Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation

It has been well documented that men are much more likely to provide heroic assistance in emergencies (Johnson, 1996). However, such heroic rescue disobeys the theory of evolution (Darwin, 1871). Studies investigated charitable donations suggested that public prosocial behaviors might be considered as costly signaling behaviors, serving the function of displaying one’s wealth and generosity, with the ultimate goal of attracting potential mates (Griskevicius et al., 2007). Although heroic rescue meets the four criteria of costly signaling behaviors, there was no direct evidence supporting the notion that heroic rescue, like public charity, also serves the function of attracting potential mates. The present study directly tests this possibility by examining the effect of mating motivation on men and women’s heroic rescue tendencies in emergent situations. The present study used a 2 (gender: male vs. female) × 2 (mating motivation induction vs. control condition) study design, and participants (N = 196, 90 males and 106 females; Mage = 22.36, SD = 2.89) were randomly assigned to the mating condition and control condition. In line with the previous studies (Durante & Li, 2009; Griskevicius et al., 2007; Hill & Durante, 2011; Roney, 2003; Wilson & Daly, 2004), mating motivation was induced by photographs of highly attractive opposite sex. Then, heroic rescue tendencies were measured by the questionnaire of Griskevicius et al. (2007), which consisted of five emergent situations. Participants’ risk-taking tendencies on financial decisions were also measured by a 10-item questionnaire developed by Liu (2010). The total scores of each of these two questionnaires served as the dependent variables. The results of the experiments showed a significant interaction between gender and mating priming on heroic behaviors: after mating motivation induction, male participants showed higher intentions of heroic rescue, whereas female participants showed lower intentions of heroic rescue. The present study also replicated previous findings (McAlvanah, 2009; Li & Zhang, 2010) regarding the effect of mating motivation priming on financial risk taking: mating motivation induction increased risk-taking tendency in financial decisions, males tend to be more risk seeking in making financial decisions, and there was no significant interaction between gender and mating priming on financial risk-taking decisions. Results from the financial decisions further confirmed the representativeness of the sample recruited in the current study and further validated the results on heroic behaviors. Based on the Costly Signaling Theory (Smith & Bird, 2001), these results concurred with the hypotheses that heroic behaviors served the function of displaying men’s advantages, such as vigor and responsibility, to potential mates and winning the intersexual selection (Farthing, 2005; Kelly & Dunbar, 2001). However, for women, the high-risk of heroic behaviors have potential harm to their offspring and are unattractive to men (Taylor et al., 2000). Thus, after eliciting the mating motivation, women would avoid the risk and reduced their intentions to offer heroic rescue in emergencies.

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The prevalence of extra-lethal violence across cultures in warfare

10.32469/10355/65953 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

◽

Aaron Z. Johnson

Keyword(s):

Cultural Analysis ◽

Cross Cultural ◽

Costly Signaling ◽

Human Relations ◽

Short Term ◽

Direct Benefit ◽

Lethal Violence ◽

Individual Level ◽

The Individual ◽

Decisive Advantage

Extra-Lethal Violence, a form of physical aggression that goes beyond the necessity to kill someone, presents a conundrum: it is inefficient and dangerous to produce, especially during warfare. Extra-Lethal Violence, particularly when it manifests in warfare, does not contribute to the immediate survival of individuals; the time, effort, and lack of awareness of surroundings or other attack suggests that Extra-Lethal Violence could be maladaptive at the individual level or in the short term. Yet this individually risky behavior that seems to have no direct benefit to the aggressor is both common and persistent across time and space. We utilized the electronic Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) to conduct a cross cultural analysis of the prevalence and potential predictors of Extra-Lethal Violence. Our research indicates that Extra-Lethal Violence is present across all populated regions of the world, for the entire timespan of the ethnographic record up to the ethnographic present, across subsistence, marriage, and social complexity levels. Our research suggests that Costly Signaling Theory (CST) is currently the best explanation for this behavior. Extra-Lethal Violence can be characterized as a difficult to fake, clear indicator of martial skill and physical fitness that has a high broadcast efficiency, both within and between groups. Rather than allowing behaviors such as Extra-Lethal Violence to be labeled as 'abhorrent' or 'disgusting,' we must view Extra-Lethal Violence in the same light as the cavalry, the ironclads, or nuclear weapons: societies seeking a decisive advantage over their enemies, utilizing available resources, be they material or behavioral.

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Universal modesty in signal-burying games

10.31234/osf.io/j6a7h ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Tadeg Quillien

Keyword(s):

Simple Model ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Costly Signaling ◽

Positive Information ◽

Probabilistic Information ◽

Signaling Dynamics ◽

The Stability ◽

Positive Traits ◽

Shed Light

Why would people hide positive information about themselves? Evolutionary game theorists have recently developed the signal-burying game as a simple model to shed light on this puzzle; they have shown that the game has an equilibrium where some agents are better off deliberately reducing the visibility of the signal by which they broadcast their positive traits. However, their explanation falls short of explaining all modesty norms, since this equilibrium also features individuals who openly brag. This leaves modesty norms that everyone adheres to in want of an explanation. Here we show that the signal-burying framework actually affords such an explanation: the game contains an equilibrium where all agents who send a signal voluntarily reduce its conspicuousness. Surprisingly, the stability of the two kinds of equilibria rely on very different principles. The equilibrium where some agents brag is stable because of costly signaling dynamics. By contrast, the universal modesty equilibrium exists because buried signals contain probabilistic information about a sender's type, and receivers make optimal use of this information. In the latter equilibrium, burying a signal can be understood as a handicap which makes the signal more honest, but honesty is not achieved through standard costly signaling dynamics.

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