scholarly journals When complex is easy on the mind: Internal repetition of visual information in complex objects is a source of perceptual fluency.

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yannick Joye ◽  
Linda Steg ◽  
Ayça Berfu Ünal ◽  
Roos Pals
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (12) ◽  
pp. 2813-2822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soojin Park ◽  
Marvin M. Chun ◽  
Marcia K. Johnson

Constructing a rich and coherent visual experience involves maintaining visual information that is not perceptually available in the current view. Recent studies suggest that briefly thinking about a stimulus (refreshing) can modulate activity in category-specific visual areas. Here, we tested the nature of such perceptually refreshed representations in the parahippocampal place area (PPA) and retrosplenial cortex (RSC) using fMRI. We asked whether a refreshed representation is specific to a restricted view of a scene, or more view-invariant. Participants saw a panoramic scene and were asked to think back to (refresh) a part of the scene after it disappeared. In some trials, the refresh cue appeared twice on the same side (e.g., refresh left–refresh left), and other trials, the refresh cue appeared on different sides (e.g., refresh left–refresh right). A control condition presented halves of the scene twice on same sides (e.g., perceive left–perceive left) or different sides (e.g., perceive left–perceive right). When scenes were physically repeated, both the PPA and RSC showed greater activation for the different-side repetition than the same-side repetition, suggesting view-specific representations. When participants refreshed scenes, the PPA showed view-specific activity just as in the physical repeat conditions, whereas RSC showed an equal amount of activation for different- and same-side conditions. This finding suggests that in RSC, refreshed representations were not restricted to a specific view of a scene, but extended beyond the target half into the entire scene. Thus, RSC activity associated with refreshing may provide a mechanism for integrating multiple views in the mind.


Author(s):  
Shalin Hai-Jew

Some pedagogical theories and research have direct application to the use of digital imagery in electronic learning (e-learning). Applied perceptional research forms a foundational understanding of how humans see through their eyes. Cognitive theories address how the mind handles visual information. Pedagogical theories provide understandings of how individuals process information and learn effectively. These concepts lead to applied uses of digital imagery in e-learning contexts. These principles and practices will be introduced, analyzed, and evaluated in the context of the creation and use of digital imageries in e-learning. Then, strategies for how to apply theory to the selection, creation, and deployment of digital imagery in e-learning will be proposed.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lina Teichmann ◽  
Genevieve L. Quek ◽  
Amanda K. Robinson ◽  
Tijl Grootswagers ◽  
Thomas A. Carlson ◽  
...  

AbstractThe ability to rapidly and accurately recognise complex objects is a crucial function of the human visual system. To recognise an object, we need to bind incoming visual features such as colour and form together into cohesive neural representations and integrate these with our pre-existing knowledge about the world. For some objects, typical colour is a central feature for recognition; for example, a banana is typically yellow. Here, we applied multivariate pattern analysis on time-resolved neuroimaging (magnetoencephalography) data to examine how object-colour knowledge affects emerging object representations over time. Our results from 20 participants (11 female) show that the typicality of object-colour combinations influences object representations, although not at the initial stages of object and colour processing. We find evidence that colour decoding peaks later for atypical object-colour combinations in comparison to typical object-colour combinations, illustrating the interplay between processing incoming object features and stored object-knowledge. Taken together, these results provide new insights into the integration of incoming visual information with existing conceptual object knowledge.Significance StatementTo recognise objects, we have to be able to bind object features such as colour and shape into one coherent representation and compare it to stored object knowledge. The magnetoencephalography data presented here provide novel insights about the integration of incoming visual information with our knowledge about the world. Using colour as a model to understand the interaction between seeing and knowing, we show that there is a unique pattern of brain activity for congruently coloured objects (e.g., a yellow banana) relative to incongruently coloured objects (e.g., a red banana). This effect of object-colour knowledge only occurs after single object features are processed, demonstrating that conceptual knowledge is accessed relatively late in the visual processing hierarchy.


KronoScope ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rémy Lestienne

Very simple psychophysiological visual tests suggest that the brain, instead of processing visual information in a passive way as was classically thought, in fact actively evaluates probabilities of the causes of visual data and continuously proposes to the mind the ones that are more likely to account for sensory inputs. In the past few years, Karl Friston, a researcher from University College of London, and his group have proposed a mechanism by which the brain successfully performs with great precision the inversion of probability densities necessary for this Bayesian computation. This mechanism would account for several anatomic structures of the cortex, explaining in particular the abundance of backwards interneuronal connections. The proposed picture of brain functioning is that of a dynamical process, far from the static image of a photographic plate. The result is an emergence, for the final picture of the world is a coherent vision where the more likely causes are proposed in a coherent manner. Although the theory accounts for the automatic, infraconscious side of the processing of information in the brain, it is in good accord with Roger Sperry’s theory of consciousness as a theory of strong emergence. It is too soon to evaluate the solidity of the law of “minimization of free energy” proposed by Friston not only as ruling the automatisms of the brain but as a general law of biology. This law is similar (although in contradistinction) to the second law of thermodynamics of increase of entropy (insofar as it explains the tendency of living beings for self-organization), and it is already looked at by some neuroscientists as a big step forward in deciphering the mysteries of the brain.


Chapter 1 describes how specifically organized, hierarchical structures of a neural network can create neural representations of perceived reality. The authors describe how, as a result of categorization and generalization, memory traces created in subsequent layers can represent the perceived world in all its complexity. Starting from the representation of direct sensual impressions in the lowest layers, closely connected to the sensors of individual senses, to the representation of increasingly complex objects, the feelings and knowledge about the observed world are built. They postulate that to achieve this goal imaginary natural and artificial brains must contain such semihierarchical structures capable of creating new connections and information transmission paths. By associating large areas of brain fields in multiple layers, it is possible to create representations of complex reality. The dominant mechanism of self-learning is correlation learning, during which simultaneous, synchronous arousal of different senses creates mutually correlated features of the observed object. Perceived objects excite neuronal stimulation patterns that allow the system to identify the object in the future. The re-stimulation of the memory structures from the top layers to the sensory fields, causes the recall and creation of sensations similar to those felt during the original experiences. By comparing new sensual impressions with those stored in memory, the perceived objects are recognized. Frequent, simultaneous co-occurrence of stimulations of mental representations results in associations of memory cells and synapses, and thus associations of mental facts. Order and sequences of their occurrence is the basis of episodic memory. Imagined neural network memory cells, like natural brain neurons, do not limit their role to just remembering the information that they receive. They actively process this information and change the structure of their connections. We put forward the thesis that the described memory cells, artificial neurons, can create brains with features such as natural brains. It is this semihierarchical structure of neurons, which arise from categorization, generalization and association processes that can create neural representations of perceived reality. Learning through life experiences allows us to give them the characteristics of psychological sensations and thus they also become mental correlates of perceptions. The knowledge that these structures represent is as hierarchical they are. This hierarchy starts from the representation of the simplest direct sensual features, to complex models of the environment and abstract concepts that can be defined by symbolic language. The presented model describes the creation of knowledge in the mind, pattern recognition, remembering and imagining objects and events, planning, and making decisions. The systems thus created yield minds with cognitive, intentional, and propositional awareness. Unfortunately, they are devoid of phenomenal awareness, which we write about in the following chapters.


Author(s):  
Mark Sprevak

This chapter examines Alan Turing’s contribution to the field that offers our best understanding of the mind: cognitive science. The idea that the human mind is (in some sense) a computer is central to cognitive science. Turing played a key role in developing this idea. The precise course of Turing’s influence on cognitive science is complex and shows how seemingly abstract work in mathematical logic can spark a revolution in psychology. Alan Turing contributed to a revolutionary idea: that mental activity is computation. Turing’s work helped lay the foundation for what is now known as cognitive science. Today, computation is an essential element for explaining how the mind works. In this chapter, I return to Turing’s early attempts to understanding the mind using computation and examine the role that Turing played in the early days of cognitive science. Turing is famous as a founding figure in artificial intelligence (AI) but his contribution to cognitive science is less well known. The aim of AI is to create an intelligent machine. Turing was one of the first people to carry out research in AI, working on machine intelligence as early as 1941 and, as Chapters 29 and 30 explain, he was responsible for, or anticipated, many of the ideas that were later to shape AI. Unlike AI, cognitive science does not aim to create an intelligent machine. It aims instead to understand the mechanisms that are peculiar to human intelligence. On the face of it, human intelligence is miraculous. How do we reason, understand language, remember past events, come up with a joke? It is hard to know how even to begin to explain these phenomena. Yet, like a magic trick that looks like a miracle to the audience, but which is explained by revealing the pulleys and levers behind the stage, so human intelligence could be explained if we knew the mechanisms that lie behind its production. A first step in this direction is to examine a piece of machinery that is usually hidden from view: the human brain. A challenge is the astonishing complexity of the human brain: it is one of the most complex objects in the universe, containing 100 billion neurons and a web of around 100 trillion connections.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Caplette ◽  
Frédéric Gosselin ◽  
Gregory West

Prior expectations influence how we perceive and recognize objects. However, how they do so remains unclear, especially in the case of real-world complex objects. Expectations of objects may affect which features are used to recognize them subsequently. In this study, we used reverse correlation in neurotypical participants to reveal with high precision how the use of spatial frequencies across time is modulated by everyday object expectations in a recognition task. We show that coarse information leads to accurate responses earlier when an object is expected, indicating that subjects use diagnostic features earlier in this situation. We also demonstrate an increased variability in the later use of coarse information depending on the expected object, indicating that subjects adopt a more specialized recognition strategy when they have a specific object expectation. In summary, our results reveal how expectations of real-world complex objects affect the use of visual information across time.


2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 332-338
Author(s):  
Eve Dupierrix ◽  
Anne Hillairet de Boisferon ◽  
Emmanuel Barbeau ◽  
Olivier Pascalis

Although human infants demonstrate early competence to retain visual information, memory capacities during infancy remain largely undocumented. In three experiments, we used a Visual Paired Comparison (VPC) task to examine abilities to encode identity (Experiment 1) and spatial properties (Experiments 2a and 2b) of unfamiliar complex visual patterns during the first year of life. In the first experiment, 6- and 9-month-old infants were familiarized with visual arrays composed of four abstract patterns arranged in a square configuration. Recognition memory was evaluated by presenting infants with the familiarized array paired with a novel array composed of four new patterns. The second couple of experiments aimed to examine infant ability to encode the spatial relationships between each pattern of the array (e.g., where is A in the square configuration). The 6-, 9- and 12-month-old infants were tested on a spatial version of the VPC task, in which the novel array was composed of the same patterns than the familiarized array but arranged differently within the square configuration. Results indicated that infants retained the identity of the patterns but not their specific spatial relationships within the square configuration (i.e., allocentric location of the patterns), suggesting either an immaturity of the processes involved in object-to-location binding, or the inappropriateness of unfamiliar complex objects to reveal such early allocentric abilities.


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