Scripting a Massacre

2019 ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
National Community ◽  
Crisis Events ◽  
Revolutionary Politics ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter explains that it is not entirely wrong to partially attribute the coup, the massacre, and the certainty of those who backed these actions to the notion that revolutionary politics left no alternative to violence, which manifested in the Rabʻa Massacre. But it is entirely wrong to neglect the long-standing discursive apparatus of excommunicating the Muslim Brotherhood from the national community that was operational during the period of revolutionary liminality and before it. Resorting to such concepts as imitation and crisis in no way obviates the need to delve into the production, meaning, and circulation of this discourse. If anything, the need to document and interpret the means of excommunication are heightened by one's attention to the form of crisis: the creation or occurrence of a threshold in the present; a plunge into liminality, and then a reckoning. The revolution created a series of thresholds, not just the initial threshold of the plunge into the void when the label “revolution” was applied to events on January 25, 2011. The Maspero Massacre was a threshold; the Battle of Muhammad Mahmud Street was too, and so were a number of other crisis events, including the Tamarrud demonstration against Muhammad Morsy in 2013 and the coup that followed shortly thereafter.

The Disputed Grievability of Sally Zahran

2019 ◽  
pp. 74-98
Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Single Event ◽  
Fault Line ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Participation Of Women ◽  
Revolutionary Politics ◽  
Major Fault ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter details how the disputed grievability of Sally Zahran proved to be a microcosm of the major fault line within the revolutionary camp, particularly between the Muslim Brotherhood in uneasy alliance with Islamists more generally, and the non-Islamist protestors, but also a fault line between men and women. The Left were undoubtedly the most articulate among the non-Islamist revolutionaries, or if not Left in a hard ideological sense, then at least those who saw themselves as inspired by the generation of the 1970s. To be sure, Sally Zahran's death also touched on the rage of the old regime against the revolution, evident through the undercurrent of suspicion that someone, or some political force, was trying to cover it up or negate its meaning. Whether or not old regime elements were trying to manipulate Ms. Zahran's death, the mere suspicion of manipulation was a foretaste of vicious pro-regime polemics against the revolution that had, at that juncture, receded into the background, but would again come roaring back in challenges to every single event that had been taken as a “fact” by the revolutionaries. Sally Zahran's death also highlighted the confluence of gender politics with revolutionary politics. The participation of women in protest became a constant target of provocateurs and propaganda.

scholarly journals Does revolutionary politics reconfigure Islamist women’s agency organizationally? The case of the Muslim Sisters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1928-2013)

2017 ◽  
pp. 85-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariz Tadros ◽  
Mariz Tadros
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Religious Movements ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Egyptian Revolution ◽  
Political Empowerment ◽  
Revolutionary Politics ◽  
Gender Hierarchies ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Arabic And English ◽  
First Time

For the first time in eighty years, one of the oldest and most important religious movements striving to establish an Islamic state, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt reached the apex of political power between 2011-2013, after decades of containment and sometimes repression. Against this backdrop this paper explores how the dramatic power reconfigurations associated with the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and its aftermath impacted on the agency of the Muslim Sisters belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood both internally within the organization and in terms of their public roles. The paper is based on empirical data collected between 2007-2012 and complemented with secondary literature both in Arabic and English. The paper aims to make a contribution to understanding the extent to which political empowerment of women and men in Islamist movements affects internal gender hierarchies through a historicized and contextualized approach.

Anatomy of the Egyptian Counterrevolution

2014 ◽  
pp. 91-100
Author(s):  
A. Korotaev ◽  
L. Isaev
Keyword(s):  
Urban Poor ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Political Events ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

The authors analyze roots, causes and implications of both major political events that took place in Egypt in the last three years, namely the Tahrir Revolution of 2011 and what they call the Counterrevolution of 2013. Focus of the article is on the role of the military and the Islamists. The young educated democrats of middle class who initiated the revolution in 2011 under the slogans of combatting autocratic and corrupt government were joined by the poverty-stricken population of Cairo, by the desolate and unemployed and – what was especially important – by the Muslim Brotherhood. This combination of forces proved too strong for the army and government, Mubarak had to resign. But the urban poor who played a decisive role in the victory of the revolution had always been under a very strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, so it was inevitable that free and fair elections would bring the Islamists to power. Moursi became President. The Islamists, however, made a number of grave mistakes while in power, and the old elites, both economic and military/bureaucratic, did their best to sabotage the government policy. At last the army (supported by the Egyptian economic elites) came on top, so both the Muslim Brothers and the young secular democrats have lost.

"A Revolutionary, Not a Politician"

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter examines the March crisis of 1954, which saw the Command Council of the Revolution (CCR) face off against the combined opposition of the old political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Left, much of the independent intelligentsia, and significant units within the army. The March crisis was sparked by the ouster of Muhammad Nagib as prime minister, and the opposition rallied behind him. They demand that power must return to civilian hands, the officers must return to the barracks, and the revolution must end. The chapter discusses the street demonstrations that were part of the March crisis and the steps taken by the Free Officers after it ended. It shows that the March crisis turned out to be a pivotal moment that allowed the CCR to consolidate its power and establish itself as the only viable alternative to the old regime.

Postscript on Laila Soliman's Revolutionary Theatre

2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-171
Author(s):  
Brinda Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Identity ◽  
State Level ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Spoken Word ◽  
The State ◽  
Creative Expression ◽  
Experimental Theatre ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Revolution

Laila Soliman's prophetic words in Lessons in Revolting, “this revolution is far from over” (2011) have come to fruition. The ouster of former President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government by a military takeover on 3 July 2013 (after only one year in power) has added another chapter to the uprising's trajectory. While the revolution inspired dramatic protest and equally spectacular creative expression in the form of experimental theatre, music, art, spoken word, and other forms, many Egyptian artistes and cultural critics have bemoaned a general stymying of artistic synergies at the state level due to a series of interconnected factors. They have attributed this attrition to “budget limitations, recurring safety problems, the so-called ‘religious eye’ that defied Egypt's cultural identity— particularly during the year when power was in the hands of the former president Mohamed Mursi—and a cabinet filled with either the Islamist factions or their sympathizers” (Metwaly 2013).

Copts and Salafis

2019 ◽  
pp. 140-156
Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust
Keyword(s):  
Labor Unions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Political Freedom ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Public Figures ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter assesses the most important period in the revolution, namely the last three months of 2011. By that time the revolutionary forces—those that stayed mobilized or that remobilized periodically throughout the year—had articulated a series of demands that went far beyond the ubiquitous but vague “bread, freedom, and social justice” slogan. They included the cleansing of institutions from Mubarakist elements, greater autonomy and political freedom within universities and al-Azhar, independent labor unions, the cessation of military trials for civilians, unambiguous civilian rule, and redress for those killed or injured by the security forces. None of this had anything to do with an institutionally nurtured “democratic transition” that occupied the attention of political scientists; none of it was acknowledged by institutions or powerful public figures, who never deviated from the line that the revolution was incoherent, and merely the product of a few feckless youths. Hence, chants at demonstrations of “down with military rule” were heard by March, but it was a series of massacres and street battles beginning in October and lasting until early February of 2012 that brought anti-SCAF (Supreme Council for the Armed Forces) sentiment much more openly into the mainstream than anyone could have dreamed, given the deeply institutionalized reverence for the military in Egyptian public culture. At that point, the military had little choice but to push ahead with elections that it knew would result in a transfer of power to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Dynamics of Egypt’s “Semi-opposition,” 2004–11

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-103
Author(s):  
Mai Mogib Mosad
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
Political System ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
The Relationship

This paper maps the basic opposition groups that influenced the Egyptian political system in the last years of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. It approaches the nature of the relationship between the system and the opposition through use of the concept of “semi-opposition.” An examination and evaluation of the opposition groups shows the extent to which the regime—in order to appear that it was opening the public sphere to the opposition—had channels of communication with the Muslim Brotherhood. The paper also shows the system’s relations with other groups, such as “Kifaya” and “April 6”; it then explains the reasons behind the success of the Muslim Brotherhood at seizing power after the ousting of President Mubarak.

Grievances against the Morsi Government

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Harassment ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Interview Data ◽  
Political Appointments ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Political Economic

This chapter outlines the individual grievances arising from political, economic, social, and religious conditions under the government of Mohamed Morsi that became the foundations of opposition to his rule. It focuses on democracy in Egypt, the 2012 presidential elections, and the expectations and promises put forth by Morsi. The chapter also covers popular perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, grievances surrounding electricity and gas, security and sexual harassment, Morsi’s speeches and representation of Egypt on the international stage, and Morsi’s political appointments. The chapter relies on interview data and fieldwork conducted in Egypt during the year of Morsi’s presidency.

scholarly journals Islamist Women as Candidates in Elections: A Comparison of the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 329-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarína Škrabáková
Keyword(s):  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Demand Model ◽  
Mena Region ◽  
External Interference ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Supply And Demand Model ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the legislative recruitment of women from conservative Islamist parties. It questions the common assumption that generally all Islamist parties are equally hostile to political participation and representation of women. For this purpose, two of the electorally most successful Islamist groups in the MENA region are compared, namely the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its Moroccan offshoot, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). The article seeks an explanation for diverging trends in female candidacy between these conservative religious movements, using the traditional supply and demand model of candidate selection. It argues that the less centralized and the more institutionalized parties (as is the case with the PJD) seem to be better equipped to facilitate women’s candidacy than the more oligarchic ones (the MB). In order to fully grasp the reasons behind the diverging trends in the nomination of female candidates from both Islamist parties, cultural factors are scrutinized as well. The article highlights the limits of the supply and demand model of candidate selection, which cannot explain instances of unexpected change in recruitment strategies based on external interference. Furthermore, it does not provide us the means to assess the impact of individual candidates’ ‘feminist credentials’ on overall female representation.


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