Towards A Comparative Rhetoric of Argument: Using the Concept of “Audience” as a Means of Educating Students about Comparative Argument

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helena Whalen-Bridge

AbstractAre Asian law schools adequately preparing law students to handle problems raised by cross-border disputes? Preparation has generally been limited to courses in conflicts of law, international law and comparative law, but the successful presentation of a legal position in a foreign legal system arguably requires more than an understanding of legal rules. Studies in legal culture suggest that participants in different legal systems think about the law in radically different ways. Comparative examples from the criminal justice systems of the United States and Japan demonstrate that some knowledge of a comparative rhetoric of argument - which arguments are appropriate in different legal systems - is required. Legal Writing Programmes can play a role in teaching comparative argument by expanding the concept of “audience” to include foreign legal systems.

Author(s):  
Karen Knop

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.


Author(s):  
D. K. Labin ◽  
T. Potier

INTRODUCTION. Occasionally a book appears which has a significant impact on the scholarly community. A fine example of this is the work considered here by the Australian international lawyer, Anthea Roberts. Until very recently, comparative studies on international law were rare. However, as international law further develops and widens, so special attention will need to be paid to ensure that international law students are, to a greater extent, taught the same material and in the same way. As municipal systems of law became more mature, so doctrine and jurisprudence began to diverge. International law has now entered such a phase in its development and, in this excellent book, Dr. Roberts asks a series of very important questions: exactly what is taking place, what are the factors that are driving these processes, is such to be welcomed, is it unstoppable and where do we go from here?MATERIALS AND METHODS. The article reflects on Anthea Roberts’ book “Is International Law International?” (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017). The authors of the article consider the contribution of the monograph to legal science, particularly with its interest in a revived Comparative International Law.RESEARCH RESULTS. The view of the authors of the article is that Anthea Roberts’ book is a work of profound significance, which will, hopefully, inspire additional research in the field of Comparative International Law in years to come.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Comparative International Law is a relatively neglected field in International Law. Without question, the international legal academy (from the elite law schools of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) emphasises different things both in its scholarly writings and pedagogy. This needs to be given greater attention, even if, at least for now, it cannot be entirely arrested; so that the much-feared fragmentation of international law into not only separate fields and standards, but also in terms of agreeing on its content and application, is minimised. 


2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 419
Author(s):  
Richard P Boast

One of the best-known discussions of the historical foundations of native title law is Felix Cohen's famous paper on the Spanish Origins of Federal Indian Law, published originally in 1942 and since then reprinted many times.This article cites Cohen's paper in its political and historiographical context, paying particular attention to Cohen's role as one of the architects of the Indian Reorganisation Act of 1934, and considering also shifts in American historiography and legal writing relating to the Spanish legacy as exemplified by legal historians such as James Brown Scott and historians such as H E Bolton. This article also considers fully Cohen's analysis of the precise ways in which Spanish law penetrated the legal framework of Federal Indian Law in the United States and concludes that, as a historical discussion, Cohen's work is in need of substantial revision. In particular Cohen's arguments that Spanish law influenced federal Indian law via international law and by means of judicial consideration of old Spanish land claims seem difficult to sustain.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eesa A Fredericks

This series of two articles provides a comparative overview of the position in the common-law conflict of laws in respect of the contractual capacity of natural persons. The comparative study is undertaken in order to provide guidelines for the future development of South African private international law. Reference is primarily made to case law and the opinions of academic authors. The legal position in the law of the United Kingdom, as the mother jurisdiction in Europe, is investigated in part I. Although Scotland is a mixed civil/common-law jurisdiction, the situation in that part of the United Kingdom is also discussed.Part II will deal with the rules and principles of private international law in respect of contractual capacity in Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), North America (the common-law provinces of Canada and the United States of America), Asia (India, Malaysia and Singapore) and Africa (Ghana and Nigeria). Part II also contains a comprehensive summary of the legal position in the common-law countries, followed by ideas for the reform of South African private international law in this regard.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey McGee ◽  
Ros Taplin

AbstractThis paper shows how international law scholarship might adopt a constructivist interdisciplinary research design to better engage with the political and social context of legal rules and institutions. In 2005 the Asia-Pacific Partnership was launched by the United States and Australia as a climate change institution outside the UN climate process. Controversially, the Member States claimed the Asia-Pacific Partnership was complementary to the UN climate process. This paper investigates the veracity of this claim by analysing the normative compatibility of the Partnership and the UN climate process. The paper adopts Dryzek's discourse theory to analyse the shared ideas and assumptions underlying both institutions. This analysis indicates that the Asia-Pacific Partnership embodied a deep market-liberal discourse that is in significant tension with the more interventionist and equity-based principles underpinning the UN climate process. This market-liberal discourse is important for understanding recent developments in global climate governance.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-578
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Kimball

Between 1915 and 1925, Harvard University conducted the first national public fund-raising campaign in higher education in the United States. At the same time, Harvard Law School attempted the first such effort in legal education. The law school organized its effort independently, in conjunction with its centennial in 1917. The university campaign succeeded magnificently by all accounts; the law school failed miserably. Though perfectly positioned for this new venture, Harvard Law School raised scarcely a quarter of its goal from merely 2 percent of its alumni. This essay presents the first account of this campaign and argues that its failure was rooted in longstanding cultural and professional objections that many of the school's alumni shared: law students and law schools neither need nor deserve benefactions, and such gifts worsen the overcrowding of the bar. Due to these objections, lethargy, apathy, and pessimism suffused the campaign. These factors weakened the leadership of the alumni association, the dean, and the president, leading to inept management, wasted time, and an unlikely strategy that was pursued ineffectively. All this doomed the campaign, particularly given the tragic interruptions of the dean's suicide and World War I, along with competition from the well-run campaigns for the University and for disaster relief due to the war.


2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Kercher

Peter Karsten asks why there might be a greater comparative propensity among CANZ historians than among those of the United States. Part of the reason may lie in the legal education many of us in Australia received, and in the formal legal status of many commonwealth countries until recently. As recently as the early 1970s, Australian law students were taught that English law was as significant as that made in the Australian courts. Appeals from the Australian Supreme Courts to the Privy Council were finally abolished only in 1986. From that time onward, there was a drive within the law schools to find differences from England, to look toward comparisons with other places than England.


1937 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-273
Author(s):  
William Warren Sweet

Professional Schools in the United States, whether of medicine, law, engineering, or theology, are of relatively recent orgin. It is a matter of interest that the ministry was the first profession in America for which a technical and standardized training was provided. While the first law school in America was founded in the same year as the oldest theological seminary (1784), the courses were loosely organized and there was no definitely prescribed amount of work required of graduation and no academic requirement for the practice of law. In all the institutions where there were law departments or law schools, even as late as the middle of the last century, the law students were considered as distinctly inferior to the regular college students.


Author(s):  
Craig Brown

The Philip G. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition is now well established as an annual event on the calendar of Canadian legal education. It may seem trite, therefore, to assert that the competition is a worthy pursuit for law students, that it should be preserved, and that a greater number of law schools should be encouraged to participate in it. The Jessup has great potential both as a teaching tool and as a basis for meaningful interaction among students from across the country and an attempt should be made to realize this potential. In this note, some suggestions are made for doing so.


Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Carmen E. Pavel

Abstract Anarchy is often contrasted with law, order, or security. But anarchist societies, by which I mean societies that lack a monopoly of coercive force, need not be lawless. They can develop sophisticated legal systems that regulate the behavior of their members and protect their rights. International law, market anarchism, and other models of anarchism such as the one proposed by Chandran Kukathas already exhibit or could plausibly exhibit complex legal rules and institutions. I will show that insofar as these models rely on consent, they all share similar structural flaws, namely, that they cannot meet basic rule-of-law values such as equality before the law and access to legal remedies for wrongs that embody and respect individual moral equality, even minimally conceived. The implication of this argument is not to vindicate state-based legal systems. Rather it is to show that legal systems, state-based or not, must have a strong nonconsensual, coercive element: the process of making, applying, and enforcing law must, to some extent, be severed from consent if law is to perform its function of providing for minimal justice.


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