scholarly journals DuPont analysis was used to evaluate the operation of non-profit medical institutions in Chongqing

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03012
Author(s):  
Tian Guo ◽  
Weiwei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Cost Control ◽  
Drug Expenditure ◽  
Public Hospitals ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Operating Capacity ◽  
Medical Institutions ◽  
Dupont Analysis ◽  
Huge Impact ◽  
The Cost

It has been nearly eleven years since the reform of China’s medical and health system entered the final sprint stage in early 2008. During this period, great changes have taken place in China’s medical system, which has had a huge impact on the operation of public hospitals in China. This paper analyzes the key financial indicators of public hospitals in Chongqing from 2007 to 2017, including revenue and expenditure situation and structure, assets and liabilities situation and structure, finds out the problems in operation and puts forward suggestions. The key financial indicators of public hospitals in Chongqing were analyzed and evaluated by trend analysis, ratio analysis and DuPont analysis. The total revenue and expenditure of public hospitals in Chongqing increases with GDP year by year, the structure of revenue and expenditure has changed greatly, the debt level is reasonable, and the operating capacity is at a low level. The balance of drug revenue and expenditure in public hospitals is unbalanced, so it is necessary to strengthen the implementation of drug price adjustment plan; Public hospitals should strengthen the cost control, especially the cost control of drug expenditure, in order to meet the requirements of national policies and improve their own operating capacity.

scholarly journals Tension in New Zealand's Public Hospitals:  Performance Effects of Sharpening Incentives

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Adrian Slack
Keyword(s):  
Cost Control ◽  
Health Sector ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Public Hospitals ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Performance Effects ◽  
Crown Health

<p>New Zealand's health sector reforms in the mid-1990s introduced corporate institutions and market disciplines to public hospitals. Yet the reorganisation of New Zealand's public hospitals into Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) led to severe criticisms. Ultimately the CHEs were replaced with non-profit Hospital and Health Services. This thesis focuses on three major criticisms of the CHEs. We use game theory to provide a formal and novel analysis of interactions that could cause an organisation's performance to differ markedly from the reformers' expectations. The analysis explains how a stylised set of reforms could fail to achieve their objectives. Chapter 2 analyses public hospital throughput data over the reform period. We find that the CHE reforms were independently associated with an increase in hospitals' treatment costs. This chapter motivates the theoretical analyses of the three criticisms of the CHEs. We structure the theoretic analysis using an organisational hierarchy with four actors: a funder, an (hospital) administrator, a (medical) specialist and a (health) consumer. The first criticism was that CHE Boards paid bonuses despite managers failing to achieve performance targets. Chapter 3 examines when a funder may want to revise the budget of an organisation and to pay the administrator a bonus despite failing to meet a target. We introduce three features of the CHE reforms that conventional soft budget constraint models partly or entirely neglect: funder bargaining power, revisable targets and performance bonuses. A  flexible budget constraint paired with bonuses can be efficient in the light of uncertainty. The second criticism was that costs escalated despite strong managerial incentives for cost control. Chapter 4 argues that such incentives could disrupt trust in an organisation. We show that sharpening the administrator's incentives for cost control can create a misalignment between the administrator and the specialist and cause costs to escalate. Our result, that incentivising a measurable dimension of performance can worsen performance of that same task, contrasts with the conventional game-theoretic literature. The third criticism was that the reforms let doctors manipulate managers, resulting in inefficiency. The first model of Chapter 5 shows that an administrator might want to encourage a specialist to influence public opinion. We modify the first model to reflect a feature of the reforms: managerial efforts aimed at improving the organisation's operation. The administrator can damage a whistle-blower's credibility, to the detriment of specialists and patients. Both models give original insights into how the reforms could let an administrator take advantage of his role. In this multi-layered model, the administrator may intentionally reduce communication. The CHE reformers expected performance incentives to  flow through a corporate structure to improve efficiency. Rather than a cascade of beneficial incentives, incomplete contracts could cause unintentional negative interactions. Tension and perverse incentives could have caused costs to rise, necessitating budget revisions and additional bonus payments, while permitting administrators to silence whistle-blowers. This research shows how complex organisations that rely on soft information can benefit from systems that enhance trust and collaboration, and may be harmed by unhealthy tension.</p>

scholarly journals Tension in New Zealand's Public Hospitals:  Performance Effects of Sharpening Incentives

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Adrian Slack
Keyword(s):  
Cost Control ◽  
Health Sector ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Public Hospitals ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Performance Effects ◽  
Crown Health

<p>New Zealand's health sector reforms in the mid-1990s introduced corporate institutions and market disciplines to public hospitals. Yet the reorganisation of New Zealand's public hospitals into Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) led to severe criticisms. Ultimately the CHEs were replaced with non-profit Hospital and Health Services. This thesis focuses on three major criticisms of the CHEs. We use game theory to provide a formal and novel analysis of interactions that could cause an organisation's performance to differ markedly from the reformers' expectations. The analysis explains how a stylised set of reforms could fail to achieve their objectives. Chapter 2 analyses public hospital throughput data over the reform period. We find that the CHE reforms were independently associated with an increase in hospitals' treatment costs. This chapter motivates the theoretical analyses of the three criticisms of the CHEs. We structure the theoretic analysis using an organisational hierarchy with four actors: a funder, an (hospital) administrator, a (medical) specialist and a (health) consumer. The first criticism was that CHE Boards paid bonuses despite managers failing to achieve performance targets. Chapter 3 examines when a funder may want to revise the budget of an organisation and to pay the administrator a bonus despite failing to meet a target. We introduce three features of the CHE reforms that conventional soft budget constraint models partly or entirely neglect: funder bargaining power, revisable targets and performance bonuses. A  flexible budget constraint paired with bonuses can be efficient in the light of uncertainty. The second criticism was that costs escalated despite strong managerial incentives for cost control. Chapter 4 argues that such incentives could disrupt trust in an organisation. We show that sharpening the administrator's incentives for cost control can create a misalignment between the administrator and the specialist and cause costs to escalate. Our result, that incentivising a measurable dimension of performance can worsen performance of that same task, contrasts with the conventional game-theoretic literature. The third criticism was that the reforms let doctors manipulate managers, resulting in inefficiency. The first model of Chapter 5 shows that an administrator might want to encourage a specialist to influence public opinion. We modify the first model to reflect a feature of the reforms: managerial efforts aimed at improving the organisation's operation. The administrator can damage a whistle-blower's credibility, to the detriment of specialists and patients. Both models give original insights into how the reforms could let an administrator take advantage of his role. In this multi-layered model, the administrator may intentionally reduce communication. The CHE reformers expected performance incentives to  flow through a corporate structure to improve efficiency. Rather than a cascade of beneficial incentives, incomplete contracts could cause unintentional negative interactions. Tension and perverse incentives could have caused costs to rise, necessitating budget revisions and additional bonus payments, while permitting administrators to silence whistle-blowers. This research shows how complex organisations that rely on soft information can benefit from systems that enhance trust and collaboration, and may be harmed by unhealthy tension.</p>

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES TO ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF BUSINESS PROCESSES ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF AN ORGANIZATION

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 201-205
Author(s):  
A. L. GENDON ◽  
◽  
G. F. GOLUBEVA ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Business Processes ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Life Activity ◽  
Cost Of Production ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

The article reveals a system of financial indicators that characterize business processes, accounting for income and expenses according to Russian and international standards. The ways of increasing the efficiency of the company's life activity, in particular, the ways of reducing the cost of production, are considered.

Internal audit of accounting for the costs of auxiliary production in agricultural organizations

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-53
Author(s):  
Taigib Kamilovich Musaev
Keyword(s):  
Cost Control ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Cost Accounting ◽  
Agricultural Organizations ◽  
The Cost

The article presents the methodology for organizing and conducting an internal audit of cost accounting and calculating the cost of products (works, services) of auxiliary industries. The sequence of conducting internal audit of costs in the subdivisions of the auxiliary sphere is proposed. Working papers were developed within the proposed methodology for internal cost control

scholarly journals Primary Research of the Advantages and the Cost Control of the ABC & EVA Integrated System

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Haibo Hu
Keyword(s):  
Cost Control ◽  
Control Strategies ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Capital Cost ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Activity Based Costing ◽  
Cost System ◽  
Integrated Cost ◽  
The Cost

The integrated product of Activity-Based Costing (ABC) and Economic Value Added (EVA) is the ABC & EVA system, i.e. the integrated cost system. Traditional ABC method gives priority to the interior activity chain of enterprise to implement the cost analysis, but ignores the capital cost, so the cost accounting is not complete. The ABC & EVA system brings the capital cost into the cost management, which could not only open out the real economic value created by the cost objects, but extend the pure cost computation of ABC to the performance evaluation. Based on the principle of the ABC & EVA system, the enterprise cost control strategies under the integrated cost system are proposed.

scholarly journals Altruism in behavioural, motivational and evolutionary sense

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojana Radovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Reproductive Success ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Evolutionary Theories ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Material Benefits ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Sacrifice

This paper discusses the relations between three forms of altruism: behavioural, evolutionary and motivational. Altruism in a behavioural sense is an act that benefits another person. It can range from volunteering to a charity and helping a neighbour, to giving money to a non-profit organisation or donating blood. People often dedicate their material and nonmaterial resources for the benefit of others to gain psychological, social and material benefits for themselves. Thus, their altruistic acts are driven by egoistic motivation. Also, the final goal of an altruistic act may be the increase in the welfare of a group or adherence to a certain moral principle or a social norm. However, at least sometimes, the welfare of others is the ultimate goal of our actions, when our altruistic acts are performed from altruistic motivation. In evolutionary sense, altruism means the sacrifice of reproductive success for the benefit of other organisms. According to evolutionary theories, behaviour which promotes the reproductive success of the receiver at the cost of the actor is favoured by natural selection, because it is either beneficial for the altruist in the long run, or for his genes, or for the group he belongs to. However, altruism among people emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate and learned behaviours. Not only do we benefit the members of our own group, but we are capable of transcending our tribalistic instincts and putting the benefit of strangers at our own personal expense as our ultimate goal.

scholarly journals Effectiveness of Cost Control in Increasing Profit Operations

Sosio e-kons ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 10
Author(s):  
Marlina Nur Lestari ◽  
Nina Herlina ◽  
Risna Kartika
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Cost Control ◽  
Survey Method ◽  
Production Data ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Determination Coefficient ◽  
Operating Profit ◽  
Regression Test ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Test Correlation

<p><em>The purpose of this research is to know the effect of how much the cost control of production</em><em> </em><em>to operating profit. The method used in this research is the survey method with a descriptive quantitative approach. The data used is the cost of production data and profit data from CV Insan Lestari. with sample pick up used purposive sampling. The Data analysis method in this research is a regression test, correlation test, determination coefficient, and signification test. The result from a statistic test, there known about a positive correlation from cost control to the production with an operating profit, with determination coefficient are 75,1% and 24.9% are factors outside this research. With the signification test, the conclusion is, the cost control had affected the operating profit.</em><em></em></p>

scholarly journals ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT OF AN ENTERPRISE AS A TOOL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-130
Author(s):  
A.A. Navasardyan ◽  
◽  
I.G. Nuretdinov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Management ◽  
Environmental Safety ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Competitive Advantages ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Environmental Audit ◽  
Environmental Legislation ◽  
Environmental Image ◽  
Economic Tools ◽  
The Cost

The article deals with one of the economic tools for environmental management – environmental audit. Currently, this type of audit is in demand in the market of environmental services for several reasons – the presence of a good environmental image as one of the competitive advantages, and the prevention of violations of environmental legislation, etc. In addition, the work carried out a step-by-step calculation of the cost of audit services for a specific organization related to nature users operating category II facilities, taking into account its financial indicators, the scale of activities and other factors.

scholarly journals Analisis Penentuan Beban Pokok Produksi Pada Usaha Tempe Sumber Mas Jember

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 134
Author(s):  
Luqman Arif Baihaqi ◽  
Imam Mas'ud ◽  
Yosefa Sayekti
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Production Process ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Cost Control ◽  
Total Production ◽  
Cost Of Production ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Business Cost

This study aims to find out the system of business cost control of Tempe Sumber Mas. A Controling based difference between the calculation of the cost of production with cost of production of tempe using full costing. and This research uses Descriptive by Source and Technique Triangulation. The results of this study indicate that the cost control system used by the company is still simple and the calculation of the cost of production of tempe using full costing method is greater than calculate the total production cost used in the tempe production process. Keywords: Expense, Cost of Production, Full Costing, Cost Control

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