Comments on “Fiscal Decentralization in Japan: Does it Harden the Budgets of Local Governments?”

2006 ◽  
pp. 140-152
Author(s):  
Daniel Citrin ◽  
Masayoshi Hayashi
2004 ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
A. Chernyavsky ◽  
K. Vartapetov

By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.


Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leqian Ouyang ◽  
Daming You

One of the main purposes of the 2015 Environmental Protection Law (EPL) of the People's Republic of China is to boost the green innovation of the enterprises. Using heavy-polluting enterprises as examples, this paper uses the Difference-in-difference analysis (DDD) technique to analyze the influence of EPL on the green innovation of enterprises under fiscal decentralization and enterprise heterogeneity. Results show that EPL exerts a negative impact on the green innovation of heavy-polluting enterprises at the national level, as well as those in the central and western areas specifically. The only presence of positive motivation for green innovation is being found in the eastern area, although, the motivation seems to be insignificant. The negative impacts have been lasting in the long run, especially for the low-performance enterprises in the central areas. As for the targeted implementation of EPL in China, local governments should make the best use of financial power under fiscal decentralization. This balanced approach is designed to motivate enterprises in different regions with various performance levels to develop green innovation based on their different weaknesses and strengths.


Yurispruden ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 208
Author(s):  
Fahrul Abrori

 ABSTRAKPandemi Covid-19 yang terjadi di Indonesia membuat pemerintah membuat kebijakan-kebijakan sebagai stimulus untuk menjaga kestabilan masyarakat dan perekonomian. Pemerintah pusat memberikan kewenangan kepada pemerintah daerah untuk mengelola keuangan daerah untuk menangani covid-19 di daerah masing-masing. Hal ini disebabkan karena pemerintah daerah lebih memahami kebutuhan daerahnya. Permasalahan yang diangkat Pertama, bagaimana hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah dalam pengelolaan keuangan untuk penanganan pandemi Covid-19? Kedua, Apa peran Pemerintah Daerah dalam pengelolaan keuangan daerah untuk penanganan pandemi Covid-19? Menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konsep. Hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah dalam Pengelolaan Keuangan untuk Penanganan Pandemi Covid-19 yaitu desentralisasi fiskal yang mana. Peran Pemerintah Daerah dalam Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah untuk Penanganan Pandemi Covid-19 yaitu dengan melakukan refocusing kegiatan, realokasi anggaran, dan Penggunaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah.Kata kunci: Pemerintah Daerah, Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah, Pandemi Covid-19 ABSTRACTThe Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia led the government to make policies as a stimulus to maintain the stability of society and the economy. The central government authorizes local governments to manage local finances to deal with covid-19 in their respective regions. This is because the local government better understands the needs of the region. The issue raised first, how is the relationship between the Central Government and Local Government in financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic? Second, What is the role of local governments in regional financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic? Using normative juridical research methods with statutory approaches and concept approaches. The relationship between the Central Government and Local Government in Financial Management for the Handling of the Covid-19 Pandemic is fiscal decentralization. The role of local governments in regional financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic is by refocusing activities, reallocating budgets, and using regional budgets.Keywords: Local Government, Regional Financial Management, Covid-19 Pandemic


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip J. Bryson

In the transition experience, the Czech and Slovak Republics have made some effort to achieve fiscal decentralization. From independence to EU accession, the devolution of power designed to strengthen the autonomy of local governments according to the principles of subsidiarity have also included a reform of public administration. The nature of reform efforts and their implications for fiscal decentralization are analyzed. The failure to achieve a robust autonomy for subnational governments is due to the ongoing adherence to the notion of “state administration” as opposed to self-government in both republics.


Author(s):  
Mehmet Serkan Tosun ◽  
Dilek Uz ◽  
Serdar Yılmaz

There have been important developments in the decentralization of the government structure in Turkey since the early 1980s. This paper examines the link between fiscal decentralization and local borrowing within Turkish provinces. It first discusses local government reforms throughout the history of the Turkish Republic with the focus on recent reform efforts and current local government structure. It then provides an empirical analysis of the effects of decentralization in Turkish provinces using cross-sectional and panel data approaches, and spatial econometrics. The dataset consists of 67 provinces from 1980 to 2000, and separately cross-sectional data on all 81 provinces for the year 2000. Using decentralization measures such as number of local governments per capita and ratio of own-source municipal revenue to total provincial tax revenue, and specific characteristics of the municipalities the analysis examines whether variations in local decentralization across these provinces and across time have had a significant impact municipal borrowing in those provinces.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-138
Author(s):  
Benedictus Raksaka Mahi ◽  
Syarah Siti Supriyanti

The volatility of expenditures sub-local derived from central government transparency in transfers to local governments may aggravate sublocal economy. This study aims to analyze the eect of fiscal decentralization to the level of volatility of local government spending in 230 sub-local in Indonesia. We use two periods, before and after the implementation of Law No. 28 Year 2009. The regression results indicate that the volatility of local government spending may decrease if the degree of fiscal decentralization increases, especially at the time when districts implement that law. As responsive taxation can provide incentives for smooth spending for sub-local government. ================================= Volatilitas belanja pemerintah kabupaten/kota yang berasal dari ketidakpastian transfer pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah daerah dapat memperburuk perekonomian kabupaten/kota. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis pengaruh desentralisasi fiskal terhadap tingkat volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah pada 230 kabupaten/kota di Indonesia serta membandingkan data sebelum dan sesudah implementasi UU No. 28 Tahun 2009. Hasil menunjukkan semakin tinggi derajat desentralisasi fiskal, cenderung menurunkan volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah kabupaten/kota karena kemampuan fiskal kabupaten/kota cenderung meningkat setelah implementasi UU tersebut. Pajak properti merupakan sumber penerimaan daerah yang dapat diprediksi sehingga pemerintah kabupaten/kota dapat mengelola belanja daerahnya dengan lebih pasti dan terukur.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 1234-1255
Author(s):  
Mohammad Arzaghi ◽  
Andrew Balthrop

Rents from natural resources can alter the relationship between central and local governments by providing a new source of government financing. We develop a model to explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and resource abundance. Our model indicates that natural resource rents can detach central government expenditures from the tax base so that the central government can spend more to persuade a fractious periphery to remain under central government control. Thus, other things being equal, higher natural resource rents can result in less decentralized government expenditures. We empirically explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and natural resource rents using a panel of 60 countries over the past 40 years. Empirical results support our economic model: A 1% increase in natural resource rents as a fraction of gross domestic product results in government expenditures that are 0.53% less decentralized.


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