Commerce in Children: Slavery, Gradual Emancipation, and the Free Womb Trade in Colombia

2021 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-257
Author(s):  
Yesenia Barragan

AbstractIn 1821, as the Wars of Independence drew to a close, officials of the newly created republic of Gran Colombia passed a national gradual emancipation law. At the center of it was a Free Womb law that declared legally free the children of enslaved women born after the law's promulgation, while bonding these children to their mothers’ masters until the age of 18. Yet, in addition to establishing a term limit on their legalized captivity, the law stipulated conditions for the commerce in Free Womb children, laying the groundwork for what I refer to as the Free Womb trade. This article presents the first detailed exploration of the origins, operations, and limitations of the Free Womb trade in Colombia, particularly at the level of one province: the northwestern Pacific coastal province of Chocó. I argue that the trade created distinctly bounded market geographies of Free Womb children, who were actively, if at times ambiguously, incorporated into Colombia's slave economy. As a general rule, the Free Womb trade placed captive families at the mercy of their masters; yet, as one extraordinary case reveals, the full extent of the local trade's legal power was not entirely secure.

Author(s):  
Aruna Nair

This chapter examines the law governing the availability of claims to traceable proceeds. It argues that the language used in the case law—which uses the terminology of property rights and of fiduciary relationships—cannot fully explain the law, since such claims are often available in the absence of fiduciary duties and are not available to holders of many types of property right. It argues that such claims instead presuppose a relationship of ‘control of assets’: where the defendant has a legal power to deal with some asset, correlating to a vulnerability to a loss of rights in that asset on the part of the claimant, and coupled with a duty not to exercise the power. It argues that relationships that have this formal structure also share normative characteristics that justify the subordination of defendant autonomy that has been shown to be at the heart of the tracing concept.


Author(s):  
Lusina HO

This chapter examines the law on contract formation in Hong Kong which is closely modelled on the English common law but adapts the English solutions to the local context if and when required. The test for ascertaining the parties’ meeting of the minds is objective, the agreement (an offer with a matching acceptance) must be certain, complete, and made with the intention to create legal relations—the latter being presumed to be present in a commercial context and absent in a familial or social context. Offers are freely revocable although the reliance of the offeree is protected in exceptional circumstances. Acceptances become effective as soon as they are dispatched. In the ‘battle of forms’ scenario, the Hong Kong courts follow the traditional ‘last-shot’ rule. There is no general duty to negotiate in good faith, and even agreements to negotiate in good faith are normally unenforceable for lack of certainty. As a general rule, contracts can be validly made without adhering to any formal requirement. Online contracts will normally be valid and enforceable; the formation of such contracts is governed by common law as supplemented by legislation.


1999 ◽  
Vol 71 (12) ◽  
pp. 204-209
Author(s):  
Tamaš Korhec

Persons with two or more citizenship are exceptions from the rule that one person has a citizenship of one state. Yugoslav Law make no restrictions for Yugoslav citizens to gain the citizenship of other states, besides the citizenship of the FRY, with the general rule that these dual citizens shall be treated as Yugoslav citizens during there residence in FRY. On the other hand, concerning the military service the Law on Yugoslav Army makes an exception, and provides that dual citizens, regular service in military is conditional and facultative obligation. This pretty vague rule has been recently interpreted by the decisions of the Supreme military court.


1987 ◽  
Vol 75 ◽  
pp. 106-106

Jurisdiction — Territorial — Whether punishment in State of nationality precludes prosecution in State of commission of offence — Principle of ne bis in idem — Whether recognized as a general rule of international law — The law of Switzerland


2021 ◽  
pp. 69-71
Author(s):  
Agnė Andrijauskaitė

This chapter reviews administrative procedure and judicial review in Lithuania. The introduction of administrative justice into the Lithuanian legal system happened against the backdrop of Lithuania's 'unflinching' desire to join the European Union and was meant to strengthen the protection of individual rights and administrative accountability. Two cornerstone acts in this regard, the Law on Public Administration and the Law on Administrative Proceedings (APA), were adopted in 1999. Administrative courts were also established in the same year. Article 3 (1) APA spells out the general rule that administrative courts settle disputes arising in the domain of the public administration. All the acts and measures excluded from the competence of administrative courts are listed in Article 18 APA, which establishes the so-called negative competence of administrative courts. Meanwhile, Article 91 (1) (3) APA provides that the impugned administrative decision may be quashed if 'essential procedural rules intended to ensure objective and reasonable adoption of an administrative decision were breached'.


Author(s):  
Richard Glover

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the law on witness competence and compatibility. The general rule of law in England and Wales is that all witnesses, including children, are competent (able to give evidence) and witnesses are also compellable (liable to be required to give evidence subject to sanction for contempt). Particular rules apply to children and persons under disability, the accused in a criminal case, and spouses and civil partners. The second part deals with oaths and affirmations, covering the requirement of sworn evidence; the effect of oaths and affirmations; and exceptions to the requirement of sworn evidence.


Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 245-258
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

Requirements of form (such as writing) are not as important today as they were in the past. As a general rule, contracts can be made in any form and can be proved by any means, although there remain exceptional cases where the law does insist upon requirements of form. This chapter, which considers the reasons for continued reliance upon requirements of form, along with the criticisms levelled against such requirements, begins by explaining why legal systems impose formal requirements upon contracting parties. It then outlines the formal requirements in English contract law, followed by a discussion of the future of formal requirements, noting the distinction between cases where the contract must be made in writing and cases in which contracts must be evidenced in writing.


Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

Requirements of form (such as writing) are not as important today as they were in the past. As a general rule, contracts can be made in any form and can be proved by any means, although there remain exceptional cases where the law does insist upon requirements of form. This chapter, which considers the reasons for continued reliance upon requirements of form, along with the criticisms levelled against such requirements, begins by explaining why legal systems impose formal requirements upon contracting parties. It then outlines the formal requirements in English contract law, followed by a discussion of the future of formal requirements, noting the distinction between cases where the contract must be made in writing and cases in which contracts must be evidenced in writing.


Author(s):  
Adam Reilly

Abstract Private lawyers owe a particular debt of gratitude to Hohfeld, given their widespread use of his scheme. An example is equitable rescission, where the entitlement to rescind a voidable transfer is now widely understood to be a Hohfeldian legal power. Yet, though scholars have been quick to use Hohfeld’s concept of legal power, they have given little sustained thought to what he meant by ‘volitional control’ and how we might identify it within the law. The result is that certain areas of law have been mislabelled as ‘power conferring’, most notably equitable rescission. This article seeks to unpack Hohfeld’s concept of ‘volitional control’ as terminological shorthand for the coincidence of two distinct elements: (i) the power holder’s normative intention to effect the relevant legal change; and (ii) her decision to effect that change as exhibited in power-exercising conduct. By these lights, the rescinding claimant does not have a legal power to rescind.


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