Abir's Enlightenment Revolution is the basic element leading to the end of the corrupt regime resulting from the poisoned Tunisian revolution 2011

Ten years after the launch of its 2011 revolution, Tunisia has reached a catastrophic socio-economic situation that confirms that none of major goals of this revolution have been achieved. Here, from an anthropological analysis of major events happened during this decade I reveal and discuss mysteries of this revolution, and I show how and why it got to her final stage. I qualified it as „poisoned‟ because of clandestine interventions from some foreign countries that were able to steer it on a corrupt and dangerous path from the very beginning. In fact, although it was started by young people who have no political and ideological affiliation, many opportunist politicians rode its wave and given a false revolutionary label to their parties. One of these parties, „Ennahdha‟, in a clear relationship with some countries, very likely got secretly considerable funds. The use of these moneys, coupled with dissemination of religious misinformation, during the pre-elections period permitted this party to be the first to come to power. Since then, it began (1) to support secretly those who perform the corrupt instrumentalization of Islam leading to terrorism and obscurantism, (2) not to apply laws that conflict with its interests, and (3) to develop corruption through wide networks spread in most of the national institutions particularly in judicial and security sectors. This has ensured it permanent influence over the major joints of the State even if it does not have the highest representation in the Government. At the end of this despaired decade, a glimmer of hope appeared with the emergence of the wonderful leader ‟Abir Moussi‟ who called for Enlightenment Revolution. Her heroic struggle is the basic element leading to the end of the poisoned revolution 2011 and the resulting corrupt regime, which was mainly fabricated and dominated by Ennahdha, the last dangerous stronghold of the World Brotherhood Sect. I end this study by presenting recommendations aimed at eliminating the corrupt instrumentalization of Islam and preventing its return.

Body and Sartorial Paradox in Physical Education: A New Look at the Gender Interaction and Co-Educational System in Physical Education Class

Since the Tunisian Revolution of 2010, two views (modernism and conservatism) conduct two opposite social projects for the Tunisian population, which affect, in first order, the school from primary to secondary level. The Tunisian educational system is based on co-education, contradicting the country’s conservatism culture. The religious dress (veil/hijab) is accepted and tolerated in schools. Physical education, as an educational discipline, had to adapt to these changes, especially to the religion dress and gender interaction. The aim of this paper is to study, through the representations of physical education’s (PE) teachers, the paradoxes observed between physical practice and religious dress (veil/Hijab) and the management of the co-educational system in PE classes. This is based on the opinion which indicates that this matter requires the student’s body and physical ability to be independent from their gender, dress or motor skills. The results show a difference in opinion between females and male teachers regarding gender interaction and religious dress.

Tunisian Revolution: prerequisites, features, legal grounds

The monograph is devoted to the consideration of one of the urgent problems of political theory and practice — the revolution of freedom and dignity in Tunisia, which opened the way for deep democratic transformations in the Islamic country. This revolution has become a convincing example of new, one might say unprecedented before, opportunities for revolutionary renewal of the world within the framework of the current law and without violence, based on revolutionary legality. For the first time in the Islamic world, the possibility of a certain and sufficiently broad cooperation between revolutionary forces and representatives of the former dictatorial power in the country was shown in practice. The main force in the Tunisian Revolution was the masses of the people, who acted independently in the absence of any universally recognized leaders, political parties and movements. Finally, perhaps the highest achievement of the revolution was the adoption of a new constitution that defined the conditions for the subsequent political development of Tunisia. It is addressed to everyone who is interested in the political development of the modern world. It will be useful for postgraduates and undergraduates studying in the fields of "Political Science" and "Sociology", as well as for university and college teachers.

PEOPLE AS A COLELCTIVE POLITICAL ACTOR (ON THE EXAMPLE OF TUNISIA)

The article discusses the role of people as a collective actor in the Jasmine Revolution, which occurred in Tunisia at the beginning of 2011. The Tunisian revolution, that had aris-en from collective national sense of dignity and justice, was marked by its spontaneous character. It is shown, that this revolution was related neither to parties nor movements, preparing politically revolutionary renewing of the society. The revolution was guided neither by leaders nor authoritative persons. The program of country transformation also lacked. Taking into account positions of Tunisian scholars, the content of notion “people” and its changeable character, as well as its liberating function, manifesting during political reforms is revealed. Peculiarities of political transit during first months of its post-revolutionary development are analyzed.

Demystifying Qatar’s Pro-Revolution Monarchy: Old Rivalries, New Geopolitical Motives

Unlike other Arab monarchies, Qatar has embraced a supportive position toward the Arab revolutions since the moment they broke out in late 2010. In fact, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network was an essential media mobilizer for the Arab masses and a major promoter of the revolutionary change process in the region, hosting pro-revolution Arab intellectuals, and broadcasting pro-reform messages. Qatar welcomed the Tunisian Revolution, financially backed the country in its transitional stage, and behaved the same with the subsequent Egyptian and Yemeni cases. What’s more, Qatar made efforts to encourage both Arab and international support for humanitarian interventions in Libya and Syria, and generously backed the revolutionary forces there both financially and militarily. Given the fact that Qatar’s political system is of the conservative-monarchic type, this paper aims to review the dynamics and geopolitical interests that drove Doha to embrace a pro-change policy in the region during the Arab Spring, with a view to better understanding what has become known as the ‘Qatari Oxymoron’ or ‘Qatari Exceptionalism,’ and the ensuing dynamics that led to the Gulf crisis of 2017 –the most difficult crisis among the GCC states since the organization’s establishment in 1981.

Post-Islamism in Tunisia and Egypt: Contradictory Trajectories

In the wake of the Tunisian Revolution of 2011, Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi distanced his party from the main Islamist paradigm, which is spearheaded primarily by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and announced the separation of the religious movement entirely from its political wing (al-Siyasi and al-da’awi). In addition to reassuring Tunisians that Ennahda’s socio-political project is rooted in its “Tunisianity,” these measures aimed at signaling Ennahda’s joining the camp of post-Islamist parties and Muslim democrats such as the AKP in Turkey and the JDP in Morocco. In this article, using the comparative case studies, I examine the patterns, similarities, and differences between the Tunisian Ennahda party and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in terms of their evolutions from an Islamist to a post-Islamist discourse and identity. I argue that the Ennahda party outpaced the Muslim Brotherhood in that shift considering the local/regional realities and the new compromises dictated by the post-revolutionary political processes in both countries. Although the Muslim Brotherhood managed to come to power and govern for only one year before being deposed by the army, Ennahda’s political pragmatism (consensus, compromise, and coalition) enabled it to fare well, ultimately prodding the party to adapt and reposition itself intellectually and politically.