scholarly journals Dynamics of collective action to conserve a large common-pool resource

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Andersson ◽  
Sigrid Bratsberg ◽  
Andrew K. Ringsmuth ◽  
Astrid S. de Wijn
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Behavioural Change ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Sociopolitical Environment ◽  
Bounded Confidence ◽  
High Connectivity ◽  
Favourable Environment

AbstractA pressing challenge for coming decades is sustainable and just management of large-scale common-pool resources including the atmosphere, biodiversity and public services. This poses a difficult collective action problem because such resources may not show signs that usage restraint is needed until tragedy is almost inevitable. To solve this problem, a sufficient level of cooperation with a pro-conservation behavioural norm must be achieved, within the prevailing sociopolitical environment, in time for the action taken to be effective. Here we investigate the transient dynamics of behavioural change in an agent-based model on structured networks that are also exposed to a global external influence. We find that polarisation emerges naturally, even without bounded confidence, but that for rationally motivated agents, it is temporary. The speed of convergence to a final consensus is controlled by the rate at which the polarised clusters are dissolved. This depends strongly on the combination of external influences and the network topology. Both high connectivity and a favourable environment are needed to rapidly obtain final consensus.

scholarly journals Dynamics of collective action to conserve a large common-pool resource

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Ringsmuth ◽  
David Andersson ◽  
Sigrid Bratsberg ◽  
Astrid de Wijn
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Behavioural Change ◽  
Opinion Dynamics ◽  
Nonequilibrium Dynamics ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Favourable Environment ◽  
Constructive Engagement

<p>A pressing challenge in the Anthropocene is sustainable and just management of large-scale common-pool resources (CPRs) including the atmosphere, biodiversity and public services. This poses a difficult collective action problem because such resources may not show signs that usage restraint is needed until tragedy is almost inevitable. To solve this problem, a sufficient level of cooperation with a pro-conservation behavioural norm must be achieved, within the prevailing sociopolitical environment, in time for the action taken to be effective. In this work, we investigate the transient, nonequilibrium dynamics of behavioural change in an agent-based model on structured networks that are also exposed to a global external influence. Our model combines elements of rational choice theory with psychology-based opinion dynamics to reflect that individuals who promote collective action to conserve a large CPR are rationally motivated and also face psychosocial constraints. We find that social polarisation emerges naturally, even without assuming bounded confidence, but that for rationally motivated agents, it is temporary. The speed of convergence to a final consensus is controlled by the rate at which the polarised clusters are dissolved. This depends strongly on the combination of external influences and the network topology. Both high connectivity and a favourable environment are needed to rapidly obtain final consensus. Our findings expand the evidence that designing systems to encourage constructive engagement between disagreeing groups could be a powerful promoter of large-scale collective action.</p>

scholarly journals Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Water Resources Planning for Hydrologically Connected Surface and Groundwater Systems

Hydrology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Francisco Muñoz-Arriola ◽  
Tarik Abdel-Monem ◽  
Alessandro Amaranto
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Integrated Management ◽  
Design Principles ◽  
Water Levels ◽  
High Plains ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Connected Surface

Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.

scholarly journals On the preconditions for large-scale collective action

AMBIO ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (7) ◽  
pp. 1282-1296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sverker C. Jagers ◽  
Niklas Harring ◽  
Åsa Löfgren ◽  
Martin Sjöstedt ◽  
Francisco Alpizar ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Resource Depletion ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Theoretical Understanding ◽  
Collective Action Problems

Abstract The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity’s most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-scale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and large-scale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.

scholarly journals An agent-based model to support community forest management and non-timber forest product harvesting in northern Thailand

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 17894
Author(s):  
Wuthiwong Wimolsakcharoen ◽  
Pongchai Dumrongrojwatthana ◽  
Christophe Le Page ◽  
François Bousquet ◽  
Guy Trébuil
Keyword(s):  
Forest Management ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Forest Product ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Community Forest Management ◽  
Community Forest ◽  
Northern Thailand ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Participatory Simulations

Agent-based models are popular in common-pool resource management to represent complex systems and stimulate collective action and management, where they are used to evaluate scenarios of stakeholders’ choice in participatory simulations. We developed the “CoComForest” (COllaborative COMmunity FOREST management) model to support community forest management (CFM) and non-timber forest product (NTFP) harvesting in Nan Province, northern Thailand. The model was used as a computer-based role-playing game to support sharing of perceptions and knowledge among stakeholders, and in participatory simulations to explore future CFM scenarios. The Unified Modelling Language was used to build the conceptual model, subsequently implemented under the CORMAS (COmmon-pool Resource and Multi-Agent System) simulation platform. Several tests were conducted in the laboratory for verification and calibration before using this tool with 21 diverse stakeholders during a field workshop. Three different participatory gaming and simulation sessions were organized. The first one focused on the co-validation of the model with participants. They accepted most of the model functionalities and the scheduling of the rounds of play. The model was used in the subsequent two sessions to simulate the scenarios of firebreak establishment and introduction of outsiders intensively harvesting NTFPs, respectively. The results showed that the intensive harvesting practices of outsiders accelerated the depletion of resources, whereas the prevention of wildfire by establishing firebreaks could increase the resource availability in the landscape. The debriefing session at the end of the workshop focused on the analysis of simulation results and the relationships between the players’ decision-making and their actual circumstances. Individual in-depth interviews conducted after the workshop helped to evaluate the use of this model with local stakeholders. Most participants considered the model as a useful common representation of the system they manage collectively. Its use in participatory simulations facilitated communication among the stakeholders searching for an adapted and acceptable collective action plan to improve CFM at the sub-district level in order to prevent the overharvesting of NTFPs by outsiders.

Green Votes not Green Virtues: Effective Utilitarian Responses to Climate Change

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-205
Author(s):  
JOACHIM WÜNDISCH
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Scientific Uncertainty ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Cooperative Effort ◽  
Address Climate Change ◽  
Combat Climate Change ◽  
Implementing Strategies

Implementing strategies to address climate change confronts us with an enormous collective action problem. Dale Jamieson argues that in order to avoid large-scale defection and, therefore, the collapse of any cooperative effort to curb climate change, utilitarians should become virtue theorists. As a tool to combat climate change, virtue change faces severe obstacles. First, the non-contingent green virtues envisioned by Jamieson are highly implausible. Second, even if such virtues could function, their inculcation would take too long to make the approach viable. Third, given its inherent inflexibility, virtue change is ill equipped to deal with the great scientific uncertainty created by climate change. To combat climate change utilitarians are well advised to look elsewhere: green votes and state sanctions.

A Unified Spatial Model of Congress

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Buchler
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Legislative Session ◽  
Disciplinary System ◽  
Sincere Voting

This chapter presents a unified model of legislative elections, parties, and roll call voting, built around a party leadership election. First, a legislative caucus selects a party leader who campaigns based on a platform of a disciplinary system. Once elected, that leader runs the legislative session, in which roll call votes occur. Then elections occur, and incumbents face re-election with the positions they incrementally adopted. When the caucus is ideologically homogeneous, electorally diverse, and policy motivated, members will elect a leader who solves the collective action problem of sincere voting with “preference-preserving influence.” That leader will threaten to punish legislators who bow to electoral pressure to vote as centrists. Consequently, legislators vote sincerely as extremists and get slightly lower vote shares, but they offset that lost utility with policy gains that they couldn’t have gotten without party influence. Party leaders will rarely pressure legislators to vote insincerely.

scholarly journals Climate Change Inaction and Optimism

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Philip J. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Economic Growth ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Policy Context ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Ideological Fantasy

The problem of climate change inaction is sometimes said to be ‘wicked’, or essentially insoluble, and it has also been seen as a collective action problem, which is correct but inconsequential. In the absence of progress, much is made of various frailties of the public, hence the need for an optimistic tone in public discourse to overcome fatalism and encourage positive action. This argument is immaterial without meaningful action in the first place, and to favour what amounts to the suppression of truth over intellectual openness is in any case disreputable. ‘Optimism’ is also vexed in this context, often having been opposed to the sombre mood of environmentalists by advocates of economic growth. The greater mental impediments are ideological fantasy, which is blind to the contradictions in public discourse, and the misapprehension that if optimism is appropriate in one social or policy context it must be appropriate in others. Optimism, far from spurring climate change action, fosters inaction.

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