Balance in psychological research: The dual process perspective

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Process Perspective

Krueger & Funder (K&F) are right that various imbalances characterize social psychology, but I question whether they are characteristic of psychology or cognitive science as a whole. Dual-process theories, popular in the latter fields, emphasize both processing biases and the adaptiveness of human cognition in a more balanced manner.

scholarly journals Categorization, Fast and Slow

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-212
Author(s):  
Василь Старко
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
New York ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Linguistics ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Psychological Review ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

The title of this study is inspired by Daniel Kahneman’s best-selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow. In it, the Nobel Prize winner explains in great detail the working of two systems of human reasoning: System 1, which is fast, automatic, associative, subconscious, involuntary and (nearly) effortless, and System 2, which is slow, intentional, logical, conscious, effortful and requires executive control, attention, and concentration. This distinction applies to human categorization as well. Each of the two labels refers, in fact, to a set of systems, which is why the designations Type 1 and Type 2 processes are preferable. The default-interventionist architecture presupposes the constant automatic activation of categories by Type 1 processes and interventions of Type 2 processes if necessary. Type 1 categorization relies on the ‘shallow’ linguistic representation of the world, while Type 2 uses ‘deep’ extralinguistic knowledge. A series of linguistic examples are analyzed to illustrate the differences between Type 1 and Type 2 categorization. A conclusion is drawn about the need to take this distinction into account in psycholinguistic and linguistic research on categorization. References Barrett, F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. (2004). Individual differences in working memorycapacity in dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130(4), 553–573. Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. NewYork, NY: Guilford Press. Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlledcomponents. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. (2013) Dual-process theories of higher cognition:Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223–241. Geeraerts, D. (1993). Vagueness’s puzzles, polysemy’s vagaries. Cognitive Linguistics,4(3), 223–272. Heider, Eleanor Rosch (1973). On the internal structure of perceptual and semanticcategories. In: Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language, (pp. 111–144).T. E. Moore, (ed.). New York: Academic Press Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgement and choice. American Psychologist, 58,697–720. Kahneman, D. (2015). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitutionin intuitive judgement. In: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,(pp. 49–81). T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman, (eds.). Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press. Lakoff, G. (1973). Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts.Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 458–508. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago, London: University ofChicago Press. Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge. Oxford, England: OxfordUniversity Press. Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning.Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R F. (2000). Individual difference in reasoning: implications forthe rationality debate? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726. Старко В. Категоризаційні кваліфікатори// Проблеми зіставної семантики. 2013,№ 11. С. 132–138.Starko, V. (2013). Katehoryzatsiini kvalifikatory. Problemy Zistavnoyi Semantyky, 11,132–138. Sun, R., Slusarz, P., & Terry, C. (2005). The interaction of the explicit and the implicit inskill learning: A dual-process approach. Psychological Review, 112, 159–192. Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Multi-level theories of cognition–emotion relations. In: Handbookof Cognition and Emotion, (pp. 665–681). T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power, (eds.). Chichester,England: Wiley. Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. St. B. T. (1975). Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3,141–154. Whorf, B. L. (1956). The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In:Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, (pp. 134–159). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. (originally published in 1941) Wierzbicka, A. (1996). Semantic Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Gambling and decision-making: A dual process perspective

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenny R. Coventry
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Problem Gambling ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Gambling Addiction ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Process Perspective

AbstractThe consideration of gambling as a decision-making disorder may fail to explain why the majority of people gamble, yet only a small percentage of people lose control of their behaviour to the point where their gambling becomes problematic. The application of dual process theories to gambling addiction offers a means of explaining the differences between “normal” and “problem” gambling, augmenting the multiple vulnerabilities proposed by Redish et al.

scholarly journals Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 135 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Godden
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Psychology Of Reasoning ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
The Common ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.

scholarly journals Of two minds or one? A registered replication of Rydell et al. (2006)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Heycke ◽  
Sarah Marie Gehrmann ◽  
Julia M. Haaf ◽  
Christoph Stahl
Keyword(s):  
Impression Formation ◽  
Evaluative Conditioning ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Target Person ◽  
Implicit Measures ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Reliability And Robustness ◽  
Selective Influence ◽  
Behavioral Information

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study by Rydell and colleagues (2006) showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioral information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings. This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.

scholarly journals Individual differences in anchoring effect: Evidence for the role of insufficient adjustment

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Systematic Effect ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Anchoring Effect ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Although the anchoring effect is one of the most reliable results of experimental psychology, researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of individual differences in susceptibility to this cognitive bias. Yet, first correlational studies yielded inconsistent results, failing to identify any predictors that have a systematic effect on anchored decisions. The present research seeks to remedy methodological shortcomings of foregoing research by employing modified within-subject anchoring procedure. Results confirmed the robustness of phenomenon in extended paradigm and replicated previous findings on anchor’s direction and distance as significant experimental factors of the anchoring effect size. Obtained measures of individual differences in susceptibility to anchoring were fairly reliable but shared only small portion of variability with intelligence, cognitive reflection, and basic personality traits. However, in a group of more reflective subjects, substantial negative correlation between intelligence and anchoring was detected. This finding indicates that, at least for some subjects, effortful cognitive process of adjustment plays role in the emergence of the anchoring effect, which is in line with expectations of dual-process theories of human reasoning.

scholarly journals T70. DUAL-PROCESS THEORY, CONFLICT PROCESSING, AND DELUSIONAL BELIEF

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S258-S258
Author(s):  
Michael Bronstein ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Jutta Joormann ◽  
Philip Corlett ◽  
Tyrone Cannon
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Conflict Detection ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Conflict Processing ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Processing Deficits ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Analytic Reasoning ◽  
Reasoning Biases

Abstract Background Individuals endorsing delusions exhibit multiple reasoning biases, including a bias toward lower decision thresholds, a bias toward gathering less data before forming conclusions, and a bias toward discounting evidence against one’s beliefs. Although these biases have been repeatedly associated with delusions, it remains unclear how they might arise, how they might be interrelated, and whether any of them play a causal role in forming or maintaining delusions. Progress toward answering these questions may be made by examining delusion-related reasoning biases from the perspective of dual-process theories of reasoning. Dual-process theories posit that human reasoning proceeds via two systems: an intuitive system (which is autonomous, does not require working memory) and an analytic system (which relies on working memory, supports hypothetical thought). Importantly, when the outputs of one or both systems conflict with one another, successful detection of this conflict is thought to produce additional engagement in analytic reasoning. Thus, the detection of and ensuing neurocognitive response to conflict may modulate analytic reasoning engagement. Working from this dual-process perspective, recent theories have hypothesized that more limited engagement in analytic reasoning, perhaps resulting from conflict processing deficits, may engender delusion-inspiring reasoning biases in people with schizophrenia. Methods Given this hypothesis, a literature review (Bronstein et al., 2019, Clinical Psychology Review, 72, 101748) was conducted to critically evaluate whether impaired conflict processing might be a primary initiating deficit in pathways relevant to the generation of delusion-relevant reasoning biases and the formation and/or maintenance of delusions themselves. Results Research examined in this review suggested that in healthy people, successful conflict detection raises decision thresholds. Conflict-processing deficits in delusional individuals with schizophrenia might impair this process. Consistent with this possibility, delusional individuals with schizophrenia (vs. healthy controls) make more decisions when they perceive their favored choice to be only marginally better than alternatives. Lower decision thresholds in individuals who endorse delusions may limit analytic thinking (which takes time). Reductions in decision-making thresholds and in analytic reasoning engagement may encourage these individuals to jump to conclusions, potentially promoting delusion formation, and may also increase bias against disconfirmatory evidence, which may help delusions persist. Discussion Extant literature suggests that conflict processing deficits might encourage delusion-related cognitive biases, which is broadly consistent with the idea that these deficits may be causally primary in pathways leading to delusions. This conclusion lends credence to previous theories suggesting that reduced modulation toward analytic reasoning in the presence of conflict might promote delusions. Future research should attempt to more specifically determine the source of deficits related to analytic reasoning engagement in delusional individuals with schizophrenia. It is often unclear whether analytic-reasoning-related deficits observed in existing literature result from impairments in conflict detection, responsiveness to conflict, or both. Tasks used to study dual-process reasoning in the general population may be useful platforms for specifying the nature of analytic-reasoning-related deficits in delusional individuals with schizophrenia.

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