scholarly journals Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Jian ◽  
Yuyao Zhang ◽  
Lin Jiang ◽  
Jiafu Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Distributional Fairness ◽  
Fairness Concern

In this study, we examined the contract coordination between manufacturers with peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns. A revenue sharing contract was introduced to coordinate a competitive supply chain, in which the manufacturers have different fairness concerns based on centralized decision-making in terms of fairness neutrality. Then, we constructed two game models—the manufacturer’s peer-induced fairness concern model and the manufacturer’s distributional fairness concern model and analyzed the influence of a revenue sharing contract on the pricing decisions and profit distribution of a competitive supply chain considering fairness concerns. The results show that there is a revenue-sharing contract parameter in both the peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns of manufacturers, which can effectively realize Pareto improvements in a supply chain. Meanwhile, the retail and wholesale prices both decreased with the increase in the revenue-sharing ratio between retailers and manufacturers, and the profits of retailers decreased accordingly, but the overall utility of manufacturers and supply chains improved markedly. Moreover, the coordination condition is closely related to the level of fairness concerns of the manufacturers and the competition intensity between two manufacturers. The sharing contract designed in this study can not only effectively improve the utility of retailers and manufacturers but also enhance the total utility of the channel to ensure that node enterprises have long-term, stable, and cooperative relationships and to strengthen the overall competitiveness of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Reverse Supply Chains Considering Fairness Concern

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. 1657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Di Wu ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Ruyu Yan ◽  
Ruijun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Transfer Price ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Offline Channels

The fierce competition in the recycling industry and the rapid development of internet technology has prompted recycling centers to develop a dual-channel reverse supply chain with both offline and online recycling channels. After the introduction of online channels, recycling centers and third-party recyclers (TPR) have paid attention to the division of profits in supply chain systems and the behavior of fairness concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to help recycling enterprises make pricing decisions in consideration of fairness concerns. This paper is aimed at answering the following two main questions: (1) When the recycling center or TPR have fairness concerns, how does the optimal pricing and revenue of supply chain members change when both sides are neutral? (2) When the fairness concern coefficient changes, how does the overall revenue of the supply chain system change? How should supply chain members adjust their pricing decisions to maximize their own profits? In order to solve the above problems, Stackelberg game models were made from three aspects: both sides are neutral, only the TPR has fairness concerns, and only the recycling center has fairness concerns. Based on the results of the example analyses for the model, we found that when only the TPR has fairness concerns, the profit of the recycling center and the transfer price of offline channels will decrease, while the profit of TPR is the opposite. Furthermore, when only a recycling center has fairness concerns, it will lead to the reduction of not only the recycling price and transfer price of offline channels, but also the profits of the entire supply chain system. Specially, whether it is for a recycling center or TPR, a lower level of fairness concern coefficient has a stronger impact on pricing and revenue than at high levels.

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Assessing the coordinated revenue-sharing contract of China’s farmer-supermarket direct-purchase model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Peng Liang ◽  
Melat Sima ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Xiaoyu Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Long Term Stability ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Promotional Efforts

China began connecting farmers directly with supermarkets 10 years ago, when they were at a disadvantage and forced to sell products at low prices, as unstable cooperation among supply chain participants led to inequitable distribution of revenue. Revenue-sharing contracts offer a risk-sharing approach to ensure supply chain coordination and optimize profit for all. Research on short life cycle products with revenue-sharing contracts assume stable prices or investigate the effects of revenue-sharing contracts on supply chain coordination. This study introduced a revenue-sharing contract model into a ‘farmer-supermarket direct-purchase’ supply chain, considering price fluctuation and retail promotional efforts, stochastic market demand, among other factors. Revenue-sharing contracts achieved long-term stability in supply chain coordination, all participants obtained more profits, and the size of revenue-sharing parameter depends on the position and bargaining power of all participants. A case study on Tianhong supermarket and Nanxia farmer cooperative verified these findings, eliciting practical implications for professionals and policymakers.

scholarly journals Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Wei ◽  
Liyang Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Fashion Products ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Investment Level

This paper investigates optimal decisions in a two-stage fashion product supply chain under two specified contracts: revenue-sharing contract and wholesale price contract, where demand is dependent on retailing price and sales effort level. Optimal decisions and related profits are analyzed and further compared among the cases where the effort investment fee is determined and undertaken either by the retailer or the manufacturer. Results reveal that if the retailer determines the effort investment level, she would be better off under the wholesale price contract and would invest more effort. However, if the manufacturer determines the effort level, he prefers to the revenue-sharing contract most likely if both parties agree on consignment.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Competitive Fairness-Concerned Collectors

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yadong Shu ◽  
Ying Dai ◽  
Zujun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Competitive Strength ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Utility System ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

Based on the Shapley value fairness concern framework, a fairness concern utility system is established for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one manufacturer, one retailer, and two competitive collectors. Under the five models (one centralized and four decentralized), the influence of competitive strength and fairness concern degree of collectors on the pricing decisions is analyzed. The following conclusions can be obtained: (1) When the manufacturer considers the fairness concern of the collectors, fairness concern is a way for the collectors to obtain more profit. Whether the manufacturer “proactively” considers the fairness concern of the collectors is an approach to benefiting the collectors but only in the case of “active” consideration, there is less self-loss to the manufacturer. (2) When the collectors’ fairness concern cannot be considered by the manufacturer, the equilibrium recycling price sets lower for the purpose of achieving more profit by the collectors. At this point, the profit of the collectors and the manufacturer is the lowest, and so is the return rate of the CLSC. (3) When the collectors do not care about whether they are being fairly treated but the manufacturer “actively” takes the fairness of the collectors into consideration, the collectors get “unexpected” attention from the manufacturer, which makes the performance of the collectors more positive than it is when their fairness concerns are taken into account. The profit increased by the collectors is more than that lost by the manufacturer, so the profit of the CLSC is the largest. Additionally, our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision in the case where the collectors consider fairness concern.

scholarly journals Revenue-Sharing Contract Models for Logistics Service Supply Chains with Mass Customization Service

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Xuan Zhao ◽  
Runze Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Mass Customization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
One To One ◽  
The One ◽  
Service Supply Chains

The revenue-sharing contract is one of the most important supply chain coordination contracts; it has been applied in various supply chains. However, studies related to service supply chains with mass customization (MC) are lacking. Considering the equity of benefit distribution between the members of service supply chains, in this paper, we designed two revenue-sharing contracts. The first contract for the maximum equity of a single logistics service integrator (LSI) and single functional logistics service provider (FLSP) in a two-echelon logistics service supply chain was designed by introducing the fair entropy function (“one to one” model). Furthermore, the method is extended to a more complex supply chain, which consists of a single LSI and multiple FLSPs. A new contract was designed not only for considering the equity of an LSI and each FLSP but also for the equity between each FLSP (“one toN” model). The “one to one” model in three-echelon LSSC is also provided. The result exemplifies that, whether in the “one to one” model or “one toN” model, there exists a best interval of customized level when the revenue-sharing coefficient reaches its maximum.

scholarly journals Exclusivity or Competitor Retail? Impacts of Channel Structures on Multinational Supply Chains considering Green Manufacturing

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Luqing Rong ◽  
Maozeng Xu ◽  
Xiaofeng Chen ◽  
Qian Wen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Green Manufacturing ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Competitive Structure

The development of green supply chains by multinational manufacturers (MNMs) in emerging markets promotes a better corporate reputation and competitive advantage. Selecting viable marketing channels will help reduce risks in overseas markets while positively impacting the green level and the stakeholders. This paper analyzes channel decisions under different scenarios in a game analytical framework and identifies that both exclusive and competitive channels promote the green supply chain, and that the latter leads to a higher green level and benefits the local manufacturer. Whatever profit-seeking or corporate social responsibility- (CSR-) seeking follows, the MNM prefers the competitive channel when the green research and development (R&D) investment coefficient is relatively low and vice versa for the exclusive channel. Moreover, transaction cost undermines the green supply chain, the competitive structure lowers the loss of greenness, and the exclusionary mode raises the MNM’s profits. Another interesting finding is when subsidies are offered by the importing country, the competitive structure is more conducive to the green and the participant’s gains, while the exclusive structure is detrimental to the green and only advantageous for the domestic manufacturer’s benefits. Besides, the revenue-sharing contract results in a higher green level of the supply chain in the channels than before, but the MNM tends to select the exclusive marketing channel with a relatively lower green level due to the profits. Subject to the findings, we propose an improved revenue-sharing contract that achieves the MNM’s competitive retailing option and ensures the emergence of the manufacturers’ win-win solution.

Decision making and coordination of fresh agriculture product supply chain considering fairness concerns

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1248
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Yan-Ru Chen ◽  
Shi-You He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Behavioral Tendencies ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Overall Effectiveness

This paper investigates decisions in a supply chain of fresh agricultural products considering fairness concerns. By considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer, this paper discusses the effect of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns and the retailer’s fairness concerns on the fresh agriculture product supply chain within the framework of Nash bargaining. Meanwhile, a revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain with fairness concerns. The results show that the manufacturer’s behavioral tendency of fairness concerns will reduce their fresh-keeping effort; thereby, the freshness of products and market demand will also decrease. The behavioral tendencies of fairness concerns of both sides reduce the overall effectiveness of the supply chain and adversely affect the stability of the fresh produce supply chain. Both the optimal retail price and the fresh-keeping effort can be achieved while all parties get higher utilities under the revenue-sharing contract in comparison to the case without coordination.

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document