However, rather than an Earth-centred revolution, efforts to protect the rights of nature are distinctly "human"; as communities appeal to human rights laws, and their enhanced constitutional status, to upset the status quo. There are important lessons to be learned from these experiences in other countries in terms of the ability to entrench transformative environmental protections via constitutional hierarchies and the potential for the rights and interests of humans to be both an enabler of, as well as a threat to, nature's rights.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 614-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kanstroom

This article considers the relationship between two human rights discourses (and two specific legal regimes): refugee and asylum protection and the evolving body of international law that regulates expulsions and deportations. Legal protections for refugees and asylum seekers are, of course, venerable, well-known, and in many respects still cherished, if challenged and perhaps a bit frail. Anti-deportation discourse is much newer, multifaceted, and evolving. It is in many respects a young work in progress. It has arisen in response to a rising tide of deportations, and the worrisome development of massive, harsh deportation machinery in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Mexico, Australia, and South Africa, among others. This article's main goal is to consider how these two discourses do and might relate to each other. More specifically, it suggests that the development of procedural and substantive rights against removal — as well as rights during and after removal — aids our understanding of the current state and possible future of the refugee protection regime. The article's basic thesis is this: The global refugee regime, though challenged both theoretically and in practice, must be maintained and strengthened. Its historical focus on developing criteria for admission into safe states, on protections against expulsion (i.e., non-refoulement), and on regimes of temporary protection all remain critically important. However, a focus on other protections for all noncitizens facing deportation is equally important. Deportation has become a major international system that transcends the power of any single nation-state. Its methods have migrated from one regime to another; its size and scope are substantial and expanding; its costs are enormous; and its effects frequently constitute major human rights violations against millions who do not qualify as refugees. In recent years there has been increasing reliance by states on generally applicable deportation systems, led in large measure by the United States' radical 25 year-plus experiment with large-scale deportation. Europe has also witnessed a rising tide of deportation, some of which has developed in reaction to European asylum practices. Deportation has been facilitated globally (e.g., in Australia) by well-funded, efficient (but relatively little known) intergovernmental idea sharing, training, and cooperation. This global expansion, standardization, and increasing intergovernmental cooperation on deportation has been met by powerful — if in some respects still nascent — human rights responses by activists, courts, some political actors, and scholars. It might seem counterintuitive to think that emerging ideas about deportation protections could help refugees and asylum seekers, as those people by definition often have greater rights protections both in admission and expulsion. However, the emerging anti-deportation discourses should be systematically studied by those interested in the global refugee regime for three basic reasons. First, what Matthew Gibney has described as “the deportation turn” has historically been deeply connected to anxiety about asylum seekers. Although we lack exact figures of the number of asylum seekers who have been subsequently expelled worldwide, there seems little doubt that it has been a significant phenomenon and will be an increasingly important challenge in the future. The two phenomena of refugee/asylum protections and deportation, in short, are now and have long been linked. What has sometimes been gained through the front door, so to speak, may be lost through the back door. Second, current deportation human rights discourses embody creative framing models that might aid constructive critique and reform of the existing refugee protection regime. They tend to be more functionally oriented, less definitional in terms of who warrants protection, and more fluid and transnational. Third, these discourses offer important specific rights protections that could strengthen the refugee and asylum regime, even as we continue to see weakening state support for the basic 1951/1967 protection regime. This is especially true in regard to the extraterritorial scope of the (deporting) state's obligations post-deportation. This article particularly examines two initiatives in this emerging field: The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens and the draft Declaration on the Rights of Expelled and Deported Persons developed through the Boston College Post-Deportation Human Rights Project (of which the author is a co-director). It compares their provisions to the existing corpus of substantive and procedural protections for refugees relating to expulsion and removal. It concludes with consideration of how these discourses may strengthen protections for refugees while also helping to develop more capacious and protective systems in the future. “Those guarantees of liberty and livelihood are the essence of the freedom which this country from the beginning has offered the people of all lands. If those rights, great as they are, have constitutional protection, I think the more important one — the right to remain here — has a like dignity.” Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, 19522 “We need a national effort to return those who have been rejected … and we are working on that at the moment with great vigor.” Angela Merkel, October 15, 20163


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 522-544
Author(s):  
Arthur Chaskalson

The policies of the U.S.—developed in response to the threat of terroism have been criticized. This is of importance, not only because of the harm it does to the United States own reputation, but because of the influence such measures have on other countries with less commitment to the protection of human rights than the United States has historically had. It is, however, a crucial issue because of the impact that such policies can have on the political will of the international community to respect and promote half a century of endeavor to build an international human rights culture, and on attitudes and behavior in countries affected by such measures. The exception becomes the rule; the temporary becomes permanent; and fairness and due process cease to have the meaning they once had. This Article's remarks are directed to the right to a fair hearing which must be seen, however, in a broader context as a concern about a discourse which, whilst retaining the label, seeks to change the content of established principles of human rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 941-1012
Author(s):  
Christina M. Cerna

On April 22, 2020, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) issued its first decision on one of the Guantanamo detainees, Djamel Ameziane, an Algerian Muslim who was held at Guantanamo for almost 12 years until he was deported to Algeria in 2013, in violation, inter alia, of the principle of non-refoulement. The case was brought on Mr. Ameziane's behalf by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), and the decision is very comprehensive and carefully written, as is to be expected of a decision totaling 70 pages. Although the United States became a party to the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992, it never accepted the first Optional Protocol, which gives individuals the right to bring complaints against the United States before the U.N. Human Rights Committee; consequently, the only international body to which an individual can bring a complaint against the United States for a violation of international human rights law is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a principal organ of the Organization of American States (OAS).


1991 ◽  
Vol 4 (01) ◽  
pp. 165-186
Author(s):  
Daniel E. Wueste

According to Sir Henry Maine, “a clear and consistent meaning was for the first time given to the expression ‘a right’ by the searching analysis of Bentham and Austin.” There is no question at least that clear thinking respecting the concept of ‘a right’ has been — and still is — closely associated with the work of legal philosophers, in particular, legal philosophers working in the positivistic tradition of Bentham and Austin. In Bentham’s case, clarity and consistency of thought respecting rights are purchased by confining attention to the legal arena. In truth, Bentham writes, “there are no such things as natural rights — no such things as rights anterior to the establishment of government — no such things as natural rights opposed to, in contradistinction to, legal [rights].” In short, all rights are artificial, products of human action. Consequently, that a certain “point of conduct” is a right does not turn on whether that point of conduct passes a moral test. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of such a claim of right that the conduct in question is right conduct. To think otherwise is to confuse questions of existence with questions of merit. One may have a right, say, to burn the flag of the United States in a peaceful political protest even though, in terms of widely accepted criteria of right conduct, say, of conservative Americans, this is wrong. So it has become a commonplace among contemporary rights theorists that there is a distinction between ‘a right’ (moral or legal) and ‘the right thing to do’ (morally or legally), unless a point were being pressed with respect to natural rights.


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