scholarly journals Cleaner fish are sensitive to what their partners can and cannot see

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine McAuliffe ◽  
Lindsey A. Drayton ◽  
Amanda Royka ◽  
Mélisande Aellen ◽  
Laurie R. Santos ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Related Species ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Cleaner Fish ◽  
Labroides Dimidiatus ◽  
Cleaning Mutualism ◽  
Taxonomic Groups

AbstractMuch of human experience is informed by our ability to attribute mental states to others, a capacity known as theory of mind. While evidence for theory of mind in animals to date has largely been restricted to primates and other large-brained species, the use of ecologically-valid competitive contexts hints that ecological pressures for strategic deception may give rise to components of theory of mind abilities in distantly-related taxonomic groups. In line with this hypothesis, we show that cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus) exhibit theory of mind capacities akin to those observed in primates in the context of their cooperative cleaning mutualism. These results suggest that ecological pressures for strategic deception can drive human-like cognitive abilities even in very distantly related species.

Deception

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonso Troisi
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Animal Species ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Evolutionary Strategy ◽  
Primate Species ◽  
Clinical Syndromes ◽  
Biological Studies ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Evolution Of Communication

For a long time, biological studies of communication have been based on the postulate that communication has evolved to ensure the transmission of veridical information between conspecifics. Ethological studies of a variety of animal species have demonstrated that transmission of false information is a relevant component of intraspecific signals and that the adaptive benefit of deceiving others was a driving force in the evolution of communication. In primate species, evolving a larger neocortex was a viable evolutionary strategy to respond to environmental challenges that demand enhanced capacities of social manipulation. Among all animal species, humans are the masters of social deception. This chapter focuses on the cognitive abilities related to voluntary deception in humans, with special regard to the role of theory of mind (i.e. the capacity to infer the mental states of other individuals). Different aspects of theory of mind are discussed, including the evolution of social brain, the distinction between mentalizing and empathizing, and the abnormalities of social cognition in clinical syndromes such as autistic spectrum disorders and primary psychopathy.

Affective and Cognitive Verbal Theory of Mind in Schizophrenia: Results From a Novel Paradigm

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Okruszek ◽  
Aleksandra Piejka ◽  
Ewa Szczepocka ◽  
Adam Wysokiński ◽  
Agnieszka Pluta
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Interaction Effect ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Cognitive Assessment ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Assessment Tool ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brief Cognitive Assessment ◽  
Verbal Theory

AbstractObjectives: Impairments of Theory of Mind (ToM) have been repeatedly demonstrated in patients with schizophrenia (SCZ). However, only a handful of studies have explored deficits in affective and cognitive subcomponents of ToM. Thus, this study aims to examine affective and cognitive ToM abilities in SCZ by using a novel, verbal paradigm. Methods: Twenty-four SCZ and 22 healthy comparison subjects (HC) completed a battery of tasks, which consisted of: (i) Brief Cognitive Assessment Tool for Schizophrenia (B-CATS), (ii) three well-established tasks measuring social cognitive abilities, and (iii) original tasks which assess ability to infer cognitive and affective mental states based on everyday verbal social interactions. Results: In line with previous findings, SCZ were outperformed by HC in all tasks. However, the interaction effect of the group and the task showed that cognitive (as opposed to affective) ToM was more profoundly impaired in patients with SCZ. Conclusions: It is proposed that in SCZ group cognitive ToM is more impaired as it involves more effortful reflective processes, while affective ToM, which is more automatic and based on reflexive processes, may differentiate patients from healthy comparison subjects to a lesser extent. (JINS, 2018, 24, 305–309)

scholarly journals Bilingualism and Healthy Aging: Onset Age of Bilingualism as a Predictor of Older Adult Theory of Mind

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 479-480
Author(s):  
W Quin Yow ◽  
Xiaoqian Li ◽  
Jia Wen Lee
Keyword(s):  
Second Language ◽  
Second Language Acquisition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Older Adult ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Onset Age ◽  
General Cognitive Ability ◽  
Age Related

Abstract The ability to understand and speak more than one language (i.e., bilingualism) may protect against age-related cognitive deterioration (Abutalebi et al., 2015). While there is mounting evidence suggesting that bilingualism confers advantages in domain-general cognitive abilities in late adulthood (see Bialystok, 2017, for a review), few studies have investigated the influences of bilingualism on socio-cognitive abilities such as theory of mind (ToM) in the normal aging process. Thus, in this study, we examine how bilingualism factors (i.e., onset age of bilingualism, language balance, and diversity in language use) are associated with individual differences in ToM in healthy older adult bilinguals aged 58-79 (N=44). ToM abilities were assessed using the Theory-of-Mind Task Battery (Hutchins et al., 2008), where participants viewed vignettes and answered questions about the protagonists’ cognitive and affective mental states. All participants completed a self-report language background questionnaire and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) test as a measure of general cognitive ability. Results revealed that better ToM was negatively correlated with participants’ chronological age (r=-.43, p=.004) and the onset age of second-language acquisition (r=-.41, p=.006), but not language balance and diversity (ps>.40). Partial regression analyses showed that earlier onset age of bilingualism predicted better ToM performance (β=-.40, p=.009), even after controlling for age, education, and general cognitive ability. These findings suggest that bilingual language experience, particularly earlier exposure to a second language, may provide benefits to older adults in preserving their ability to understand others’ mental states, acting as a cognitive reserve against age-related declines in socio-cognitive functions.

Sources of cognitive conflict and their relevance to Theory of Mind proficiency in healthy ageing. A preregistered study.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Foyzul Rahman ◽  
Sabrina Javed ◽  
Ian Apperly ◽  
Peter Hansen ◽  
Carol Holland ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Spatial Working Memory ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Response Speed ◽  
Cognitive Conflict ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Younger Adults ◽  
Age Related ◽  
Outcome Knowledge

Age-related decline in Theory of Mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about others’ mental states. We assessed how older (OA; n=50) versus younger adults (YA; n=50) were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued locations and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when representing a belief incongruent with one’s own. Individual differences in attention and motor response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through conflicting Self-Other perspectives. However, OAs were disproportionately affected by managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that previous studies may have underestimated OA’s ToM proficiency by including unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks.

DISCOURSE ON FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE: A THEORY OF MIND PERSPECTIVE

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Elena Botts
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Processes ◽  
Mind Theory ◽  
Improve Analysis ◽  
Epistemic Process

This article aims at explicating that can we usefully talk about a failure of intelligence and deliberating the perspective of mind theory into it. Failures of intelligence are useful insofar as they can be evaluated so as to improve analysis. In this process, it is important that one considers the psychological processes that underpin analytical failures. It is especially important to consider how failures of intelligence are governed by an insufficient ability to understand the perspectives of others. This ability to determine others mental states is known as the theory of mind. This paper further argues that discourse on the failure of intelligence is increased because of a flaw in the epistemic process among intelligence operators and consumers.

Thinking about Things

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Sainsbury
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Semantic Description ◽  
President Obama ◽  
Representational Theory Of Mind

In the blink of an eye, I can redirect my thought from London to Cairo, from cookies to unicorns, from former President Obama to the mythical flying horse, Pegasus. How is this possible? How can we think about things that do not exist, like unicorns and Pegasus? Thinking About Things addresses these and related questions, taking as its framework a representational theory of mind. It explains how mental states are attributed, what their aboutness consists in, whether or not they are relational, and whether any of them involve nonexistent things like unicorns. The explanation centers on display theory, a theory of what is involved in attributing attitudes like thinking, hoping, and wanting. These attributions are intensional: some of them seem to involve nonexistent things, and they typically have semantic and logical peculiarities, like the fact that one cannot always substitute one expression for another that refers to the same thing without affecting truth. Display theory explains away these seeming anomalies. For example, substituting coreferring expressions does not always preserve truth because the correctness of an attribution depends on what concepts it displays, not on what the concepts refer to. And a concept that refers to nothing may be used in an accurate display of what someone is thinking. The book describes how concepts can be learned, originated, and given a systematic semantic description, independently of whether there exist things to which they refer. There being no things we are thinking about does not mean that we are not thinking about things.

Do people with schizophrenia display theory of mind deficits in clinical interactions?

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. McCABE ◽  
I. LEUDAR ◽  
C. ANTAKI
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Health Professionals ◽  
Negative Symptoms ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Chronic Schizophrenia ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Behaviour Therapy ◽  
Cognitive Behaviour ◽  
Clinical Interactions ◽  
Therapy Sessions

Background. Having a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) means that one appreciates one's own and others' mental states, and that this appreciation guides interactions with others. It has been proposed that ToM is impaired in schizophrenia and experimental studies show that patients with schizophrenia have problems with ToM, particularly during acute episodes. The model predicts that communicative problems will result from ToM deficits.Method. We analysed 35 encounters (>80 h of recordings) between mental health professionals and people with chronic schizophrenia (out-patient consultations and cognitive behaviour therapy sessions) using conversation analysis in order to identify how the participants used or failed to use ToM relevant skills in social interaction.Results. Schizophrenics with ongoing positive and negative symptoms appropriately reported first and second order mental states of others and designed their contributions to conversations on the basis of what they thought their communicative partners knew and intended. Patients recognized that others do not share their delusions and attempted to reconcile others' beliefs with their own but problems arose when they try to warrant their delusional claims. They did not make the justification for their claim understandable for their interlocutor. Nevertheless, they did not fail to recognize that the justification for their claim is unconvincing. However, the ensuing disagreement did not lead them to modify their beliefs.Conclusions. Individuals with schizophrenia demonstrated intact ToM skills in conversational interactions. Psychotic beliefs persisted despite the realization they are not shared but not because patients cannot reflect on them and compare them with what others believe.

Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Methodological Solipsism ◽  
Semantic Properties

AbstractThe paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.

Did a Little Birdie Really Tell Odin? Applying Theory of Mind to Old Norse Religion

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 280-308
Author(s):  
Declan Taggart
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Old Norse ◽  
Viking Age ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Theory ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Theory of mind, the theory that humans attribute mental states to others, has become increasingly influential in the Cognitive Science of Religion in recent years, due to several papers which posit that supernatural agents, like gods, demons, and the dead, are accredited greater than normal knowledge and awareness. Using Old Norse mythology and literary accounts of Old Norse religion, supported by archaeological evidence, I examine the extent to which this modern perspective on religious theory of mind is reflected in religious traditions from the Viking Age. I focus especially on the extent to which superperception and superknowledge were attributed to Old Norse supernatural agents and the impact of this on expressions of religion; how the attribution of theory of mind varied with circumstances and the agents to which it was being attributed; and the extent to which features of religious theory of mind common in other societies were present in the historical North. On this basis, I also evaluate the usefulness of Old Norse historiography to Cognitive Science of Religion and vice versa.

scholarly journals The Interaction Between Caudate Nucleus and Regions Within the Theory of Mind Network as a Neural Basis for Social Intelligence

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Votinov ◽  
Artem Myznikov ◽  
Maya Zheltyakova ◽  
Ruslan Masharipov ◽  
Alexander Korotkov ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Caudate Nucleus ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Social Intelligence ◽  
Functional Integration ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Caudate Nuclei ◽  
Structural Peculiarity ◽  
The Right

The organization of socio-cognitive processes is a multifaceted problem for which many sophisticated concepts have been proposed. One of these concepts is social intelligence (SI), i.e., the set of abilities that allow successful interaction with other people. The theory of mind (ToM) human brain network is a good candidate for the neural substrate underlying SI since it is involved in inferring the mental states of others and ourselves and predicting or explaining others’ actions. However, the relationship of ToM to SI remains poorly explored. Our recent research revealed an association between the gray matter volume of the caudate nucleus and the degree of SI as measured by the Guilford-Sullivan test. It led us to question whether this structural peculiarity is reflected in changes to the integration of the caudate with other areas of the brain associated with socio-cognitive processes, including the ToM system. We conducted seed-based functional connectivity (FC) analysis of resting-state fMRI data for 42 subjects with the caudate as a region of interest. We found that the scores of the Guilford-Sullivan test were positively correlated with the FC between seeds in the right caudate head and two clusters located within the right superior temporal gyrus and bilateral precuneus. Both regions are known to be nodes of the ToM network. Thus, the current study demonstrates that the SI level is associated with the degree of functional integration between the ToM network and the caudate nuclei.

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