Autocratic Regimes and Struggles for Power

Non-democratic regimes have increasingly moved beyond merely suppressing online discourse, and are shifting toward proactively subverting and co-opting social media for their own purposes. Namely, social media is increasingly being used to undermine the opposition, to shape the contours of public discussion, and to cheaply gather information about falsified public preferences. Social media is thus becoming not merely an obstacle to autocratic rule but another potential tool of regime durability. I lay out four mechanisms that link social media co-optation to autocratic resilience: 1) counter-mobilization, 2) discourse framing, 3) preference divulgence, and 4) elite coordination. I then detail the recent use of these tactics in mixed and autocratic regimes, with a particular focus on Russia, China, and the Middle East. This rapid evolution of government social media strategies has critical consequences for the future of electoral democracy and state-society relations.

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US move against Israeli firm will not slow spyware use

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db266088 ◽

2021 ◽

Keyword(s):

Private Sector ◽

Regulatory Reform ◽

Democratic Accountability ◽

Content Type ◽

Western Countries ◽

Autocratic Regimes

Significance Reports about this spyware’s widespread use to target activists and critics have tarnished the company, which on November 3 was blacklisted by US President Joe Biden’s administration. This prohibits US entities from purchasing NSO Group products. Impacts Calls for regulatory reform to limit the development, use and export of spyware capabilities will increase in Western countries The private sector in Israel and elsewhere will continue to play a major role in the development of the lucrative global spyware market. Autocratic regimes and states with weak democratic accountability will actively use spyware as more business shifts online.

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Introduction

The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190918309.003.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 1-12

Author(s):

Nils B. Weidmann ◽

Espen Geelmuyden Rød

Keyword(s):

Internet Technology ◽

The Internet ◽

Scientific Debate ◽

Fine Grained ◽

Information And Communication ◽

Internet Penetration ◽

Autocratic Regimes

The introduction of the book starts out by distinguishing between two narratives about the effect of the Internet in autocratic systems: According to “liberation technology” proponents, Internet technology is likely to empower activists in autocracies by reducing autocratic governments ability to control the ow of information and communication, while the “repression technology” perspective emphasizes the sinister ways by which autocratic regimes can use the Internet for propaganda and surveillance. The chapter argues that in order to advance the scientific debate, research should move beyond this overly simple distinction, and needs to identify the conditions under which this technology helps protesters vs. when it benefits dictators. This requires a more nuanced conception of protest and its different stages, but also better, more fine-grained data of protest and Internet penetration.

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The Expected Utility of Insurance

The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198845027.003.0002 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 8-47

Author(s):

Brad Epperly

Keyword(s):

Expected Utility ◽

Judicial Independence ◽

Utility Model ◽

Personal Security ◽

Power Means ◽

Democratic Regimes ◽

The Future ◽

Autocratic Regimes ◽

Expected Utility Model

This chapter offers a new version of popular “insurance” models of judicial independence, in which the competitiveness of the electoral arena induces leaders to prefer more independent courts, as a means of offering policy and personal security if they lose power. That is, paying the “premium” of increased constraints on behavior imposed by independent courts now for the insurance of protection in the future if out of office. The crux of the argument is that the risks associated with losing power in autocratic regimes are greater than in democracies, and therefore competition should be more salient in dictatorships than democracies. The stakes are higher because autocratic power means access to wealth and state resources in a way rarely equaled in democratic regimes, and more importantly the likelihood of being punished after leaving office is greater for former autocrats. Judiciaries exercising greater independence, however, can minimize the risks of being a former leader, and the chapter leverages this finding to develop an expected utility model, the empirical implication of which is higher salience of competition—when present—in autocracies. Unlike previous theories of how competition affects independence, this model integrates both the likelihood of losing office and the risks associated with such an outcome, and thus allows us to examine the phenomena across the democracy/dictatorship divide.

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14. Democratization and Regime Change

Politics in the Developing World ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198737438.003.0014 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Lise Rakner

Keyword(s):

Developing Countries ◽

International Development ◽

Regime Change ◽

Developing World ◽

Good Governance ◽

Democratic Consolidation ◽

Governance Regime ◽

Measuring Democracy ◽

Recent Trends ◽

Autocratic Regimes

This chapter explores the link between democratization and regime change in the developing world. It begins with a discussion of theories of democratization, along with recent trends and understandings of democratic consolidation. It then considers variations within democratic and autocratic regimes and the different ways of measuring democracy. It also examines how domestic and international factors interact to affect politics in developing countries in general and processes of democratization in particular. Finally, it evaluates international dimensions of democratization, focusing on the significance of democratization for international development. It reflects on how the global good governance regime is adopting to a world that is no longer bipolar and in which U.S. (Western) hegemonic power is reduced.

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Leader Succession and Civil War

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414019852712 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 53 (3-4) ◽

pp. 434-468 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Andrej Kokkonen ◽

Anders Sundell

Keyword(s):

Civil War ◽

Political Science ◽

Political Stability ◽

Leadership Succession ◽

Leader Succession ◽

Autocratic Regimes

Leadership succession is a perennial source of instability in autocratic regimes. Despite this, it has remained a curiously understudied phenomenon in political science. In this article, we compile a novel and comprehensive dataset on civil war in Europe and combine it with data on the fate of monarchs in 28 states over 800 years to investigate how autocratic succession affected the risk of civil war. Exploiting the natural deaths of monarchs to identify exogenous variation in successions, we find that successions substantially increased the risk of civil war. The risk of succession wars could, however, be mitigated by hereditary succession arrangements (i.e., primogeniture—the principle of letting the oldest son inherit the throne). When hereditary monarchies replaced elective monarchies in Europe, succession wars declined drastically. Our results point to the importance of the succession, and the institutions governing it, for political stability in autocratic regimes.

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Conquering and coercing: Nonviolent anti-regime protests and the pathways to democracy

Journal of Peace Research ◽

10.1177/0022343319830267 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 56 (5) ◽

pp. 650-666 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Nam Kyu Kim ◽

Alex M Kroeger

Keyword(s):

Indirect Effects ◽

Empirical Support ◽

Authoritarian Regime ◽

Authoritarian Regimes ◽

Direct And Indirect Effects ◽

Democratic Transitions ◽

Leadership Change ◽

Autocratic Regimes ◽

Leader Survival ◽

Empirical Analyses

Recent research finds an association between nonviolent protests and democratic transitions. However, existing scholarship either does not specify the pathways through which nonviolent protests bring about democratization or conduct systematic empirical analyses demonstrating that the specified pathways are operative. This article proposes four pathways through which nonviolent anti-regime protests encourage democratic transitions, emphasizing their ability to directly conquer or indirectly coerce such transitions. Most simply, they can conquer democratic reforms by directly overthrowing authoritarian regimes and installing democracies. They can also coerce democratic reforms through three additional pathways. Nonviolent anti-regime protests can coerce incumbent elites into democratic reforms by threatening the survival of authoritarian regimes. They also increase the likelihood of elite splits, which promote negotiated democratic reforms. Finally, they encourage leadership change within the existing authoritarian regime. Following leadership change, nonviolent movements remain mobilized and are able to coerce democratic concessions from the regime’s new leaders. Our within-regime analyses provide robust empirical support for each pathway. We show that nonviolent anti-regime protests conquer democratic reforms by ousting autocratic regimes and replacing them with democracies. Nonviolent anti-regime protests also coerce elites into democratic reforms by threatening regime and leader survival. These findings highlight the importance of protest goals and tactics and also that nonviolent anti-regime protests have both direct and indirect effects on democratization.

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Explaining the Paradox of Plebiscites

Government and Opposition ◽

10.1017/gov.2018.16 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 55 (2) ◽

pp. 202-219

Author(s):

Matt Qvortrup ◽

Brendan O’Leary ◽

Ronald Wintrobe

Keyword(s):

Ethnic Fractionalization ◽

Autocratic Regimes ◽

Foregone Conclusion

AbstractRecent referendums show that autocratic regimes consult voters even if the outcome is a foregone conclusion. They have been doing so with increasing frequency since Napoleon consulted French citizens in 1800. Why and when do dictatorial regimes hold referendums they are certain they will win? Analysing the 162 referendums held in autocratic and non-free states in the period 1800–2012, the article shows that referendums with a 99% yes-vote tend to occur in autocracies with high ethnic fractionalization and, in part, in sultanistic (tinpot or tyrannical) regimes, but generally not in communist (totalitarian) states. An explanation is proposed for this variation.

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Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies

Conflict Management and Peace Science ◽

10.1177/0738894219836285 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 37 (5) ◽

pp. 559-579 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Abel Escribà-Folch ◽

Tobias Böhmelt ◽

Ulrich Pilster

Keyword(s):

Authoritarian Regime ◽

Authoritarian Regimes ◽

Civil Military Relations ◽

Weak Institutions ◽

Regime Types ◽

Quantitative Analyses ◽

Autocratic Regimes ◽

The 1960S ◽

Military Relations

How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.

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