Postscript on Laila Soliman's Revolutionary Theatre

2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-171
Author(s):  
Brinda Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Identity ◽  
State Level ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Spoken Word ◽  
The State ◽  
Creative Expression ◽  
Experimental Theatre ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Revolution

Laila Soliman's prophetic words in Lessons in Revolting, “this revolution is far from over” (2011) have come to fruition. The ouster of former President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government by a military takeover on 3 July 2013 (after only one year in power) has added another chapter to the uprising's trajectory. While the revolution inspired dramatic protest and equally spectacular creative expression in the form of experimental theatre, music, art, spoken word, and other forms, many Egyptian artistes and cultural critics have bemoaned a general stymying of artistic synergies at the state level due to a series of interconnected factors. They have attributed this attrition to “budget limitations, recurring safety problems, the so-called ‘religious eye’ that defied Egypt's cultural identity— particularly during the year when power was in the hands of the former president Mohamed Mursi—and a cabinet filled with either the Islamist factions or their sympathizers” (Metwaly 2013).

A true study of a benevolent state. S.N. Baburin. Moral State. Russian view on the values of constitutionalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
Orlin Zagorov
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Identity ◽  
Traditional Culture ◽  
The State ◽  
Internal Quality ◽  
Orthodox Christianity ◽  
Solid Foundation ◽  
The Revolution

This article is the author's reflections on the problems of humanism, morality, and traditional culture in connection with the concept of a Moral State put forward by Professor S.N. Baburin. The role of the spirituality of the Slavic peoples and their contribution to the strengthening of European cultural identity is considered. The author argues the importance of the conclusion that the virtue of the state as its internal quality in itself turns the state into a guarantor of virtue as a universal value and the validity of the thesis that the values of both Orthodox Christianity and Slavic spirituality represent a solid foundation of a Moral State. The author sees in the Moral State a mechanism for the harmonious combination of the spirit of the revolution with the revolution of the spirit.

PRISON TALK: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S INTERNAL STRUGGLE DURING GAMAL ABDEL NASSER'S PERSECUTION, 1954 TO 1971

2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 433a-433a
Author(s):  
Barbara Zollner
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The State ◽  
State System ◽  
Joint Project ◽  
Organizational Reform ◽  
Ideological Discourse ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Internal Struggle ◽  
Number Of Authors

This article investigates the history of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1954 to 1971, when thousands of its members were imprisoned and tortured in Gamel Abdel Nasser's prisons. The period is marked by intervals of crisis, attempts at organizational reform, and ideological discourse, which was prompted by Sayyid Qutb's activist interpretation. However, the Muslim Brotherhood finally developed a moderate ideology, which countered radical Islamist leanings growing within its midst while remaining loyal to Qutb's legacy. This centrist approach to Islamist activism and opposition is epitomized by Duءat la Qudat, which was composed by a number of authors and issued in Hasan al-Hudaybi's name. Written as a joint project of leading Brothers and al-Azhar scholars, the text is evidence of the first steps toward reconciling with the state system during Nasser's presidency.

Scripting a Massacre

2019 ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
National Community ◽  
Crisis Events ◽  
Revolutionary Politics ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter explains that it is not entirely wrong to partially attribute the coup, the massacre, and the certainty of those who backed these actions to the notion that revolutionary politics left no alternative to violence, which manifested in the Rabʻa Massacre. But it is entirely wrong to neglect the long-standing discursive apparatus of excommunicating the Muslim Brotherhood from the national community that was operational during the period of revolutionary liminality and before it. Resorting to such concepts as imitation and crisis in no way obviates the need to delve into the production, meaning, and circulation of this discourse. If anything, the need to document and interpret the means of excommunication are heightened by one's attention to the form of crisis: the creation or occurrence of a threshold in the present; a plunge into liminality, and then a reckoning. The revolution created a series of thresholds, not just the initial threshold of the plunge into the void when the label “revolution” was applied to events on January 25, 2011. The Maspero Massacre was a threshold; the Battle of Muhammad Mahmud Street was too, and so were a number of other crisis events, including the Tamarrud demonstration against Muhammad Morsy in 2013 and the coup that followed shortly thereafter.

How and Why Has the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan Changed since 2011?

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-52
Author(s):  
Mohammad Abu Rumman ◽  
Neven Bondokji
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Identity Crisis ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Campaigning ◽  
Personal Experiences ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Arab Spring

In the wake of the Arab Spring, many younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan left the movement, especially after 2015, establishing new political parties due to ideological shifts over the nature of the state and questions of civil liberties. Four factors influenced this transformation: identity crisis, the movement's organizational rigidity, members' personal experiences during and after the uprisings, and a growing desire to separate political campaigning from religious outreach.

Al-Nour Party's influence in Egypt will be limited

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Political Landscape ◽  
Political Group ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood

Significance Al-Nour Party was the only Islamist political group to participate in the elections. However, the conservative Salafist party has seen its fortunes decline, from being the second most successful party in the relatively diverse political landscape of 2011-13, to an underperforming one in the current parliamentary elections. Impacts Al-Nour's lack of credibility among Egyptian Islamists will obstruct its development. As a result the Muslim Brotherhood will have greater influence as and when the regime reconciles with political Islamists. Supporters of the state, especially the media, will view al-Nour as an extension of the Brotherhood.

scholarly journals MILITANT ATHEISM IN THE LATE 1940S – EARLY 1950S IN THE KEMEROVO REGION

2018 ◽  
pp. 24-31
Author(s):  
A. V. Gorbatov ◽  
E. S. Skvortsova
Keyword(s):  
State Level ◽  
Technical Condition ◽  
The State ◽  
Russian Orthodox ◽  
Religious Institutions ◽  
Russian Orthodox Church ◽  
Christian Communities ◽  
One Year ◽  
Domestic Affairs ◽  
Restrictive Measures

The article features the policy of militant atheism during the period of late Stalinism in the late 1940s – early 1950s. The research is based on various studies on relations between the state and religious institutions. The authors used unpublished materials from regional and federal archives to investigate foreign and domestic affairs that triggered the change in the state religious policy in 1948. The paper describes the main prohibitive and restrictive measures against the Russian Orthodox Church at the state level. In the case of the Kemerovo region, the authorities attempted to close five Christian communities within one year. They did not recognize property rights on the place of worship and claimed that the churches were in unsatisfactory technical condition. The authors established that the claims of the authorities were merely formal, and the gross administrative measures to restrict religious life contradicted Soviet legislation. 

Anatomy of the Egyptian Counterrevolution

2014 ◽  
pp. 91-100
Author(s):  
A. Korotaev ◽  
L. Isaev
Keyword(s):  
Urban Poor ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Political Events ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

The authors analyze roots, causes and implications of both major political events that took place in Egypt in the last three years, namely the Tahrir Revolution of 2011 and what they call the Counterrevolution of 2013. Focus of the article is on the role of the military and the Islamists. The young educated democrats of middle class who initiated the revolution in 2011 under the slogans of combatting autocratic and corrupt government were joined by the poverty-stricken population of Cairo, by the desolate and unemployed and – what was especially important – by the Muslim Brotherhood. This combination of forces proved too strong for the army and government, Mubarak had to resign. But the urban poor who played a decisive role in the victory of the revolution had always been under a very strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, so it was inevitable that free and fair elections would bring the Islamists to power. Moursi became President. The Islamists, however, made a number of grave mistakes while in power, and the old elites, both economic and military/bureaucratic, did their best to sabotage the government policy. At last the army (supported by the Egyptian economic elites) came on top, so both the Muslim Brothers and the young secular democrats have lost.

"A Revolutionary, Not a Politician"

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter examines the March crisis of 1954, which saw the Command Council of the Revolution (CCR) face off against the combined opposition of the old political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Left, much of the independent intelligentsia, and significant units within the army. The March crisis was sparked by the ouster of Muhammad Nagib as prime minister, and the opposition rallied behind him. They demand that power must return to civilian hands, the officers must return to the barracks, and the revolution must end. The chapter discusses the street demonstrations that were part of the March crisis and the steps taken by the Free Officers after it ended. It shows that the March crisis turned out to be a pivotal moment that allowed the CCR to consolidate its power and establish itself as the only viable alternative to the old regime.

scholarly journals Post-Islamism in Tunisia and Egypt: Contradictory Trajectories

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 408
Author(s):  
Houssem Ben Lazreg
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Religious Movement ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Comparative Case Studies ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
To Come ◽  
One Year ◽  
Tunisian Revolution

In the wake of the Tunisian Revolution of 2011, Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi distanced his party from the main Islamist paradigm, which is spearheaded primarily by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and announced the separation of the religious movement entirely from its political wing (al-Siyasi and al-da’awi). In addition to reassuring Tunisians that Ennahda’s socio-political project is rooted in its “Tunisianity,” these measures aimed at signaling Ennahda’s joining the camp of post-Islamist parties and Muslim democrats such as the AKP in Turkey and the JDP in Morocco. In this article, using the comparative case studies, I examine the patterns, similarities, and differences between the Tunisian Ennahda party and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in terms of their evolutions from an Islamist to a post-Islamist discourse and identity. I argue that the Ennahda party outpaced the Muslim Brotherhood in that shift considering the local/regional realities and the new compromises dictated by the post-revolutionary political processes in both countries. Although the Muslim Brotherhood managed to come to power and govern for only one year before being deposed by the army, Ennahda’s political pragmatism (consensus, compromise, and coalition) enabled it to fare well, ultimately prodding the party to adapt and reposition itself intellectually and politically.

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